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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Al-Karaeen, Fawaz Khalil. Ph.D., Department of Industrial, Biomedical, and Human 
Factors Engineering, Wright State University, 2006. Characterizing Battlefield Human 
Decision Making with Value Focused Thinking and Reliability Modeling. 
 
 
 
 Military officers and soldiers in combat are faced with complex, time-critical 
decision problems. The battlefield, or combat, environment involves decisive operations 
under unpredictable and rapidly changing conditions. Decisions in battlefields take place 
under uncertain, time constrained conditions and in a tactical environment. A battlefield 
decision maker encounters a dynamic information environment. During combat, 
individuals gather and consider information from a variety of sources to determine what 
information is reliable and useful, and what information is not. There is a clear 
correlation between the decision making process and the value of information feeding 
that process. This research examines a decision making model applicable to the 
battlefield space, a reliability of information model, and then a combined model 
integrating the individual models. The decision making model will exploit the value-
focused thinking paradigm. The reliability model will capture information degradation 
considerations after deriving and defining a new reliability of information concept. The 
combined model will provide a means to capture and examine the dynamics of battlefield 
decision making by linking the value-focused thinking model and the information 
reliability model. The linked model (Integrated Model) has more advantages and it is 
more useful than existing models of battlefield decision making. Each effort represents a 
novel approach and a unique contribution of this research. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 General Discussion 
 The battlefield, or combat, environment involves decisive operations under 
unpredictable and rapidly changing conditions. Decisions in battlefields take place under 
uncertain, time constrained conditions and in a tactical environment. Battlefield decisions 
are difficult for many reasons. For instance, a decision may involve risks especially when 
there is uncertainty about the consequences of the decision. Military battlefield decisions 
also involve conflicting objectives so even the evaluation of the alternatives is difficult. 
 Military officers and soldiers in combat are faced with complex decision 
problems. The result of their decisions affects a large number of people and vast array of 
resources. For a long time these decisions were made using standard procedures or by 
relying on personal experience. Modern technology, particularly computer simulations, 
has provided improved training experiences. These new training models still fall short in 
capturing the battlefield decision making process. In fact, most models fall short in 
accurately modeling human decision making. This research targets this shortcoming. 
 The military views decision making as both science and art. Battle command is 
divided into two categories: command and control. The art of command is the arena of 
the commander where he tries to predict the future, make decisions based on those 
predictions, and lead his troops. Control is the science of the battle command staff. 
Commander staffs compute requirements, apply means and resources to achieve the 
commander’s intentions, and monitor the status of the operation (TCAICE, 2006). 
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 General Maxwell in 1981 (as referenced in Lykke, 2000) characterized a strategy 
as consisting of objectives, ways and means. This general concept can be used as a basis 
for the formulation of any type strategy whether it is political, military, or economical. 
 Strategists, Planners, Commanders, and team leaders are all concerned with ways 
to employ means to achieve objectives. Due to the criticality of the decisions and the 
importance of deploying the strategies, a systematic structured approach to problem 
solving and decision making is needed. In practice, a commander’s approach is honed by 
actual and exercise experience. In creating computational models, the commander’s 
approach must be understood and specified. This model approach is needed to not only 
understand the actual decision making process but also to create better models of the 
process. 
 To help improve their decision making process, any individual should be aware of 
what is happening around them. Military decision making is significantly affected by the 
environment in which individuals make decisions especially on the basis of received 
information. A future command decision may depend on what happened in the past. If 
commanders are given false information, or even valuable information late, it may lead 
them to incorrect problem identification and thus poor decisions.  
 A battlefield decision maker encounters a dynamic information environment. 
During combat, individuals gather and consider information from a variety of sources to 
determine what information is reliable and useful, and what information is not. Tactical 
military information is particularly uncertain. The uncertainty of information depends on 
many factors, including the source, reliability, and age of information. The information 
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must be fielded into a decision making system quickly. The cost of delaying the 
information can be quite high. 
 The temporal value of information can and should be modeled when modeling 
decisions. In battlefields, the value of information degrades along time. The probability 
of degradation along time can be modeled using certain probability distributions. 
However, current models do not model information degradation in this manner and in 
fact fail to explicitly link decision making and information models. This research will 
initiate the means to overcome this deficiency. 
 There is a clear correlation between the decision making process and the value of 
information feeding that process. This research examines a decision making model 
applicable to the battlefield space, a reliability of information model, and then a 
combined model to capture both of the individual models. The decision making model 
will exploit the value-focused thinking paradigm. The reliability model will capture 
information degradation considerations. The combined model will provide a means to 
capture and examine the dynamics of battlefield decision making. Each effort represents 
a novel approach and a unique contribution of this research.  
1.2 Past Efforts 
 The following paragraphs describe some of the past efforts applied to the general 
area of battlefield decision making. 
1.2.1 Decision Analytic Methods 
 The first extensive use of formal analytic methods as an aid to military decision 
making was made by operations analysis teams in World War II (Quade, 2000). A typical 
 4 
example of an operations analysis problem was the selection of the bomber formation in 
attacking targets deep in Germany.  
 An early outstanding example of the use of decision analysis techniques, one that 
had a significant impact on United States strategic policy, was the “Selection and Use of 
Strategic Air Bases” in Europe. The project was carried out by the RAND society in 
1951, and a full report was published in 1954 (as referenced in Quade, 2000). The project 
main concern was to deter a possible Soviet attack on Western Europe. The general 
objective was the deterrence of such an attack based on the unilateral atomic capability. 
The decision problem was to analyze where and how to base the strategic Air Force and 
how to operate this force in conjunction with the base system chosen and the main 
objective. 
 The cold war period provided the United States with the most academically 
rigorous and enduring theories of conflict in the history of war studies. Beene (2002) 
translated some of the theory developed during the cold war era into terms to make it 
relevant to strategies and force structures today. Decision analysis techniques, value-
focused thinking in particular, were used to create a framework for assessing the 
contribution of force structure toward achieving national strategic goals and the 
contribution of strategy toward achieving national policy goals. Beene assessed the US 
national strategy by breaking it down into a hierarchy to provide focus and organization. 
His work highlights the unique nature of the US national strategy from a decision 
analysis perspective. The techniques were illustrated using a specific context example, a 
coercion strategy wherein the US seeks to compel an adversary to reverse its military 
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action against a friendly state. The contribution of military force to a strategy of coercion 
was analyzed and investigated. 
 TCAICE (2006) presents the Tactical Decision Making Process (TDMP), defined 
as, “The process in the military version of the decision making tailored to the unique 
needs of the military”. The TDMP involves four essential steps: mission analysis, course 
of action development, course of action analysis/comparison, and finally decision and 
execution. 
 The mission analysis step begins with the review of the commander’s intent and 
ends with the commander approval of the restated mission. The course of action 
development step starts after receiving the commander’s guidance; the entire staff 
develops courses of action to identify and retain for subsequent analysis to achieve the 
mission. The course of action analysis/comparison step starts after the courses of action 
are developed; the staff analyzes each course of action and compares them to identify the 
best course of action to recommend to the commander. Finally, the execution step occurs 
when the commander selects the course of action he feels is most advantageous.  
 TCAICE (2006) views the tactical decision making process as having three 
methodologies: deliberate decision making, combat decision making, quick decision 
making. 
• Deliberate decision making is characterized by maximum planning time and the 
involvement of staff and the opportunity to examine many courses of action. 
• Combat decision making is used when time is constrained. The process usually is 
commander driven. 
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• Quick decision making is used when the commander has no staff, the staff is not 
readily available, or when there is a crisis or emergency requiring a decision. 
 Murray (2002) presented a systematic approach for defense decision making. The 
approach is based on executive decision making applicable to senior military officers or 
career defense civilians involved in complex decisions that affect the long term 
capabilities of the military organization, force structure, organization, modernizations, 
policy, and the welfare of the nation.  
 In Murray’s type of decision problems, a time frame boundary is not a direct 
constraint. Such is not the case in combat decisions problems where the time is almost 
always a binding constraint. Information value degradation along the time horizon in the 
executive decision making process is not as critical when compared to the temporal 
aspects of the combat decision making process. 
 Allen (2005) identified the current external influences on command decision 
making. He investigated how these influences have necessitated a change in the 
command decision making process. He concluded that experience is the main factor in 
military decision making. A specified decision model (the Recognition-Primed Decision 
model, RPD) was used to support his findings. The origin of RPD stemmed from the 
recognition of the human strengths and weaknesses that impact on how well people do 
under adverse decision making problems. The model is based on the fusion of two 
processes: the way decision makers size up the situation to recognize which course of 
action applied, and the way decision makers evaluate the course of action by imagining 
the execution of that course of action (Klein, 1992). 
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 Buede and Bresnick (1992) discussed applications of decision analysis in the 
military systems acquisition process. They discussed applications in the four major 
phases of the acquisition process. These phases were derived by White and Hendrix (as 
referred in Bude and Bresnick, 1992). The use of decision analysis can provide the 
defensible decisions that should be produced by the acquisition process. The acquisition 
process can not be separated from the planning, programming, and budgeting system 
(PPBS) founded by McNamara in 1961 (as referred in Bude and Bresnick, 1992). They 
presented a methodology for linking systems acquisition to PPBS by allocating resources 
to the systems. 
 John, Callan, and Proctor (2000) experimentally examined the effects of uncertain 
battlefield information on the nature of tactical decisions. In their first experiment, they 
investigated whether decision making can be improved by how information is displayed. 
For this purpose, they developed textual and graphical representations of uncertain enemy 
intent and future troop movements on realistic battlefield maps. 
 In a second experiment, they investigated how uncertainty affects the tactical 
decision making and how adverse effects of uncertainty can be minimized or eliminated. 
They designed an experiment to examine the effect of situation uncertainty on decision 
time and choice of battle plan in a series of three controlled tactical scenarios. 
 Islam, Biswal, and Alam (1997) verified the applicability of the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) to the problem of choosing the best transport aircraft among 
several alternatives, using Saaty’s (1990) suggestion (as referred in Islam, Biswal, and 
Alam, 1997) of clustering alternatives into groups according to a common attribute. 
Saaty’s clustering technique is valid when the number of alternatives is high and the 
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evaluation scores of alternatives on the criteria are widely dispersed. The procedure starts 
by breaking down the decision problem to construct the hierarchy of inter-related 
decision elements. Then it adopts a subjective suitable scale to rank all the alternatives 
with respect to a certain criterion. It then makes clusters of alternatives having closure 
magnitudes and finds the priority weights of all the alternatives belonging to each of the 
clusters. Finally, the procedure obtains the ranking of all the alternatives by applying the 
usual principle of hierarchal composition. Islam, Biswal, and Alam (1997) solved the 
problem of choosing the best transportation aircraft using the traditional AHP and using 
the clustering procedure. They concluded that in the clustering procedure, the number of 
comparisons required is much less than that required in the unified approach and the 
rankings that result are sufficiently close to the standard AHP with all the pairwise 
comparisons. Their conclusion was sustained by the computed rank correlation 
coefficients and a statistical test. 
 Bassham, Bauer, and Miller (2006) presented an evaluation methodology that 
incorporates the preferences of an evaluator and the war fighter, each having a vested 
interest in the Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) system. Their methodology 
implements a decision analysis approach to incorporating the preferences and value 
structure of the various decision makers. The decision analysis techniques were based on 
an overview from Clemen (1990). 
 Baker, Green, Lowe, and Francis (2000) offer an approach for performance-based 
decision making and budgeting that objectively orders alternatives according to 
established mission criteria. A model was employed using value focused-thinking to 
address the contemporary focus on performance and mission-oriented results. The model 
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was applied on equipment purchases for the Dean of the US Air Force Academy 
(USAFA) Faculty. 
 Jurk, Chambal, and Thal (2004) used a value-focused thinking (VFT) model to 
choose an alternative among innovative force protection alternatives ideas. Usually, a 
variety of proposed solutions or initiatives are presented to the battle-labs as alternatives 
to meet the demand of improving the ability of the Air Force to execute its core 
competencies and joint war-fighting. Therefore, the battle-labs must prioritize those 
initiatives to select the best application of their limited resources. The purpose of their 
study was to demonstrate the usefulness of applying the VFT process in a generic setting, 
while tied up to a particular topic of interest, the force protection environment. The 
results and conclusions of the Force Protection Battle-lab (FPB) focus case may be 
logically extrapolated to address similar challenges faced by the other battle-labs. 
1.2.2 Simulation Methods 
 A good deal of research has been done simulating battlefields. These efforts vary 
from low-resolution simulations where the battlefield is simulated in general constructs to 
high-resolution simulations where even the infantry soldier is represented in detail in the 
simulation. Simulations were used to measure or improve human factors engineering 
topics like estimating the operational effectiveness of a soldier, improving situation 
awareness of a soldier, or improving the ability of allocating resources for a commander 
(Tollefson, et al., 2004). 
 Kaste, May, and Heilman (2003) reported the results of a collaborative effort 
between researchers at the Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and The Ohio State 
University (OSU) experimenting with a decision tool for mining ARL combat simulation 
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data to gain battlefield-planning insights. The collaborating team developed and used an 
approach based on multiple criteria decision-making to enhance battle planning. Decision 
support systems can assist commanders in examining simulation data for relationships 
between Courses of Action (COA) structure and various objectives. However, there were 
no efforts directed toward simulations that would measure and analyze the values or the 
characteristics of an officer or a soldier in a battlefield system. 
 Ntuen and Park (2003) described an analytical decision aid, the Alternative 
Course of Action Display (ACAD), for supporting the commander’s course of action 
planning and analysis based on the battle asset information. The paradigm of Mission, 
Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time (METT-T) is the main knowledge that drives the 
ACAD software. 
 Another planning decision aid is FOX-GA, which is a COA generating tool 
developed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) by Schlabach and 
Hayes in 1998 (as referenced in Ntuen and Park, 2003). FOX-GA mimics the state-space 
mappings predetermined friendly force strength to that of the enemy. CORAVEN was 
developed for intelligence collection management and analysis by Jones, et al., in 2000 
(as referenced in Ntuen and Park, 2003). CORAVEN runs in a multimedia system. It uses 
the Bayesian belief network as a modeling tool. A last example is OWL, a decision 
analytic war-gaming tool for predicting alternative outcomes of a battle based on 
uncertain information available about friendly and enemy forces. The software was 
developed at the Rockwell Science Center by Uckun, et al. in 1999 (as referenced in 
Ntuen and Park, 2003). The software randomly generates inputs to execute the same war 
scenario in several iterations. 
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 Managing major defense systems successfully requires deliberate and continuous 
attention to risk due to the reduced budgets, expanded mission objectives, and increased 
schedule pressure (Cho, Garvey and Giallombardo, 1997). Cho, Garvey and 
Giallombardo (1997) present a management tool called RiskNav for prioritizing, 
displaying, and tracking program risk. RiskNav provides program offices a structure for 
conducting continuous risk assessments. As a decision aid, the tool (RiskNav) assists in 
identifying where engineering resources are best allocated to mitigate potentially 
crippling areas of risk to a program. 
 Some of the research by the Department of Defense includes training programs 
that prescribes the policies, procedures and responsibilities for headquarters and 
commanders. Those regulations outline the battle command training program (BTCP). 
For example see, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (2005). 
 Another example is Battle Book (2005) which provides information to the battle 
commanders at the brigade and battalion levels on the employment of the battlefield 
operating systems. In other words, it presents what commanders should consider and care 
about, along with the regulations and applied restrictions. Understanding this pamphlet 
leads to better understanding of commanders’ values and how these values influence their 
decision making. 
1.2.3 Reliability-Focused Methods 
 Reliability technologies are a main concern of the Department of Defense. 
Reliability modeling and analysis is applied in a direct way in military industries. The 
importance of reliability modeling and analysis started in the military field. The 
Department of Defense in 1952 (Ebeling, 1997) established the Advisory Group on 
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Reliability of Electronics Equipments (AGREE), and the efforts and studies in reliability 
have continued since then. A good deal of research is available that focuses on applying 
reliability to different components and systems in the militarily industries. However, 
there appear to be no efforts modeling the information reliability for battlefield decision 
making. This research is the nucleus of future research in this field.  
 The following are some of the past efforts applied to the area of battlefield 
information: 
 Bracken, Kress, and Rosenthal (1995) present simple models of an air defense 
situation that illustrates the expected payoff from a reduction in uncertainty by utilization 
of the products of sensor and Command, Control, Communication, and intelligence 
)/( 3 IC capabilities. Each model consists of a single defensive system that assists in 
defending a high-value area against massed missile attack. The defensive system makes 
use of information available so as to plan the defensive resource allocation. They 
investigated the effects and the value of information available to the defense against the 
mass attack. Three probabilistic models were developed. Each model corresponds to a 
different information level available to the defender. They concluded that the availability 
of a relatively higher level of information should enable the defender to enhance his 
strategy and achieve a gain in his defense effectiveness. 
1.2.4 Information-Focused Methods 
 With the rapid growth of information technologies, especially those associated 
with information transfer, there is a need to secure information from being accessed and 
used by an unauthorized third party. Since the military can often not sacrifice the speed of 
transferring information, it must find ways to assure its protection. Joint Doctrine (as 
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cited in Beauregard, et al., 2002) defines Information Assurance (IA) as “information 
operations that protect and defend information systems by ensuring their availability, 
integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation”. The difficulty in 
increasing IA lies in the balance between the level of IA and the impact of that IA level 
on the system operational capability and resource costs.  
 Beauregard, et al. (2002) created an Information Assurance Analysis Model 
(IAAM) to aid organizations within the Department of Defense (DoD) in their efforts to 
appropriately protect valuable information and information systems. The model was 
composed of three different value hierarchies that measure the total level of information 
assurance as tradeoff between IA, system operational capability, and the resource cost of 
implementing an IA strategy. The objective of the IAAM is to aid a military decision 
maker in determining which IA strategy to implement. The hierarchical models and their 
associated measures are used to identify the most beneficial information assurance 
strategy based on the value-focused thinking approach. 
 In securing information systems, there is a required tradeoff between security and 
functionality. Hamill, et al. (2002) presents an approach to improve the risk management 
process associated with the operation and implementation of information systems, by 
incorporating value-focused thinking. In their approach, the value of information being 
protected serves as a focus to prioritize vulnerabilities requiring remedy. The risk 
management approach approximates the current level of risk and relies upon a decision 
making model to determine if risk is at an acceptable level. 
 In their approach, the information was the focus; a value model of information 
was developed as opposed to the typical focus on information systems. The value model 
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for information was constructed by deriving those aspects of information and information 
systems valued by the decision makers. The resulting value model can be used to 
evaluate current performance and proposed improvements to information systems, and 
facilitate the development of previously unforeseen alternatives. The alternatives (current 
performance and proposed improvements) were evaluated based upon the value model of 
information. In other words, the value of information model helps in the identification of 
consequences or the impact due to exploited vulnerabilities. 
 Their concluding assumption was that if the model accurately represents the 
decision makers’ preferences regarding the information within their respective 
information system, the approach offers a clear focus on the cost effective elimination of 
Information Systems (IS) vulnerabilities. 
 Beene (1998) captures the degradation of situation awareness over time in his 
efforts to develop a methodology for mathematically quantify awareness in a military 
command and control (C2) environment; battle field environment. Endsley in 1995 (as 
referred in Bolstad, et al, 2005) defined situation awareness as “the perception of the 
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of 
their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future”. Beene developed an 
information warfare entropy model based on Shannon’s original entropy model. Shannon 
(1949) developed a measure of information based on what an individual knows and how 
well or precisely they know it. Shannon defined entropy in an information theory context 
as: 
  ∑
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            ip = probability of outcome i 
 Beene (1998) derived a function for entropy over time using a formulation that 
defines the probability of a certain event as a function of time. 
 Sherrill and Barr (1996) investigated the effects of intelligence on battlefield 
results. They also developed entropy as a measure of information in a battlefield 
environment by quantizing the battlefield space into a grid and eliciting the decision 
maker’s probability of an enemy asset being located in each grid cell. Their entropy scale 
is reversed; the higher value for entropy implies less awareness, and the lower value for 
entropy implies higher awareness. 
 Shupenus and Barr (1999) reported the development of a measure of performance 
for battlefield information systems called Information Gain. Their measure is based on 
decreases (and increases) in Shannon’s entropy to quantify the probability of various 
information states that result from receipt of data by a commander. The approach 
measures the level of information a commander has at a given point in time by modeling 
the amount of uncertainty regarding an adversary, in terms of probability distributions 
over sets of possible enemy states. The probability distributions are updated when the 
commander receives new information. The new resultant distribution is assumed to 
reflect the new state of the commander’s uncertainty. They investigated the effects of 
target mobility on information loss when surveillance of a target is broken. The 
investigation was based on a stochastic model of target movements, together with an 
approximation appropriate for implementation in a spreadsheet. They concluded that the 
shapes of the information loss curves were dependent on terrain features affecting the 
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movement of the target, and that information is lost rapidly once contact with the target is 
lost. 
 Perry (2000) developed a probability model of knowledge using information 
entropy to measure the amount of uncertainty in the commander’s current knowledge, his 
current situation awareness, of the battle space. The initial model distribution depends 
upon the information available to the commander from his sensors and sources. As 
additional sources or sensors reports arrive, the probability distribution is refined. 
 Driscoll and Henderson (2006) propose a unifying meta-model architecture for 
fusing information in sensor-based decision support system. Metamodeling is the 
construction of a collection of concepts within a certain domain. The sensor decision 
support systems are capable of delivering to the user strong inference results in support of 
tactical decision-making. 
 Doyle, Deckro, Kloeber, and Jackson (2000) developed a structure to view 
information operations. The structure is used as a basis to create measures of merit for 
offensive information operations (IO) by applying value-focused thinking. Offensive 
information operations (IO) are operations undertaken to affect an adversary’s decision 
making in a way that benefits the friendly forces. The offensive information operations 
(IO) objectives hierarchy for the information realm is consisting of attacking information, 
attacking information systems, and attacking information-based processes. The result of 
their analysis was a set of measures that quantitatively describe the expected effect of 
(IO) on the adversary’s decision making. 
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1.3 Research Layout 
 The dissertation is divided into ten main chapters. This first chapter is an 
introduction, an overview of the past efforts applied to the area of battlefield decision 
making and battlefield information, and a discussion of the contributions. The second, the 
third, and the fourth chapter provide background on human decision making, value-
focused thinking, and reliability analysis, respectively. In chapter two, the human 
decision making topic is discussed generally with different human decision making 
models. In chapter three, the elements of a decision and how they are interrelated are 
introduced, and then the decision or value model construction is presented. Chapter three 
adapts the value focused thinking as a strategy for decision making. Chapter four 
introduces the reliability background needed to model the reliability of different 
components and systems, which in this research will pertain to the information in a 
decision making system. 
 Chapter five provides a scenario background for the battle of Khafji scenario used 
in the research. This scenario is used to focus the research theories. It is not the first time 
that the battle of Khafji was a research concern. Clevenger (1996) analyzed the battle of 
Khafji to assess air power effectiveness. His analysis was later used to recreate battalion 
and brigade size portions of the battle in a mission-level model for analytical purposes. 
The objective of the battle re-creation was to provide a historically-based framework for 
analysis of force structures, weapons systems, tactics, command and control, and their 
interactions. 
 Chapter six builds a value model of the research scenario. The decision makers’ 
values are determined and are organized into hierarchies. A quantitative and qualitative 
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analysis is then applied to build a value model. This value model is used to evaluate 
alternatives. This model is an initial effort using value-focused thinking to model 
battlefield decision making. 
 Chapter seven presents the new topic of information reliability and an information 
reliability model of the research scenario. This model will be a unique contribution of this 
research. 
 In chapter eight, the value model and the information reliability model are 
combined together in a single integrated model. A theoretical background of the model is 
introduced, and then applied to the research scenario. 
 In chapter nine, different scenarios or cases of decision situations that might occur 
in reality are discussed based on the employment of the integrated model. 
 Finally, the conclusion, and future avenues will be presented in chapter ten. 
1.4 Contributions 
 In combat, time pressures on decision making are extreme and coordination 
among units requires mutually predictable behavior and responses to problems. All 
commanders must make and execute decisions faster than the enemy to be successful. 
Limited time forces the decision maker to make decisions rapidly. 
 In the military, commanders are selected to command based on their experience 
and ability to make successful decisions. In some combat decision making situations, 
relying on experience is a powerful methodology for making decisions. The individual 
aggregates their life experiences from making decisions in similar problems. This 
collective experience, plus requirements of the current scenario, forms the individual 
decision model. Capturing exemplar decision models and using these models for analysis 
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to enhance future decision making research and augment training for decision making is a 
focus of this research. 
 The results and conclusions of this research can be captured and incorporated into 
institutional doctrines and training systems in order to improve the decision making 
abilities of commanders, team leaders, and soldiers. Past efforts focused on the 
commander decision making problem, although there were no efforts to model and 
capture the different individuals’ values in the decision situation. The interactions 
between the different individual’s models are recorded. 
 This research presents a methodology for dividing the dynamic decision situations 
of a battlefield scenario into a group of static decision situations. 
 The research generates value hierarchies that represent the basic objectives of 
different individuals in the military chain of command. This value hierarchy might be 
used as a generic hierarchy for similar cases or scenarios with few editions if required. 
Thus, this research provides an initial VFT-based model of battlefield decision making. 
 Reliability modeling is usually applied to physical components or systems. This 
research applies reliability modeling to the non-physical information value. The 
reliability of information is modeled using the probability distribution functions that are 
used in reliability analysis. A definition of reliability of information is derived and a 
suitable model is presented. This represents an initial effort to model battlefield 
information reliability in the context of battlefield decision making. 
 A final contribution of this research is the integrated model that combines the 
decision value-focused thinking model with the information reliability model. This model 
is theoretical but detailed enough to generate a computational model presenting that 
 20 
linkage. This also represents a unique contribution of the research; an initial combined 
decision making, information reliability model. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HUMAN DECISION MAKING 
 Examining the process of decision making systematically, and exploring how 
each part of the decision process contributes to a good decision, is what yields a better 
understanding of decision making and what makes a good decision maker. Clemen 
(2001) advocates that applying decision analysis techniques can lead to better decisions 
that give the best possible outcomes. This chapter provides a broad discussion of different 
aspects of decision making and decision making models. Chapter three will discuss the 
specific required background, value-focused thinking, used in this research.  
2.1 Introduction 
 An important element of a decision making problem is the existence of at least 
two choices or alternatives. The decision is then usually based on the decision maker’s 
judgment. Lehto (2006) defined judgment as “a closely related process in which a person 
rates or assigns values to the attributes of the alternatives considered”. The decision 
making process might be as simple as choosing a restaurant or as complicated as 
choosing a spouse. Decision making may take place under time pressure constraints, such 
as battlefield decisions, or it may take place over a longer time period, such as choosing a 
house. Another way to categorize decision making is whether decisions require a single 
decision maker or a group of decision makers. In this chapter and throughout the 
research, the focus is on a single decision maker. This chapter will discuss the difficulty 
of decision making, then briefly discuss a human decision making integrative model. 
Different theories of decision making such as: the classical decision making theory, the 
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behavioral decision making theory, and the dynamic and naturalistic decision making 
theory are briefly discussed along with their related models. 
2.2 Difficulty of Decision Making  
 Decision making is not an easy process. Clemen (2001) discussed four reasons for 
the difficulty of decision making. His four reasons are summarized as the following: 
• The complexity level of the decision situation. Some decisions involve a large 
amount of details and information. Russo and Schoemaker (1990) note that there 
is a limit to the amount of information that a human can handle at one time.  
• The inherent uncertainty in the decision making situation. This uncertainty can 
take the form of uncertain outcomes associated with choosing among alternatives. 
• The conflicting multiple objectives. A tradeoff is required between competing 
objectives, where the decision maker must trade off benefits in one area against 
possible consequences in another. 
• Different perspectives that leads to different conclusions. This source of difficulty 
is associated with group decision making where more than one decision maker is 
involved in a decision, and each has a different perspective on the problem. 
2.3 Human Decision Making Integrative Model 
 Clemen’s four areas of difficulty are the main cause of conflict in decision 
making. Welford in 1976 (as referred to in Lehto, 2006) defined human decision making 
as “a stage of information processing that falls between perception and response 
execution”. Welford’s perspective was used by Lehto and Nah (as presented in Lehto, 
2006) to present an integrative model of decision making that relates conflict resolution 
to the elements of decision making (alternatives, outcomes, and uncertainty associated 
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with the alternatives). They defined decision making as “the process followed when a 
response to a perceived stimulus is chosen. The applied decision strategy decides the 
process followed. An integrative model is shown in Figure 1 (adapted from Lehto, 2006). 
 
Figure 1 Human Decision Making Integrative Model (Lehto, 2006) 
 The decision strategies in Figure 1 correspond to the different paths between the 
situation assessment node and the execute action node. In the model, the decision context 
and the conflict occurrence decide the decision strategy followed. Lehto (2006) 
distinguished four categories of decision making: 
Group Decision Making 
 Group decision making is the case where a group of decision makers collectively 
arrive at a decision. This category is represented at the highest level of the integrative 
model in Figure 1. 
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Dynamic Decision Making 
 Dynamic decision making occurs in an environment where a future decision may 
depend on what happened in the past. The multi-stage nature of the environment requires 
the use of feedback. Battlefield decision making is an example of a dynamic decision 
making environment. This category is represented at the lowest level of the integrative 
model in Figure 1. 
Routine Decision Making 
 Routine decision making occurs when the experience and the knowledge of the 
decision makers are the basis of their decisions. This category is represented in Figure 1 
as a pattern matching step between the situation assessment node and the execute action 
node. Usually routine decision making is considered a subset of dynamic decision 
making. 
Conflict Driven Decision Making 
 Conflict-driven decision making occurs when a decision requires resolving 
various forms of conflict. This category involves a complicated path between the nodes. 
2.4 Classical Decision Making Theory 
 There is a need for a systematic approach of structuring decision problems to 
overcome the difficulties and the conflicts associated with decision making. Classical 
decision theory focuses on the notion of rationality and has been applied to two problems: 
Choice and statistical inference (Lehto, 2006). 
2.4.1 Choice Procedures 
 Classical decision theory uses four basic elements to represent preference and 
choice problems: 
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• A set of alternatives or actions ( iA ) 
• A set of events ( jE ) 
• A set of outcomes or consequences ( ijC ) associated with each combination of 
alternative i and event j. 
• A set of probabilities ( ijP ) for each combination of alternative i and event j. 
 After the decision situation is represented in terms of these elements, a decision 
making rule is required to make decision. Several of these decision rules are discussed 
briefly (based on Lehto, 2006). 
Dominance 
 Dominance occurs if alternative iA  is at least as good as jA  for all E  events, and 
for at least one event kE , iA  is preferred to jA . Dominance is a normative decision rule; 
the dominating alternative is always better than the dominated alternative.  
Lexicographic Ordering and EBA 
 The Lexicographic ordering decision rule considers cases where alternatives have 
multiple consequences. These consequences are organized according to their importance. 
The alternatives are compared sequentially, starting with the most important 
consequence. An alternative is selected if it is found better than the others on the most 
important consequence. If no alternative is better, comparisons continue with the next 
most important consequence level. The process continues until an alternative is selected. 
 The Elimination by Aspect (EBA) is similar to the Lexicographic decision rule, 
except that the consequences used for the comparison are used in a random order. 
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Minimum Aspiration Level and Satisfying 
 This decision rule considers screening the alternatives sequentially until an 
alternative is selected; the screening process is terminated when an alternative i exceeds a 
minimum aspiration level ijS  for each of its consequences ijC  over the possible 
events jE . 
Minimax Cost and Minimax Regret 
 The Minimax Cost decision rule considers selecting the minimum worst-case cost 
alternative iA among the other alternatives. Mathematically,  
 iA  is the alternative for which over the events j, )]([)( ijjijj CMaxMinCMax = . 
 The Minimax Regret decision rule involves regret calculations instead of cost. 
The best alternative for each possible event is identified. The regret ijR associated with 
each outcome ijC  for the combination of event jE  and alternative iA   then becomes
 ijijiij CCMaxR −= )( . 
The R calculation are carried out for the set of all events jE , resulting in regret values for 
each combination of events and alternative actions. The selected alternative is the 
alternative which over the event i, )]([)( ijjiijj RMaxMinRMax = . 
Maximizing Expected Value 
 The MEV decision rule picks the alternative with the highest expected value. The 
expected value of an alternative iA  is equal to weighting of its outcome ijC  over all 
events jE , by the probability ijP  that the event will occur. Mathematically, 
 ∑=
j
ijiji CPAEV ][ . 
 27 
 More details on expected value of an alternative are in chapter 3 as this approach 
is used for a risk-neutral decision maker in the value-focused thinking modeling 
paradigm. 
Expected Utility (EU) Theory 
 The Expected Utility (EU) theory is the same as the expected value theory except 
that it uses a utility measure instead of the value. Utility theory distinguishes between risk 
neutral, risk seeking, and risk averse human behaviors by the shape of the utility function. 
In other words, the theory describes how different individuals react to risk or 
uncertainties. More details about utilities are discussed in chapter 3 of this research. 
Multi-attribute Utility Theory 
 The multi-attribute theory (MAUT) extends the EU case to the case where the 
decision maker has multiple objectives. More details on MAUT are discussed in chapter 
3. 
Holistic Comparison 
 Holistic Comparisons is a non-analytical method. The process involves a holistic 
comparison of the alternatives outcomes instead of measuring them separately and then 
recombining probability measures, values, or utility. Thus, a preference ordering between 
the alternatives is obtained. The Holistic Comparison method does not require formal 
consideration of probability or utility. 
2.4.2 Statistical Inference 
 Decision makers can use statistical hypothesis testing about the past, the future, or 
the present states of the world to determine whether reject a hypothesis or fail to reject a 
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hypothesis. Some of the techniques for inferring the probability iP  that a hypothesis iH  
is true are described below. 
Bayesian Inference 
 The Bayesian Inference technique is based on Baye’s rule (Savage, 1954). Baye’s 
rule defines the posterior probability of hypothesis iH  given evidence iE  is present. 
Mathematically, 
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where )( ij HEP  is the probability of obtaining evidence iH  given that the hypothesis 
iH  is true, and )( iHP  is the probability of the hypothesis iH  is true before obtaining 
the evidence iE . 
 The Bayesian Inference technique infers the probability iP  that a hypothesis iH  
is true using evidence iE  that links the hypothesis to other observed states of the world. 
For more information on Baye’s rule, see Savage (1954). 
Signal Detection Theory 
 Signal detection theory assumes that the decision maker uses Baye’s rule to 
estimate the probability of a signal occurring in a noisy observation system. An operator 
receives evidence from the environment about the true state of the world. The conditional 
probability )]([ SEP  stands for the probability of obtaining evidence observed, given that 
the signal is there, measures the relationship between the signal (S) and the evidence (E). 
For more information on Signal-Detection theory, see Heeger (1997). 
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Dempster-Schafer Method 
 The Dempster-Schafer method is used to accumulate evidence for or against a 
hypothesis proposed for use in the decision analysis. A basic probability assignment 
(bpa) function P describes the relation between the hypothesis (H) and the evidence (e). 
For an evidence e, the function )(nPe  assigns a value, between 0 and 1, to each subset of 
H such that the sum of the assigned values is 1. For example, consider X, Y, and Z as 
three hypotheses. The bpa assigns a value of 1, when no evidence is available, to the set 
of hypotheses H = (A, B, C) and 0 to all subsets: (A), (B), (C), (A,B), (A,C). Also, given 
that evidence xAPe =)(  supporting a specific hypothesis A is found, the method assigns 
)(1 APe−  to H.  
 The method uses a belief function B (n) to assign a total belief to n, where n is a 
subset of the set of possible hypotheses H, as the sum of the beliefs assigned to m, where 
m is the set of possible subsets of n. For more information on Dempster-Schafer method, 
see Shafer (1976) or Kohhlas and Monney (1995). 
2.5 Decision Analysis 
 Decision analysis applies classical decision theory to improve human decision 
making. Keeney and Raiffa in 1976 (as referenced in Clemen, 2001) defined decision 
analysis as “A perspective approach designed for normally intelligent people who want to 
think hard and systemically about some important real problems”. Bodily, S. (1992) 
defined Decision analysis as “any activity that involves analysis for purposes of making a 
decision”. Brown (1992) defined decision analysis as “any quantitative analysis of 
uncertainty or value based on normative models that is designed to aid decisions”. 
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Howard (1992) defined decision analysis as a “quality conversation about a decision 
designed to lead to clarity of action”. 
 Decision analysis is typically an iterative process. The process starts by 
structuring the decision, then assessing subjective probabilities, utility functions, and 
preferences of the decision maker. Different techniques for each phase of this process are 
briefly discussed in the following subsections. 
2.5.1 Structuring Decisions 
 Frameworks are used to represent what is known about the decision problem. 
Some of these framework techniques are discussed below. 
Decision Matrices 
 The decision matrix technique arrange the consequences of a decision problem in 
a matrix with rows of alternatives iA  and columns of events jE . The technique is often 
used for single stage decision problems. The technique is not used for modeling any 
sequence of events or passage of time. 
Decision Trees 
 The decision tree technique can be used for both single-stage decision problems 
and multi-stage decision problems. In a decision tree, different shapes represent different 
decision elements, typically decision elements, chance elements, and outcomes. The 
decision tree represents all of the possible paths that the decision maker might follow 
through time (Clemen, 2001). The different nodes in a tree are interpreted in sequence 
from left to right. For example, the left side of tree starts with a decision node or a chance 
node, followed by subsequent decision nodes or chances nodes in chronological orders. 
For more details on decision trees and their use and structure, see Clemen (2001). 
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Influence Diagrams 
 Influence Diagrams define the relations between events and actions in a decision 
problem. The different decision elements are represented in different graphical shapes 
referred to as nodes. The nodes are connected by links that define the relations among 
them. The diagrams provide a graphical representation of a decision situation. For 
example, a link from an event A to an event B represents the conditional probability of 
event B occurrence based on the occurrence of event A. A link from a decision node to an 
event node represents the probability of the event occurrence based on action taken at the 
decision node. For more details on influence diagrams, see Clemen (2001). 
Value Trees 
 The value tree technique organizes objectives, attributes, and values in a 
hierarchical fashion. More details on constructing value trees and developing objectives, 
attributes, and values are discussed in chapter 3. 
Event Trees 
 An event tree shows how a sequence of events, starting from a primary event, 
might lead to one or more outcomes. This technique works backward; it starts at a single 
undesired event and ends at its causes. The technique assumes a set of hypotheses at the 
top level of the tree, and relates these to evidence depicted at the lower levels (Lehto, 
2006). 
2.5.2 Probability Assessment 
 Different techniques are used in decision analysis to assess probabilities. The 
better known techniques (Lehto, 2006) are presented and briefly discussed next. 
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Direct Assessment 
 In direct assessment, the decision maker directly assigns a value for the 
probability of an event occurrence. Kirkwood (1997) presents techniques to avoid 
different biases in assessing these values. In this method, the decision maker must have a 
good knowledge of probability. 
Fitting a Subjective Belief Form 
 The Subjective Belief Form contains statistical parameters estimation questions 
that require answers from the decision maker. The decision maker will assign an 
estimated true value of a certain probability, and then he will be asked to assign statistical 
measures such as: the mean, the mode, or median. In a more detailed form, the decision 
maker is asked to estimate a confidence interval on his assigned values. For more details 
on fitting a subjective belief form, see Buck (1989). 
Bisection Method 
 The bisection method is used to fit a subjective pdf. The pdf is fit by asking the 
decision maker to determine the median ( 5.0p ) of the subjective pdf. The question asked 
is “for what value of p do you feel it is equally likely that the true value *p  is greater 
than or less than p?” as cited in Lehto (2006). The step is repeated for various 
subintervals to obtain the required pdf. 
Conditioning Arguments 
 The conditioning arguments method assumes that the probability of a complicated 
event A is based on the probabilities of simpler events iC  that relate to it. If the 
complicated event is A, and iC  then the possible conditions under which A might happen, 
then: 
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Reference Lotteries 
 The Reference Lottery method obtains point estimates of the decision maker’s 
subjective probabilities. The method relates a lottery to the decision maker’s point 
estimate. For example, to measure the decision maker’s subjective probability of an event 
A occurring, the decision maker is asked to consider a lottery with prize x if event A 
occurs, and a prize y if event A didn’t occur. The decision maker is then asked how much 
he is willing to pay, z, for the lottery. Values of x, y, and z are varied until the decision 
maker is indifferent. Finally, the decision maker’s subjective estimate of P (A) is 
estimated: 
 )./()()( yxyzAP −−=  
 Reference lotteries are often used in value-focused thinking. Clemen (2001) 
provides the axioms of utility that justify the use of reference lotteries. 
Scaling Methods 
 In scaling methods, the decision maker rates or ranks the probabilities to be 
assessed. Various approaches are available for this method. An example is the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP). The AHP process finds the best alternative from several by 
considering a number of conflicting criteria. AHP structures the decision making problem 
hierarchally. The strategic objective is placed at the top pf the hierarchy and the criteria, 
sub-criteria and the alternatives on each descending level. A local priority weight for the 
elements is found by pairwise comparisons among the elements in a level with respect to 
an element in an immediately higher level. The global weights of the alternatives are 
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obtained by synthesizing the local weights from each level of the hierarchy. For more 
details, see Saaty (1990). 
2.5.3 Utility Function Assessment 
 The certainty equivalent is a standard method for assessing a decision maker’s 
utility function. This method is discussed in detail in chapter 3 of this research. 
2.5.4 Preference Assessment 
 There are quite a few methods to measure the strength of a decision maker’s 
preference. These methods include: indifference assessment, direct assessment, and 
indirect assessment. The indifference methods modify one of two sets of stimuli until the 
decision maker is indifferent between the stimuli. In the direct assessment method, the 
decision maker rates or assigns numerical values to attributes. These values are then used 
to obtain preferences for the specified alternatives. The indirect measurement method 
avoids asking the decision makers to rank or rate directly the importance of factors that 
affect their preferences. Instead, the decision makers are asked for preference orderings 
between alternatives. For more information on these three methods, see Keeney and 
Raiffa (1976). 
2.6 Behavioral Decision Theory 
 People use heuristics during judgments tasks (Lehto, 2006). There is a need for an 
approach to capture this aspect in the process of human decision making. Stevenson in 
1993 (as referred to in Lehto, 2006) states that descriptive models that relax assumptions 
of the classical decision theory models, but retain much of their essence, are being 
evaluated in the field of judgment and decision theory. In this section, research on 
statistical estimation and inference, and decision making under uncertainty are discussed. 
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2.6.1 Statistical Estimation and Inference 
 Lehto (2006) discussed human abilities and limitations in performing tasks. He 
then discussed heuristics that people might use to cope with their limitations, and how 
these heuristics can cause biases. He also discussed the role of memory and selective 
information processing from a similar perspective. 
 Brunswik developed the Lens model (Brunswik, 1952) to describe how people 
perceive their environment. The Lens model is used in many approaches to describe 
human judgment on some criterion in terms of two symmetric concepts: the ecological 
validity of probabilistic cues, and the cue utilization. The ecological validity is defined in 
terms of the correlation or the probabilistic relation between a cue and the criterion. 
While the correlation or the probabilistic relation between the cue and the judgment 
defines the cue utilization. For more information on Lens model, see Brunswik (1952). 
 Several approaches describe human judgment mathematically include the use of 
policy-capturing models in social judgment theory, probabilistic mental models, multiple-
cue probability learning models, and information integration theory. The work in this 
field was built on the Lens model. 
Social Judgment Theory 
 Social Judgment theory is used to develop policy-capturing models to describe 
how decision makers make use of the probabilistic environmental cues to make 
judgments. Regression modeling is used to relate judgments to environment cues. 
Probabilistic Mental Models 
The Probabilistic Mental model assumes, as in the Social Judgment Theory, that 
human knowledge is described as a set of cues, their values, and their ecological 
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validities. The ecological validity of a cue is defined as “the relative frequency with 
which the cue correctly predicts how well an object does on some criteria measure” 
(Lehto, 2006). 
Multiple-Cue Probability Learning Model 
The Multiple-Cue Probability Learning model assumes that providing cognitive 
feedback about cues and their relation to the effects inferred leads to faster learning than 
with feedback about the outcomes (Lehto, 2006). 
Information-Integration Theory 
 This Information-Integration theory develops models of how cue information is 
used when judging. The theory emphasizes the use of factorial experimental designs for 
collecting data with which to develop models. This approach determines how decision 
makers scale cues when determining their subjective values, and determine how these 
scaled values are combined to form all over judgments. 
2.6.2 Preference and Choice 
 There is a good amount of research on human preference and choice to compare 
observed preference to the predictions of subjective utility theory. Lehto (2006) 
summarizes some common violations of the subjective expected utility axioms. He also 
summarizes a body of research in the area of framing decisions. This research suggests 
that the way the decision is presented can have a huge influence on the decision maker’s 
preferences. For more details on this topic, see Tversky and Kahneman (1981).  
Prospect Theory 
 Prospect theory considers behaviors that are not consistent with the expected 
utility model by including decision farming as a phase in judging preferences among risk 
 37 
alternatives. Decision framing means the manner in which a decision problem has been 
presented. The theory assumes that the decision makers are risk averse in terms of gain, 
and risk seekers in terms of losses. The resulted value function weights losses 
disproportionately. For more information on prospect theory, see Lehto (2006). 
Labile Preferences 
 The decision maker’s preferences and attitudes toward risk might change over 
time. A good deal of research captures this aspect, where the preferences of the decision 
makers are modeled as the collective decisions obtained by a group of internal agents. 
Another approach is to model utility as a random valuable to explain the inconsistency in 
preference while ordering alternatives. 
2.7 Dynamic and Naturalistic Decision Making 
 Decision makers take actions sequentially in a dynamic decision making 
environment. Their actions might result in a new set of decision problems.  Klein in 1998 
(as referred in Lehto, 2006) discussed his Naturalistic Decision theory and how it applies 
to the decisions in the real world environment. The deriving force of the theory is the 
notion that most decisions are made in a routine and non-analytical way. In this section, 
models of dynamic and naturalistic decision making are briefly discussed. The models 
assume that decision makers rarely weigh alternatives and evaluate them in terms of their 
expected values or expected utilities. The models also assume that the decision maker’s 
experience, the task, and the decision context decide their different decision strategies.  
2.7.1 Levels of Task Performance 
 The assumption that the decision maker makes decisions based on past behavior 
plays an important role in this modeling perspective. There are four levels of 
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performance: skill-based, rule-based, knowledge-based, and judgment based. When tasks 
are routine in nature, then the performance is skill-based or rule-based. Knowledge-based 
performance occurs during learning activity during which people cognitively simulate the 
alternatives and develop plans. The judgment-based performance occurs when reactions 
of a decision maker change his goals or goals priorities. For definitions of each level of 
task performance, see Lehto (2006). Lehto (2006) defines each level of task performance, 
and discussed the reasons for error occurrence in each level. 
2.7.2 Recognition-Primed Decision Making 
 The Recognition-Primed Decision Making (RPD) method is based on the 
assumption that decision makers make decisions following a past behavior pattern when 
faced with a similar situation. Klein (1989, 1998) developed the RPD model. The model 
distinguishes between three different conditions. The first condition is when the decision 
maker recognizes the situation and takes the usual appropriate action. The second 
condition is when the decision maker mentally simulates the action to evaluate the 
alternative before executing it. The third condition is when the decision maker simulates 
the action and mentally rejects it. In the RPD model, the decision maker compares the 
actions that seem useful based on his experience. For more details on the PRD model, see 
Klein (1989, 1998). 
2.7.3 Image Theory 
 Image theory is a purely descriptive theory. The theory considers that knowledge 
used to make decisions can be categorized as follow: value images, trajectory images, 
and strategic images. The decision maker’s values are described by the value image, the 
decision maker’s goals are described by the trajectory image, and the means to achieve 
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goal are described by the strategic image. The theory also categorizes decisions as: 
adoption decisions and progress decisions. In the adoption decisions, an alternative is 
selected from a screened set of alternatives. In the progress decisions, an alternative is 
selected after a comparison between goals and the expected result of choosing the 
alternative. For more details on Image theory, see Beach (1998). 
2.7.4 Contingent Decision Making 
 The Contingent Decision Making method assumes that the characteristics of the 
tasks and the decision context decide the decision maker’s decision strategy. The cost and 
benefit of a decision strategy decide the decision strategy. Accuracy and cognitive efforts 
depend on the task characteristics such as: complexity and response mode. They also 
depend on the contextual characteristics such as the similarity of the compared 
alternatives, ranges and correlations of the attributes, and the quality of the options 
considered. For details on this theory, see Beach and Mitchell (1978). 
2.7.5 Dominance Structuring 
 The Dominance Structuring method assumes that decisions in real situations are 
composed of the following four steps: first a preediting stage to screen alternatives from 
further analysis. The next step is to select a promising alternative from the set of the 
initial screening survived alternatives. Then a test is made to check if the alternative 
dominates the other alternatives. If there is no dominance, then the alternative is 
redeveloped or restructured to apply the dominance over the other surviving alternatives. 
For more details on this theory, see Montgomery (1989).  
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2.7.6 Explanation-Based Decision Making 
 The theory assumes that decision makers build a mental model to explain the 
received facts that shapes the decision problem. It also assumes that decision makers 
generate alternatives while building that mental model. Finally, these alternatives are 
compared based upon the mental model not based upon the facts that are used build the 
model. For more details on this method, see Pennington and Hastie (1988). 
2.8 Summary 
 The chapter described methods of decision making. The integrative model 
developed by Lehto and Nah (as presented in Lehto, 2006) presents how the various 
approaches fit together as a whole. The specific sources of conflict, the methods of 
conflict resolution followed, and the types of decision rules distinguish each path through 
the model. The different paths represent different ways of making decisions. The 
different ways of making decisions range from routine situation assessment driven 
decisions to satisfying, analysis of expected utility.  
 Behavioral decision making theory is more of a descriptive process. Studies of 
naturalistic decision making theory revealed that most decisions are made on a routine 
non-analytical basis. The classical decision theory provides formal way for reaching 
optimal solutions but does not describe how people make decisions. It focuses on the 
ways that decision makers pull together all available information into their choice of a 
best alternative. Most of the decision aids have been developed based on the basis of the 
classical decision theories (Orasanu and Connolly, 1992). The goal of this research is to 
develop a model and a methodology to better capture battlefield decision making. In 
battlefields, optimal solutions are desired more than satisfactory solutions derived from 
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non-classical decision making theories. The classical decision theories are preferred when 
consequences are critical (Orasanu and Connolly, 1992), such as the case in battlefields. 
The value-focused thinking model is the candidate model for this research. It provides 
optimal solutions by examining a set of alternatives, weighing the likely consequences of 
choosing each, and making a choice. The decision maker evaluates the alternatives in 
terms of a set of goals, purposes, or values that he clearly knows.  It was chosen because 
of its analytical nature and applicability to the situation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HUMAN DECISION MAKING WITH VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING   
3.1 General Discussion 
 An important element of a decision situation or a decision problem is the 
existence of choices or alternatives. The reason for studying decision analysis is to learn 
techniques that help lead to selecting the best available, or least harmful, outcome. 
Studying decision analysis aids the understanding of decision problems we face and thus 
helps us make better decisions and choices. That understanding includes developing the 
problem structure, determining the uncertainty inherent in the alternatives and outcomes, 
and examining trade-offs inherent in the alternatives and outcomes.  Keeney and Raiffa in 
1976 (as referenced in Clemen, 2001) defined decision analysis as “A perspective 
approach designed for normally intelligent people who want to think hard and 
systemically about some important real problems”. 
 These are other definitions of decision analysis. Bodily, S. (1992) defined 
Decision analysis as “any activity that involves analysis for purposes of making a 
decision”. Brown (1992) defined decision analysis as “any quantitative analysis of 
uncertainty or value based on normative models that is designed to aid decisions”. 
Howard (1992) defined decision analysis as a “quality conversation about a decision 
designed to lead to clarity of action”. 
 Decision analysis is typically an iterative process. Throughout the process, the 
decision maker’s perception of the decision situation changes, subjective beliefs about the 
occurrence of different uncertain events might change, or new subjective beliefs might 
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develop. In addition, the preferences for outcomes might change or develop along the 
process of the decision analysis (Clemen, 2001). 
 Modeling is critical in decision analysis, whether this modeling is quantitative or 
qualitative. This modeling should capture all the relevant aspects of the decision problem 
and all the subjective beliefs and preferences of the decision maker. A requisite model is 
defined as a model that provides no further insight beyond what is already captured. 
 This chapter focuses on decision analysis applied to a single decision maker 
functioning within a group of decision makers. The decision context involves a group of 
independent decision makers. The focus is not on a group trying to reach a single decision. 
3.2 Values and Value Focused Thinking 
 Values are what a decision maker cares about. Values are a fundamental notion in 
modeling a decision making problem. Values are the basis for the effort and time spent 
thinking about decision problems. Keeney (1994) defined values as “principles used for 
evaluation of the actual or potential consequences of action and inaction, of proposed 
alternatives, and of decisions”.  
 Value-focused thinking decision making focuses on how to study decision making 
on the basis of values versus alternatives. Alternatives are the means to achieve the 
fundamental values in a decision making problem (Keeney, 1994). A decision making 
process that generates better alternatives and properly evaluates those alternatives is 
favored. Naturally, military decision making should select the best alternative. 
 There are five activities in value-focused thinking. First, the decision problem is 
recognized. Second, the values for the decision maker are then specified. These values 
are qualitatively derived then quantified in the third activity. The values are then used to 
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derive alternatives for the decision problem in step four. Finally, in step five the 
alternative evaluation process and the selection of an alternative can then be based on any 
established evaluation or analysis method. Table 1 presents the five activities for 
examining decision problems with value-focused thinking. 
For Decision Problems 
1. Recognize a Decision Problem 
2. Specify values 
3. Create Alternatives 
4. Evaluate alternatives 
5. Select an alternative 
 
Table 1 Sequence of Activities with Value-Focused Thinking 
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3.3 Objectives 
 The values of decision makers are made explicit by the identification of 
objectives. In other words, the values are made explicit through statements that express 
the value judgment of the decision maker in terms of their objectives. 
3.3.1 Definition 
 An objective as defined by (Keeney, 1994) is “a statement of something that one 
desires to achieve”. Kirkwood (1997) defined an objective as “the preferred direction of 
movement with respect to an evaluation consideration” where the evaluation 
consideration is “any matter that is significant enough to be taken into account while 
evaluating alternatives”. 
 Clemen (2001) defined an objective as “a specific thing that you want to achieve”. 
3.3.2 Types of Objectives 
 A principle of thinking about values is to evaluate the reasoning for the objectives 
and how those objectives are related. It is important to distinguish between two types of 
objectives: fundamental objectives and means objectives. Both of these objectives depend 
on the decision context. A fundamental objective characterizes an essential reason for 
interest in making any decision. The fundamental objectives state every concern in the 
decision situation. A means objective is of interest in the decision context because of its 
implications for the degree to which the fundamental objective might be achieved. In 
other words, the means objectives are means to achieve the fundamental objectives. 
 
 
 
 46 
3.3.3 Hierarchies and Networks 
 Fundamental objectives are organized into hierarchies such as shown in Figure 2. 
The upper level in the hierarchy contains more general objectives, while the lower levels 
in the hierarchy explain or describe important elements of the upper level objectives. 
 
Figure 2 Example of Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
 Means objectives are organized into networks as shown in Figure 3. The Means 
objectives can be connected to several objectives indicating that they help in achieving 
the higher level objectives in the network. 
 
Figure 3 Example of Means Objectives Network 
 The means objectives are used to develop the models that help analyze decision 
problems. They might also be used to develop more alternatives. Fundamental objectives 
are used as a guide to the efforts in the decision situations and in the evaluation of 
alternatives as measured against supporting means objectives. 
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 Structuring objectives aids the understanding and the specification of the decision 
context. The structured objectives are the basis for the quantitative modeling and 
analysis. Fundamental objective hierarchies indicate the set of objectives upon which the 
attributes
 
of those objectives should be defined. Means objectives network indicates the 
objectives needed to develop a model to relate the alternatives to their consequences. In 
general, the fundamental objectives hierarchy indicates the interest in the decision 
problem while the means objectives network proposes the methodology to improve 
matters within the decision context or situation. 
3.3.4 Strategic Objective 
 In addition to the two types of objectives, fundamental objectives and means 
objectives, it is important to define a strategic fundamental objective. Keeney (1994) 
defined a strategic fundamental objective as “the overall objective is the same for both 
the fundamental objective and the means objectives structures. It characterizes the reason 
for interest in the decision situation and defines the breadth of concern”. The strategic 
objective may be a single statement in some decision situations or it may be a 
combination of the more specific fundamental objectives. 
 Based on the definition, the strategic fundamental objective should provide 
common guidance to the decisions taken along the decision problem time horizon. Those 
decisions made over time are means to pursue the strategic objective. 
3.3.5 Constructing Hierarchies and Networks 
 There are some methods in practice to differentiate means objectives from 
fundamental objectives. A common method is called the WITI test. The test consists of 
the following question “Why Is This Important?” The answer to this question 
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differentiates the means objectives from the fundamental objectives, and reveals 
connections among the objectives. For example, if the question is, “Why is Objective X 
important?” and the answer to the question is, “the objective X is important because it 
helps achieving the objective Y,” then the objective X is a means objective. In the same 
manner the test iterates through Y…Z, until the answer to the WITI question is, “This 
objective is important because simply it is important” then this objective is a fundamental 
objective. The WITI test is used to move objectives among the means set and the 
fundamental objectives set. To structure within the fundamental objectives hierarchy, the 
question is “What do you mean by that?” 
 Table 2 (Adapted from Clemen, 2001) summarizes the techniques used for 
organizing means objectives and fundamental objectives. 
 Fundamental 
Objectives 
Means 
Objectives 
To Move: 
Ask: 
Downward in the Hierarchy: 
“What do you mean by that?” 
Away from Fundamental Objectives: 
“How could you achieve that?” 
To Move: 
Ask: 
Upward in the Hierarchy: 
“Of what more general  
objective is this an aspect?” 
Toward Fundamental Objectives: 
“Why is that important?” 
 
Table 2 How to Construct Hierarchies and Networks (Clemen, 2001) 
 The starting point for moving downward in both the fundamental objectives 
hierarchies and means objectives network is the strategic objective. The end point, when 
the construction proceeds to lower levels in the means objectives network, is arriving at 
alternatives or classes of alternatives. 
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3.3.6 Desirable Properties for the Fundamental Objectives 
 It is possible to construct several different fundamental objectives hierarchy for a 
decision situation. To ensure that any fundamental objectives hierarchy is correct, the set 
of the fundamental objectives should possess the nine properties listed in Table 3 
(Adapted from Keeney, 1994).         
Desired properties of the set of fundamental objectives 
1. Essential, to indicate consequences in terms of the fundamental reasons for 
interest in the decision situation. 
2. Controllable, to address consequences that are influenced only by the 
choice of alternatives in the decision context. 
3. Complete, to include all fundamental aspects of the consequences of the 
decision alternatives. 
4. Measurable, to define objectives precisely and to specify the degrees to 
which objectives may be achieved. 
5. Operational, to render the collection of information required for an analysis 
reasonable considering the time and effort available. 
6. Decomposable, to allow the separate treatment of different objectives in the 
analysis. 
7. Non-redundant, to avoid double-counting of possible consequences. 
8. Concise, to reduce the number of objectives needed for the analysis. 
9. Understandable, to facilitate generation and communication of insights for 
guiding the decision making process. 
 
Table 3 Desired properties of the set of fundamental objectives (Keeney, 1994) 
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 A set of fundamental objectives are essential when each alternative in a decision 
context affects the degree of the achievement of each objective. They are controllable 
when all the alternatives that might influence the outcomes are included in the decision 
context. A set of fundamental objectives are complete if knowing about the outcomes 
with respect to each objective provides a description of all the implications of interest 
when any alternative is selected. A set of fundamental objectives is measurable if the 
information used to analyze and measure the achievement of the objectives is available. 
Objectives are operational when factual information is available to relate the alternatives 
to their possible outcomes. The factual information can be gathered and collected easily 
when the fundamental set of objectives is decomposable. Objectives are decomposable 
when the aspects of the outcomes related to a specified attribute have no effect on the 
aspects of the outcome related to another attribute. 
 The set of fundamental objectives should be non-redundant, and concise to reduce 
the effort required to collect data and apply analysis methods when using the objectives 
to evaluate alternatives. Objectives should be understandable so the insights provided by 
value-focused thinking can be adequately understood by and communicated to different 
individuals involved in making the decision. 
3.3.7 Linking Hierarchies and Networks 
 There are several relationships between a fundamental objectives hierarchy and a 
means objectives network. While analyzing the alternatives of a decision problem, the 
fundamental objectives hierarchies and means objectives networks are connected. 
Sometimes, the possible outcomes in terms of achieving the fundamental objectives 
depend on the means objectives network. This connecting criteria help define what is the 
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best means in terms that relate directly to the decision maker’s fundamental objectives 
(Clemen, 2001). Figure 4 presents an example connecting fundamental objectives 
hierarchies and means objective networks. 
 
Figure 4 Example of Connecting Objectives hierarchies and Means Objectives Networks 
3.4 Decision Context 
 Keeney (1994) defined the decision context as “the set of alternatives appropriate 
to consider for a specific decision situation”. The decision situation is composed of 
course of events. Compatibility must exist between the decision context and the 
fundamental objectives. To achieve this compatibility, the decision context must be 
specified correctly. Incorrect identification can lead to capturing an incomplete or 
inaccurate picture of the decision problem which means we may end up solving a 
different problem, sometimes referred to as type III error. 
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3.5 Attributes 
 The fundamental objectives represent the reasons a decision maker is interested in 
a decision problem. These objectives represent how the available alternatives of a 
decision problem should be evaluated. Attributes are used to measure the achievement of 
these objectives located in the lower level objectives in a fundamental objective 
hierarchy. The measurement of these lower level objectives clarifies their meaning and 
might lead to enhanced alternatives when used in a creative manner. 
 An attribute is a scale used to measure the achievement of a fundamental 
objective by alternatives. In this chapter, the term fundamental objective is also referred 
to as objective for ease of explanation. Other terms that are sometimes used for an 
attribute are measure of effectiveness, criterion, performance measure, or metric. 
 Kirkwood (1997) refers to an attribute as an evaluation measure and defines it as 
“a measuring scale for the degree of attainment of an objective”. He classifies attributes 
as either natural or constructed, and as either direct or proxy. 
 A natural scale is a scale that is in general use with a common interpretation. The 
scale definition of a natural attribute is usually available. For example, for the objective 
“Minimize the number of trees lost”, a natural attribute is “The numbers of tree lost”. 
 A constructed scale is a scale developed for a particular decision situation to 
measure the degree of objective achievement by the value of the attribute. A constructed 
scale is used when a natural scale is not available for the decision problem. A full 
description of meaningful levels related to the objective is defined as a constructed 
attribute. Table 4 presents an example of a constructed scale for an attribute to evaluate 
public attitudes toward the decision of going to war. 
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Attribute Level          Description of attribute level 
2                    Strongly support: Two or more groups have organized support 
                         to the war. 
1 Support: One group has organized support to the war. 
0 Neutrality: All groups are indifferent. 
-1                      Opposition: One group has organized action against the war. 
-2                      Strongly opposition: Two groups or more have organized action 
                          against the war. 
 
Table 4 Example of a Constructed Attribute 
 The constructed attribute in Table 4 involves verbal descriptions of five different 
levels of public attitudes. A numerical value is assigned to each level. 
 A proxy scale reflects the degree of the achievement of an associated objective, 
but does not directly measure this objective. The proxy scale should be closely related to 
the original objective. While a direct scale directly measures the degree in which an 
objective is achieved, sometimes direct scale measures are impractical. In such case a 
proxy attribute is employed. Proxy scales, like direct scales can be quantitative or 
qualitative. 
 It is possible to have direct scales that are either natural or constructed. Similarly, 
it is possible to have proxy scales that are either natural or constructed. Figure 5 
highlights this distinction. 
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Figure 5 Different combinations of attribute types 
 The desirable properties of the attributes are related to the desirable properties of 
the fundamental objectives. There are three desired properties for the attributes. The 
attributes have to be measurable, operational, and understandable. 
 An attribute is measurable if it defines and clarifies the related objective more 
than the objective statement does by itself. 
 An attribute is operational if it defines the possible consequences of its related 
objective, and if it provides a sound basis for value judgments about the desirability of 
the possible degree of achievement of that related objective. 
 An attribute is understandable if there is no ambiguity regarding how attributes 
describe the consequences or the outcomes related to each level of the attribute. 
3.6 Alternatives 
 An alternative can be thought of as a course of action taken within some decision 
situation meant to achieve the objectives of the decision situation. An important factor in 
a decision problem is the alternatives. If there are not at least two alternatives, there is no 
decision problem. One of the benefits of value-focused thinking decision making is the 
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ability to generate alternatives beyond the initial obvious set of alternatives. Keeney 
(1994) proposed a methodology to generate alternatives using the elements of the 
decision problem, the fundamental objectives, attributes, means objectives, and evaluated 
alternatives. 
 There are four approaches used to generate alternatives when there is uncertainty 
in the decision problem: hedging, sequencing, risk sharing, and insuring. 
 It is possible to hedge against the uncertainty related to the outcomes of different 
alternative by generating an alternative that will neither do very poorly regardless the 
outcome, nor will do very well if you happen to guess right about the future. 
 The sequencing approach involves developing an alternative that allows the 
decision maker to sequence his decision. By breaking down the decision to small 
components along the time horizon of the decision situation, there is a better chance of 
making the right decision. Decision sequencing in some cases is the cause of the loss of 
precious time in a decision situation. 
 Another possible approach is to share risk with a partner. The decision maker thus 
neither gains all the profit nor absorbs all the loss. 
  Finally, it might be possible to buy insurance against the risk. This approach is not 
applicable to all decision situations. 
 Using the four mentioned approaches, and considering experts’ experience, it is 
possible to create alternatives for the decision problem. 
 While deriving alternatives, it is very important to consider constraints. There are 
two kinds of constraints, restrictions on resources, or restrictions on the types of 
alternatives. Examples of restrictions on resources are barriers, lack of time, people, or 
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supplies. An example of a restriction on the type of alternatives is a military unit that 
must attack along a designated axis of advance. Restrictions on resources limit what a 
decision maker can do, restrictions on the types of alternatives are things the decision 
maker can not do. 
3.7 Value Model 
 A value model clarifies any complex matter related to values. A value model v 
assigns a number v(x) to each consequence x = (x1,…, xN), where xi  is a level of attribute 
Xi measuring objective Oi . This number v(x) is used to measure the desirability of the 
consequences of an alternative and thus is used to evaluate alternatives. In most decision 
situations, there is no alternative that yields the best value with respect to all the possible 
outcomes related to all objectives. A value tradeoff is usually required. Also, different 
decision makers have different attitudes toward risks. Both value tradeoffs and attitudes 
toward risks are explicitly addressed in building a value model for a decision maker in a 
particular decision context. 
 Before building a value model, the fundamental objectives are identified, the 
attributes used to measure the achievement of those objectives are defined, and the 
alternatives are generated. Then a general structure for combining the attributes together 
is developed. In other words the alternatives are ranked when the different attribute 
measures are combined into a single index of desirability for an alternative (Kirkwood, 
1997). This combination requires the determination of a single dimensional value 
function used to derive an ordinal ranking of alternatives. 
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3.8 Determining a Single Dimensional Value Function  
 Usually a single dimensional value function will vary between 0 and 1 over the 
range of attributes levels that of interest. These value functions are often nonlinear.  
 When the number of the attributes levels are relatively small, a piecewise linear 
procedure is used to generate a piecewise linear single dimensional value function so that 
linear modeling approaches can be used. 
 The piecewise procedure to determine the functions requires that the value 
increment between the attribute levels be specified. The value increment refers to the 
degree to which the decision maker prefers higher levels to the lower levels. The 
procedure steps (Kirkwood, 1997) are: 
• The increments in the level value that results from each successive increase in the 
level value of a certain attribute are considered. These increments are placed in 
order of successively increasing value increments. 
• Define the value increments in terms of the smallest value increment. 
• Find the smallest value increments by setting the total of all increments to 1. 
• Determine the single dimensional value for all the levels of the attribute. 
 The above steps work for an attribute where higher levels value are preferred to 
lower levels value. To consider the case where the lower levels value are preferred to 
higher levels value in an attribute, the increments in level value of the attribute that 
results from each successive decrease in the level value are considered. These are placed 
in order of successively increasing value increments. 
 For an example, consider that an attribute (X) has the following levels: -1, 0, 1, 
and 2 with X= -1 as the least preferred level and X = 2 as the most preferred level. 
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Suppose that the value increment between X= 0 and X= 1 is the same as the value 
increment between X= 1 and X= 2 and this value increment is the smallest among all the 
other value increments between two neighboring levels in the attribute (X). Also, suppose 
that the value increment from X= -1 to X= 0 is twice the value increment between X= 0 
and X= 1. 
 Consider that y represents the smallest value increment, and that the sum of 
increments from X= -1 to X= 2 is 1, then  
2y + y + y = 1 leads to y = 0.25 
 To obtain the values for each level in attribute (X), the value increments between 
the lowest level and the highest level of interest are added. 
 V (-1) = 0.00 
  V (0) = 0.00 + 2 * 0.25 = 0.50 
   V (1) = 0.00 + 2 * 0.25 + 0.25 = 0.75 
  V (2) = 0.00 + 2 * 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.25 = 1 
V (-1) = 0.00 since it is the least preferred level, and V (2) = 1 since it is the highest 
preferred level. 
0
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-1 0 1 2
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Figure 6 Single Dimensional Value Function 
 59 
 The single dimensional value function based on this example is shown in Figure 
6. In Figure 6, straight lines are drawn between each of the single dimensional values, 
and the resulting function is called piecewise linear single dimensional value function. In 
practice the actual value increments are determined using structured interviewing 
techniques. The functions lead the decision making through a definition and then a 
validation of the value increments and the resulting value function curve. 
3.9 Determining Weights 
 In reality, not all attributes are of equal importance. Therefore, the next step to 
determine a value function (or a value model) is to find the weights applied to the 
different attributes. The weight (W) of an attribute is equal to the increment in value of 
moving the level on that attribute between its least preferred level to its most preferred 
level. The procedure of determining the weights (Kirkwood, 1997) are: 
• The increments in values from increasing each attribute from its least preferred 
level to its most preferred level are considered. 
• Each of these increments is defined as a function of the least value increment. 
• The sum of all the increments in terms of the smallest increment value is set to 
one. 
• Find the weights of all the attributes. 
 For an example, suppose that three attributes, Xa, Xb, and Xc, along with their 
levels are available. Consider that Xa = -1 is the least preferred level and Xa = 2 is the 
most preferred level for attribute Xa, Xb = 100 is the least preferred level and Xb = 0 is the 
most preferred level for attribute Xb, and Xc = -2 is the least preferred level and Xc = 1 is 
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the most preferred level for attribute Xc. A swing is defined as moving from the least 
preferred level to the most preferred level of an attribute. 
 Also, suppose that the swing over the total range of attribute Xa has the smallest 
increment in value, the swing over the total range of attribute Xb is as 1.5 the swing over 
attribute Xa, and the swing over the total range of attribute Xc is as 1.25 the swing over 
attribute Xb. Expressing that algebraically:   
      Wb = 1.5 Wa 
      Wc = 1.25 Wb = 1.25 * 1.5 Wa 
The summation of the weights is equal 1. 
      Wa + Wb + Wc = 1 
then       Wa = 0.22, Wb =0.35, and Wc = 0.43 
are the determined weights for this notional example. 
 There is no specific meaning for the value number without knowing the ranges of 
the levels of the attributes. The value model development procedure was specified so that 
if an alternative has the least preferred level on all the attributes, it will have a value of 
zero. Similarly, if an alternative has the most preferred level on all the attributes, it will 
have a value of one. The value number assigned to an alternative gives the percentage of 
the value improvement relative to the worst possible alternative (Kirkwood, 1997). 
 There are also procedures where attribute weights are determined via interviews. 
For instance the decision maker may provide weights directly. Another approach involves 
the decision maker indicating some strength of preference among the attributes. In either 
case, the modeler derives weights that capture the believed relationship among the 
attributes.  
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3.10 The Value Model (Value Function) 
 After determining the single dimensional value functions and the weights, the 
form of the final value function becomes: 
 v (Xa, Xb, Xc) = wa va(Xa) + wb vb(Xb) + wc vc(Xc) 
where Xa, Xb, and Xc are different attributes, wa, wb, and wb are the weights on the three 
attributes, and va(Xa), vb(Xb), and vc(Xc) are the single dimensional value functions over 
each of the three attributes. The value function scales to accommodate any number of 
attributes beyond the three shown in the example. 
3.11 Evaluating Alternatives Using the Expected Value of a Value 
Function 
 A rational decision maker wants to choose an alternative that most improves their 
position. The hierarchies and networks define what is important to the decision maker. 
The value function measures, and ranks, each alternative with respect to the hierarchies 
and networks. In general, considering weights as a likelihood, or probability, function 
means the expected value operator suffices as a means to rank order alternatives. The 
final measure is also called a weighted value function. 
 To determine the expected value number for each alternative in a decision 
problem, the expected value for the value function is calculated as: 
 Expected value for an alternative = E [wa va(Xa) + wb vb(Xb) + wc vc(Xc)]. 
 In other words, the expected value for any alternative is determined by calculating 
the value for each single dimensional value function, then multiplying this by the related 
weights, and finally summing the results. 
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 The expected value number states that there is a high probability that the average 
outcome for a large number of decisions will be close to the average of the expected 
values for the decisions. 
 In applying the expected value criterion, it is useful to use probabilities. It is 
helpful to organize the different attributes’ levels into an event space, before eliciting 
probability values to each possible level (outcome) in all the different attributes in the 
decision problem. Kirkwood (1997) presents procedures for determining and eliciting 
probabilities from decision makers. 
 The expected value is appropriate criterion for making business decisions, but 
there are situations where this criterion is not appropriate, such as situations where risk 
must be explicitly considered.  
3.12 Probability Assessing  
 A good deal of research has been conducted to help assess the probability that a 
given risk might occur.  Risk practitioners, and most humans, experience difficulty trying 
to assess the probability of a given risk or that some event might occur. The reasons for 
this difficulty are summarized below (Hillson and Hulett, 2004): 
• Terminology. Probability has a precise statistical meaning, but not everyone is 
familiar with it. 
• Unique nature of projects. All projects are unique in some manner, so there is no 
unique body of relevant previous experience from which to draw upon. 
• Unknowable risks. Sometimes risks are identified for which some details are 
inherently unknowable. 
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• Estimating versus measuring. Risks are possible future events that have not yet 
occurred; their probability of occurrence can not be measured but can only be 
estimated.  
 Subjective natural terms are often used to describe probability. Even though these 
words might be well defined and in common use, individuals tend to translate 
probability-related terms into percentage values or ranges unreliably. In other words, the 
same word or phrase can be interpreted subjectively and has different meanings to 
different people. This is due to the subjective nature of the language used to describe 
probability. Another reason is the inherent difficulties in dealing with uncertainty 
(Hillson, 2005). For example, when someone says a risk is likely to occur, this can be 
interpreted to mean anything from around 50% probability through to a 70% chance of 
occurring. 
 There is a body of research on assessing values to verbal probability-related 
terms. A methodology to deal with this dilemma is to explore the range of probability 
values associated with commonly used natural languages phrases. For examples of 
authors reporting such studies, see Lichtenstein & Newman (1967), Moore (1987), 
Boehm (1989), and Hamm (1991). Table 5 displays the study results carried by Boehm 
(1989) and Hamm (1991) respectively. 
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Boehm 1989 Hamm 1991 
Term 
Mode (Range) Proposed value 
Almost certain 98 (85-99) 95 
Highly probable - 90 
Quite likely - 80 
Good Chance 75 (60-90) 75 
Likely 60 (55-85) - 
Probable 70 (55-85) - 
Better than even 52 (50-60) 60 
Possible - - 
Unlikely 30 (15-45) - 
Improbable 20 (15-45) - 
Seldom - 15 
Highly unlikely 5 (0-15) 10 
Rare - 5 
 
Table 5 Studies on Probability-Related Terms (Percentage Values) 
 Assessing probability from a narrative scenario is not a simple procedure. The 
above discussion is applicable to a decision maker assessing probabilities, or to an analyst 
eliciting probabilities from a decision maker. In a narrative scenario, it is not always the 
case that the author of the scenario used the exact phrases as the scenario’s characters 
(decision makers) used in reality. The remedy in such a case is to gain a deep 
understanding of the scenario’s character (decision maker) values, and then assess the 
probabilities accordingly. The understanding of the methodology of assessing values to 
verbal probability-related terms will help to gain understanding of the decision maker’s 
values. 
3.13 Biases in Eliciting Probability  
 Humans think and process information in different ways. These ways have an 
influence on the way they handle decision situations. Organizational problems are the 
source of most failures in decision analysis (Brown, 1992). One of the reasons for those 
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failures is biases. Biases are errors or oversimplifications in thinking that occur in 
decision situations with similar characteristics (Keeney, 1994).  
 The primary consideration in eliciting probabilities is to use methods that 
overcome the various reasoning difficulties. The following are some biases that should be 
counteracted while eliciting probabilities. 
 Decision makers can be overly influenced by any information they have, even if 
logic shows that the information is unrelated to the situation; sometimes, decision makers 
focus on specific compelling examples without giving weight to other information. This 
dilemma is known as the anchoring bias. Anchoring might also occur in the creation of 
alternatives; people tend to anchor on the first alternative to create the other alternatives 
(Kenney, 1994). 
 A very common bias (Kirkwood, 1997) is when decision makers underestimate 
the degree of uncertainty in a situation. 
 Another bias is the motivational bias which is a conscious or unconscious 
adjustment in the individual’s probability based on personal rewards from the situation; 
the occurrence of a certain outcome might include a reward for the decision maker. 
Similarly, a decision maker might assign a lower probability to avoid certain 
consequences.  
 Merkhofer in 1987 (as referred in Kirkwood, 1997) reviewed probability 
elicitation procedures to overcome different possible biases. Also, for more details on 
overcoming biases, see Russo and Schoemaker (1990). 
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3.14 Attitudes toward Risk 
 Different individuals have different attitudes toward risk. When an individual 
takes a more conservative attitude toward risks than expected value would suggest, his 
attitude toward risk is called risk averse. In other words, when an individual will sell an 
alternative for less than its expected value, then his attitude toward risk is called risk 
averse; they are willing to receive less to avoid risk.  
 When the individual will sell an alternative for more than its expected value, then 
his attitude toward risk is called risk seeking; they are willing to accept more risk to get 
the gain. 
 Finally, when an individual will sell an alternative for exactly its expected value, 
then his attitude toward risk is called risk neutral. 
 To apply this idea to multiple attribute situations, consider two alternatives, A and 
B, having the same expected value. Alternative A has a probability of yielding a highly 
undesirable outcome where the attributes are at their worst levels. Alternative B has a 
probability of yielding a desired level on one attribute and an undesired level on another 
attribute at the same time. 
 A decision maker that prefers Alternative B to alternative A is called multi-
attribute risk averse. A decision maker that prefers alternative A to alternative B is called 
multi-attribute risk seeker. A decision maker that is indifferent between the two 
alternatives is called multi-attribute risk neutral. The multi-attribute qualifies is used to 
accommodate those real-life situations in which a decision maker must consider 
performance along more than one attribute. 
 
 67 
3.15 Determining Utility Function (A Power-Additive Utility Function) 
 Using expected value is not appropriate as a criterion for making decisions if the 
decision maker is risk averse. A Utility function is commonly used to model attitudes 
toward risk. Under risk an expected utility analysis is conducted instead of an expected 
values analysis to evaluate alternatives as the attribute value function measures are 
replaced with corresponding utility function values. 
 This procedure is done by assigning a utility number to each possible outcome 
(attribute level) that takes into consideration the risk attitude of the decision maker. These 
utility numbers are then used into the expected value calculations. 
 The utility concept is explained using Figure 7 (Adapted from Kirkwood, 1997). 
 
Figure 7 Utility Function Example (Kirkwood, 1997) 
 Each line represents a different utility function. The lines marked Rho1 and Rho2 
represent examples of utility functions where the utility of an attribute level is less 
desirable than the actual level of the attribute x. A risk averse decision maker always has 
a utility function with this “hill-like” shape, and a risk seeking decision maker always has 
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a utility function with a “bowl-like” shape (Kirkwood, 1997) (see lines Rho3 and Rho4). 
The straight line, Rho = infinite, represents the usual expected value, for a risk neutral 
decision maker. 
 Keeney and Raiffa in 1976 (as referenced in Kirkwood, 1997) proved by theory 
and applications the applicability of an exponential form of the utility function. The 
utility function is derived using the following equation: 
 , ∞≠ρ   
 , otherwise  
where nxxx ,...,, 21  are the attributes, and  
            )(...)()(),...,( 2221121 nnnin xvwxvwxvwxxxv +++= , 
where the iw  are weights, the )( ii xv are the single dimensional value functions, and ρ  is 
the multi-attribute risk tolerance parameter. 
 The specific shape of the exponential utility function depends on the multi-
attribute risk tolerance parameter ρ . The smaller the risk tolerance ρ , the more curved 
the shape of the exponential utility function. When the risk tolerance ρ  is smaller than 
one tenth the range of the attributes levels of interest, the utility function shape is so 
bowed which indicates unusual situation that requires special study. If the risk tolerance 
ρ  is greater than ten times the range of attributes levels being considered, then the curve 
is approximately a straight line, and the expected value criterion can be used to evaluate 
alternatives.  
 Kirkwood (1997) proved that a multi-attribute risk averse utility function has a 
positive multi-attribute risk tolerance, and multi-attribute risk seeking utility function has 
a negative multi attribute risk tolerance. 
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3.16 Determining the Multi-Attribute Risk Tolerance ρ  
 It is important to find a numerical value for the multi-attribute risk tolerance ρ  in 
order to determine the utility function. The multi–attribute risk tolerance ρ  models the 
degree of the decision maker’s risk aversion. 
 The procedures to determine ρ  are: 
• A hypothetical uncertain alternative with equal probabilities of yielding an 
outcome with all the attributes at their least preferred level or all the attributes at 
their most preferred level is considered. 
• A hypothetical certain alternative which is equally preferred to the uncertain 
alternative is determined. 
• A Statistical Table is used to determine the multi-attribute risk tolerance ρ .  
 The statistical Table contains pairs of numbers 5.0z  and R that solve the equation: 
  
)/1exp(1
)/exp(1
5.0 5.0
R
Rz
−−
−−
=  
 The value of the hypothetical certain alternative that has been determined is 
located in the 5.0z  column. Then the value of R in this table corresponding to that 5.0z  is 
the needed value of ρ . Such a table can be found in any statistics text book. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RELIABILITY MODELING 
 Reliability engineering is a relatively new discipline. The increased degree of 
complexity in technology, government contractual requirements to meet reliability 
specifications, and the profit and cost considerations resulting from failures are all factors 
that affect the growth of the reliability engineering field (Ebeling, 1997). 
 There are two different views of reliability. One view assumes that failures will 
occur randomly over time. This random process can be modeled using probability 
distributions, where the failure events or the non-failure events, can be predicted 
statistically. The other view attempts to analyze the physics of the failure process where 
the time to failure is determined using a derived mathematical model. It is essential to 
have knowledge about the failure mechanism and the causes of failures to develop these 
mathematical models regardless of the particular view adopted. 
4.1 Reliability Concept 
 Reliability as defined in Ebeling (1997) is, “The probability that a component or 
system will perform a required function for a given period of time when used under 
stated operating conditions”. To determine the reliability of a system or a component, 
three steps are performed. These three steps are derived from the definition 
specifications. First, describe the failure observably and unambiguously. Second, identify 
the unit of time. For example, the specified time interval maybe based on calendar, 
operating hours, or cycles. A cycle might be an on/off cycles or mission cycles. Third, 
observe the system or component under normal performance.  This observation step 
includes such factors as loads, environment, and operating conditions (Ebeling, 1997). 
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 Reliability is a subset of quality; it extends quality into the time domain. 
Reliability is defined as the quality of the system’s (component’s) operational 
performance over time. A high quality system has high reliability; similarly, a poor 
quality system has low reliability. 
4.2 Mathematical Reliability Functions 
4.2.1 Reliability Functions 
 Ebeling (1997) defined reliability as “The probability that a system (component) 
will function over some time period t”. Mathematically, 
 R (t) = P (T ≥ t)                                                                                                     (1) 
where T ≥ 0 is a continuous random variable representing the time to failure of a system 
(or component).  
 For a given value of time (t), the reliability is the probability that the time to 
failure (T) is greater than or equal to that given value of time (t). R (t) is a probability and 
hence the usual axioms of probability hold. 
 R (t) ≥ 0, R (0) = 1, and 0)(lim =∞→ tRt . 
 Define )(tF  to be the probability that a failure occurs before time t,  
              ][)(1)( tTPtRtF <=−=                                                                             (2) 
 and       
 dttdFtf /)()( =   or dttdRtf /)()( −= ,                                                                (3) 
F (t) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the failure distribution, and f (t) is 
the probability density function (PDF) of the failure distribution. 
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 The failure rate, or hazard rate function, is a function used in reliability studies. It 
provides an instantaneous (at time t) rate of failure (Ebeling, 1997). The following 
mathematical derivation is adapted from Ebeling (1997). 
 The following formula expresses the probability of a failure occurring within 
some interval of time ],[ ttt ∆+ : 
 )()(][ ttRtRttTtP ∆+−=∆+≤≤ .                                                                       (4) 
 The conditional probability of a failure in that time interval, given that the system 
has survived to time t, is:  
 =≥∆+≤≤ ][ tTttTtP
)(
)()(
tR
ttRtR ∆+−
.                                                   (5) 
Then,   
 
ttR
ttRtR
∆
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                                                                                           (6) 
is the conditional probability of failure per unit of time (failure rate). 
Set 0lim)( →∆= ttλ t
tRttR
∆
−∆+− )]()([
 . 
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1
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.                                                          (7) 
Using the )(tf  definition in equation (2), 
)(tλ =
dt
tdR )(−
 .
)(
)(
)(
1
tR
tf
tR
=                                                                                  (8) 
)(tλ  is known as the instantaneous hazard rate or failure rate function. The failure rate 
function )(tλ provides an alternative way of describing the failure distribution. It is the 
failure rate per unit of time. It is similar in meaning to reading a car speedometer at a 
particular instant and seeing 60 mph. The next instant the failure rate may change or it 
may stay constant.  Failure rates in some cases are characterized as increasing (IFR) 
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when )(tλ is an increasing function, decreasing (DFR) when )(tλ  is a decreasing 
function, or constant (CFR) when )(tλ  is a constant function. 
The bathtub curve is a special form of the hazard rate function )(tλ  and shown 
notionally in Figure 8. The bathtub hazard rate function captures the performance of 
systems (components) that experience decreasing failure rates early in their lifetime, then 
a constant failure rate, finally increasing failure rate. 
 
Figure 8 The Bathtub Curve 
 The four probability functions, the reliability function, the cumulative distribution 
function, the probability density function, and the hazard rate function, are used to 
determine reliability. Any one of these functions can be used to determine the remaining 
three functions. 
4.2.2 Reliability Summary Measures 
 Summary measures of reliability, mean time to failure, variance of the failure 
distribution, and median time to failure, can be determined from the reliability functions.  
 The mean time to failure (MTTF) is a measure of central tendency of the failure 
distribution: 
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 ∫ ∫
∞ ∞
===
0 0
)()()( dttRdtttfTEMTTF                                                                      (9) 
The variance of the failure distribution 2σ  is: 
 ∫ ∫
∞
−=−=
0
2222 )()()()( MTTFdttftdttfMTTFtσ .                                         (10) 
The average squared distance for a failure time to the MTTF is represented by the 2σ . 
 Another central tendency measure is the median time to failure: 
 }{5.0)( medmed tTPtR ≥==                                                                                  (11) 
The median divides the failure distribution in half. The probability of a failure occurring 
before the )( medt is 0.5, and the probability of a failure occurring after the )( medt  is 0.5. 
 The design life is defined to be the time to failure Rt  that corresponds to a 
specified reliability R.  
 RtR R =)(                                                                                                             (12) 
With the specified reliability R given, the design life Rt  can be calculated. 
4.3 Theoretical Reliability Models 
 Ebeling (1997) uses four different probability models to describe a failure 
process. These models are: the exponential, normal, lognormal, and Weibull probability 
distribution. The models are derived theoretically rather than empirically. The Weibull 
distribution is the candidate for the reliability modeling in this research. 
4.3.1 Weibull Probability Distribution 
 The Weibull distribution is useful in modeling both increasing and decreasing 
failure rates in reliability modeling. The form of its hazard rate function is: 
 batt =)(λ ,  
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where the power function )(tλ is increasing for a>0, b>0 and is decreasing for a>0, b<0. 
Usually, )(tλ is expressed as follow: 
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 Beta ( β ) is called the shape parameter as it determines the shape of the failure 
distribution. Table 6 adapted from (Ebeling, 1997) summarizes the effect of varied values 
of β . 
Event Property 
0< β <1 Decreasing failure rate 
β =1 Exponential distribution 
1< β <2 Increasing failure rate 
(Concave) 
β =2 Rayleigh distribution 
β >2 Increasing failure rate 
(Convex) 
3≤ β ≤4 Increasing failure rate, Approaches 
normal distribution 
 
Table 6 Weibull Shape Parameter Effects 
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 Theta (θ ) is called the scale parameter or the characteristic life and effects the 
mean and the spread of the distribution. 
4.3.2 Weibull Distribution Summary Measures 
 The mean time to failure (MTTF) and the variance for a Weibull distribution is 
given as follow: 
 MTTF = 



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+Γ
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1                                                                                          (16) 
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where Γ (x) is defined to be an extension of the factorial to complex and real number 
arguments. There are statistical tables available to determine the value of Γ (x). If the 
value of (x) is not available in the table, then the following relation can be applied: 
 )1()1()( −Γ−=Γ xxx  
The median time to failure is given using the following formula: 
 βθ /1)5.0ln(−=medt .                                                                                           (18) 
The design life is found from: 
 βθ /1)ln( RtR −= ,                                                                                                (19) 
where R is the specified level of reliability. 
4.3.3 Three-Parameter Weibull Probability Distribution 
 If the time to failure T  is greater than ot , otT > , where ot is a minimum life, then 
the three-parameter Weibull distribution can be used. For this model, 
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and  
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 The variance of this distribution is the same as the variance of the two-parameter 
distribution model, however, 
 MTTF = +ot 

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1                                                                                   (22) 
and 
 βθ /1)5.0ln(−+= omed tt .                                                                                     (23) 
4.4 Reliability of Systems 
 There are two configurations in which components are related in a system. These 
two configurations are: serial configuration and parallel configuration as shown in Figure 
9. For a serial configuration all the components must function for the system to function. 
In a parallel configuration, at least one component must function for the system to 
function. In practice, combinations of serial and parallel configurations are employed. 
 
Figure 9 System Configurations 
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CHAPTER 5 
SCENARIO USED FOR RESEARCH 
5.1 Definitions of Terms 
 Definitions of military terms and figures of weapons are presented below and 
organized in the order they appear in the scenario. Some definitions are adapted from the 
free, open content, community-built encyclopedia “www.Wikipedia.org”. 
• Observation post (OP): An observation post is a position from which soldiers can 
watch enemy movements and direct artillery fire. 
• Reconnaissance (Recon): The military term for the active gathering of 
information about an enemy, or other conditions, by physical observation. It is 
part of combat intelligence. 
• Platoon: In an army, a platoon is a unit of thirty to forty soldiers typically 
commanded by a lieutenant assisted by a non-commissioned officer. The platoon 
is formed by at least two squads (usually three or four squads).  
• Infantry: The infantry are ground soldiers who fight primarily with small arms 
(guns and rifles) and operate within organized military units. “Infantry” also 
refers to the branch of the military in which these soldiers serve. 
• Battalion: A battalion consists of two to six companies typically commanded by a 
lieutenant colonel. It is the smallest military unit capable of independent 
operations, but is usually part of regiment or a brigade or both, depending on the 
organizational model used by that service. 
• Military Doctrine: A level of military planning between national strategy and 
unit-level tactics, techniques, and procedures. It provides a shared thinking way. 
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• Headquarters: The location where most, if not all, of the important functions of an 
organization are concentrated. The term is used especially with regards to military 
organizations and large corporations 
• Company: A company is a military unit, typically consisting of 100-200 soldiers. 
Most companies are comprised of three or four platoons although the exact 
number may vary by country, unit type and structure. 
• TOW: Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile, the heaviest 
antitank machine missile in the U.S. inventory. Figure 10 is a picture of a TOW. 
 
Figure 10 TOW Example 
• LAV: Light Armored Vehicle. Figure 11 is a picture example of a LAV. 
 
Figure 11 LAV Example 
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• A-6 Jet: Marine aircraft, known as an “Intruder”. Figure 12 is a picture of an A-6. 
 
Figure 12 A-6 Intruder 
 
• M-60 Machine gun: A medium-size machine gun. Figure 13 is a picture of an M-60. 
 
 
Figure 13 M-60 Medium-Size Machine Gun 
 
• AT-4: a light, disposable antitank rocket. Figure 14 is a picture of an AT-4. 
 
 
Figure 14 AT-4 Antitank Rocket 
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• SAW: Squad Automatic Weapon, a light machine gun. Figure 15 is a picture of 
SAW. 
 
Figure 15 SAW Example 
 
• Close air support (CAS): CAS is the use of military aircraft in a ground attack 
role against targets in close proximity to friendly troops, in support of ground 
combat operations. 
• Sabot: A sabot is literally a French wooden shoe. Here it refers to a device named 
for a shoe used in a firearm or cannon to fire a projectile or bullet that is smaller 
than the bore diameter of the weapon. 
• A-10: The A-10 is an US Air Force aircraft designed for close air support of 
ground forces. It is a simple, effective and hardy single-seat, twin engine jet 
aircraft designed to attack tanks, armored vehicles, and other ground targets. 
Figure 16 is a picture of an A-10 (nick named the Thunderbolt) 
 
Figure 16 A-10 Thunderbolt 
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5.2 Command Hierarchies  
 The hierarchies of command shown from Figure 17 to Figure 21 are aids to 
understand the scenario and to avoid confusion due to the many scenario characters. 
 
Figure 17 Chain of Command (Recon Platoon) 
 
Figure 18 Chain of Command (Delta Company) 
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Figure 19 Chain of Command (Air Command Center) 
 
Figure 20 Chain of Command (Marines Commanders) 
 
Figure 21 Chain of Command (A-6 Attack Jet) 
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5.3 Scenario Narrative 
5.3.1 Introduction  
 The 1991 Gulf War was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of 32 
nations led by the United States. Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The United 
Nation applied economic sanctions against Iraq immediately after the invasion. The 
coalition forces freed Kuwait and achieved victory in 1991 with minimum coalition 
deaths. The main battles involved aerial and ground combat within Kuwait and the 
borders of Saudi Arabia.  
 The battle of Khafji was the first major ground engagement of the Gulf War 1991. 
It took place in the Saudi Arabia city of AL Khafji. As the air portion of Operation Desert 
Storm drew to a close, Iraqi troops invaded Khafji. US Marines called in for close air 
support (CAS) while they held off the invaders. A total of 25 US servicemen lost their 
lives over the course of the three day battle. A total of 75 Iraqi armoured vehicles were 
destroyed over the course of the engagement. Estimates of Iraqi casualties range upwards 
of 2,000 soldiers killed. Over 400 Iraqi prisoners were taken in the Khafji area during the 
period of the battle (January 29th-February 1st 1991) (Morris, 2004). Many decisions 
were made, and can be analyzed, over the period of the three day battle. Understanding 
Iraq's objectives was the first step in the Air Force effort to gauge the significance of 
Khafji. As stated by retired Air Force Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Forces Air 
Component Commander, the Battle of Khafji was downplayed at the time "because we 
didn't really understand what the objectives of the Iraqi army were." (Hedges, 2003) 
 A major concern for the coalition was protecting the colossal Marine logistics 
complex at Kibrit. Located at an abandoned airfield 30 miles south of the Kuwait border, 
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it was in the direct line of the enemy assault. Kibrit, the largest fuel and ammunition 
dump in the Marine Corps’ history, was erected to a previously unheard-of-scale, 
sprawling over 25 square miles and at one point storing nearly two million gallons of 
gasoline. Kibrit sprouted up practically overnight in preparation for the ground war and 
was brazenly situated forward of friendly lines in order to maximize the Marine attack’s 
forward momentum. 
 The Iraqi offensive consisted of three heavy divisions striking at four major points 
along the boarder, Observation Post 6 (OP 6), Observation Post 4 (OP 4), Observation 
Post 2 (OP 2), and Observation Post 7 (OP 7) as shown in Figure 22.  
 
 
Figure 22 Enemy Offensive, January 29, 1991 (Morris, 2004) 
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 The battle of Khafji can be decomposed into two parts: the outpost battles and the 
battle for Khafji. The following scenario (adapted from Morris, 2004) is a brief overview 
of the outpost battles particularly at Observation Post 4 (OP 4). 
5.3.2 Scenario (The Outpost Battle of Khafji) 
Figure 23 is an aid to understand the scenario. 
 
Figure 23 Scenario January, 29, 1991 (Morris, 2004) 
January 19, 1991 
 A group of marines, a recon platoon made their way to OP 4, located in the 
vicinity of Umm Hjul, located just over the Kuwait line at 179 meters above sea level. 
The site, a police customs house, was chosen as the recon platoon’s home because of its 
peculiar location along the Kuwait boarder. Umm Hjul is known to the Saudis as Markaz 
az Zabr. The geography of Markaz az Zabr provides a distinct disadvantage for the 
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marine platoon; any forces approaching the OP have the benefit of being in a position to 
fire down upon them. 
 In the infantry, visibility is paramount. According to the modern conception of 
war, almost all fighting positions are selected based upon how well one can observe the 
likely avenues of enemy approach. The ideal fighting position is a solitary, steeply 
sloped, uniformly graded hill with an escape route to the rear.  
 The commander of the recon platoon was Lieutenant Ross (see Figure 22). He 
wanted his men to work on improving the position despite heavy rain that would impede 
efforts. An eight foot high horseshoe-shaped berm directly behind the police post was 
ready and designated as the platoon’s fallback position. The berm was large enough to 
hold the entire platoon without its small fleet of vehicles (four Humvees and a five-ton 
truck). The platoon occupied a 500 meter front along the berm. The berm actually 
extended for several miles to a corresponding earthen wall on the Kuwaiti side. 
8:00 P.M. January 29, 1991 
 January 29
th
 was the night before Lieutenant Ross, his platoon sergeant Gillispie, 
and the rest of the platoon were to be relieved. Their mission that night was recon, to 
observe and report any enemy activity and if threatened by a large enough force, evacuate 
the area with utmost haste. The platoon was divided in three teams: Sergeant Mike 
Davis’s team, Sergeant John Jestel’s team, and Thomas Manney’s team. Corporal Miguel 
Roche was the communication chief of the platoon. 
 Lieutenant Ross and Sergeant Gillispie heard a noise coming from across the 
desert. In a few minutes they could see enemy tanks headed toward them. Ross went to 
the foot of the berm to Roche’s communication shed where he told Roche to wake the 
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soldiers of the platoon and to call and inform battalion about the new situation. Roche 
punched up a message to headquarters on the DCT, a small electronic pad with numerous 
pre-formatted messages stored in it. Unknown to Roche, the messages were not getting 
through to the battalion. Roche then ran to the bunkers to ready the soldiers. Several 
minutes passed before Ross and Roche realized the enemy was jamming their 
communications capabilities preventing their messages getting sent to the battalion 
command. 
6 P.M. January 29, 1991 
 Around four miles northwest from Lieutenant Ross’s position, Captain Roger 
“Rock” Pollard, the commander of Delta Company, had his section of TOW antitank 
vehicles ready. These vehicles are considered valuable assets with powerful night scopes. 
The TOW antitank vehicles were interspersed with his lighter, 25-mm-armed LAVs. 
8:20 P.M. January 29, 1991 
 At 8:20 pm Lance Corporal Dave Burrows observed three moving enemy vehicles 
and reported this to Sergeant Vitale, the leader of the TOW section. The moving objects 
were still too far away to deduce the type of vehicles or even determine if they were 
enemy vehicles. LAV companies at this stage in the war were equipped with first-
generation passive night sights, which were practically worthless in this type of situation. 
Vitale was unconvinced this contact would develop into anything significant; the contacts 
were headed south, away from OP 4 and were still too far out to be a threat. Nevertheless, 
the number of objects sighted continued to increase. Vitale informed Captain Pollard of 
the situation. Pollard and Vitale knew that the recon team in OP 4 was at least three or 
four kilometers closer to the situation. They were expecting to hear from the recon at OP 
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4 but the messages had not come. After a few minutes Captain Pollard realized that there 
were numerous tanks on the far side of the berm moving south. 
 Pollard requested permission from battalion headquarters to engage the enemy. 
Standard rules of engagement required permission to engage. Pollard gave Lieutenant 
Colonel Cliff Myers, the battalion commander, a detailed situation report and was told to 
wait for the situation to further develop, with air support provided as soon as possible. 
However, a stream of red tracer appeared from recon’s position meaning a drastic change 
in the situation had suddenly occurred.  
8:45 P.M. January 29, 1991  
 Ross and Roche continued working the radio to try and obtain air support. They 
had been trying for almost twenty minutes, but the radio was still not working. The 
platoon had been more or less abandoned, left out at the observation post for so long that 
their radio cryptographic data had expired. 
 Ross realized they would have to evacuate soon. However, he could not leave 
without informing his chain of command what was happening. The enemy was coming, 
and commanders back in the rear of the battle space needed to know the situation. 
 Roche went to the antenna farm at the back of his position to try and solve the 
radio problem. He checked the batteries and the antenna itself but it seemed like there 
was no hope. While Ross was with the radio, Gillispie was up on the berm using night 
vision goggles to observe the approaching enemy, now about a kilometer out. The 
Marines were ready to evacuate back to the horseshoe. Ross told Gillispie to signal the 
platoon to move back to the horseshoe. The signal was a red pop-up flare. 
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9 P.M. January 29, 1991 
 Lieutenant Ross and his platoon pulled away from the berm covering the 500 
meters back to the horseshoe berm. By then Ross had contact with an airborne command 
and learned a marine A-6 intruder attack aircraft was on the way. 
 While Ross and the platoon still could not get hold of the light-armored vehicle 
company, the air support would give them time to regroup before striking out to the south 
to find a safe site. Furthermore, the aircraft would be able to relay their message to 
battalion headquarters and request more air support. 
 Just then a green tracer fire emanating from the second story of the customs house 
hit the lead tank. It was sergeant Jestel’s M-60 machine gun followed by several 
resounding AT-4 shots. The enemy tanks returned fire with their 115-mm main guns. The 
tanks were now only few hundred meters away, practically point-black range for armored 
combat. 
 As the force of between ten to fifteen enemy tanks approached, Davis gave the 
signal to engage. Sergeant Bench decided to use all the AT-4 launchers within his reach, 
scoring one direct hit. Lance Corporal Anderson, the team’s SAW gunner, had thrown 
down his SAW to grab an idle M-60 nearby. Bench discarded his M-16, picked up 
Anderson’s SAW, and began engaging the tanks to his front. 
 In the customs house, Lance Corporal Jeffery knew that the enemy would be 
drawn to their position if he and the others tried to do something. Just as one of the 
vehicles moved into his sights, Jestel and the other Marines unleashed a fusillade of 
antitank rocket fire. The enemy return fire was ineffective impacting well behind 
Jeffery’s position. 
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 Soon an odd pause developed, the enemy appeared to be breaking off their attack. 
Sergeant Jestel yelled for his team to advance on the tanks. They sprinted out to a small 
clump of sand mounds in front of the house and hastily organized a defensive position. 
 Back at the horseshoe, Ross and Gillispie watched Jestel’s team in stunned 
disbelief. They knew the futility of trying to stop the tanks with machine guns and failed 
to understand why Jestel was shooting at them. Suddenly, the enemy jamming ceased. 
Ross suddenly had communication capability with Davis’s team. He told Davis to gather 
Jestel’s team and have them fall back to the horseshoe. 
 First Lieutenant Michael Kies, the bombardier navigator of the marine A-6 attack 
jet, received a radio call from the air-support center informing him that a ground unit on 
the border was in trouble and needed close air support. The pilot was Kies’s squadron 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Cummings. The air support center instructed them to 
change their radio to the ground radio frequency and make contact with the ground unit 
commander.  
 Kies contacted Lieutenant Ross and informed him that they were inbound and just 
a few minutes from their position. At his position Ross directed Kies toward an enemy 
tank. The A-6 dropped ordinance nearby directly on the target tank and then headed back 
to the base. The enemy vanguard appeared in disarray, with numerous vehicles breaking 
off the attack and careening through the gloom in random directions. 
 The enemy force, initially stunned by the volume of machine-gun fire and the 
cluster-bomb strike, had regrouped and were pressing on with their attack. They began 
blasting away at the small generator building behind the customs house and grinding 
toward the Marines. 
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 With air support outbound away from the battle, but more air support sure to 
follow, Ross began focusing on getting the light armored vehicles to his position to 
conduct a battle handover. Rather than surrender ground without a fight, he wanted the 
LAVs, with their heavier armament and antitank missiles to link up with his platoon and 
attrite the enemy armored formation in preparation for the coming air strikes. Also, if 
they could suppress the enemy, and take off some of the pressure of their advance, Ross 
and his marines could safely escape. 
 Ross grabbed another radio from Roche and began conversing with Pollard’s 
second-in-command, Lieutenant William. Ross managed to coax the LAVs forward. 
Enroute, Lieutenant William requested that Ross mark his position with an infrared 
strobe to avoid any friendly fire situation. This was a nearly universal control measure, 
and the LAVs, which had night sights mounted on their hulls, would be able to pick up 
the infrared flashes. Pollard informed Ross that as the company got closer, they would 
fire their 25-mm chain guns over the recon platoon to cover their escape. 
 Ross sent Lance Corporal Pacheco out with a wallet-sized infrared strobe light to 
the mouth of the horse shoe. As soon as Pacheco activated the beacon, tank rounds began 
impacting all around the Marines. Noticing the increasingly accurate barrages, Peacheco 
quickly snapped off the device. It appeared that contrary to all intelligence, the enemy 
also had night-vision scopes. Ross would have to target the LAVs via radio, a challenging 
proposition. 
 Meanwhile, Gillispie began collecting marines to strike at the converging tanks 
with their AT-4s. Although the AT-4s were not doing damage, they were rattling and 
confusing the enemy. As they started moving out, Ross spotted them; the last thing that 
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Ross wanted was for the platoon to get split up again or for half of the platoon to get 
decisively engaged as the other half was preparing to evacuate.   
Approximately 9:00 P.M. January 29, 1991 
 From his position, Pollard knew the enemy was shooting Sabot rounds designed 
to pierce the thick laminate steel of American tanks. The Sabot rounds were punching 
straight through the buildings of the observation post and emerging out the other side. 
 Lieutenant Williams reported to Pollard that Ross’ recon platoon was under fire 
and that he had requested Delta’s immediate assistance. To Williams, Ross sounded 
panicky and seemed to have lost control over his men. Ross apparently thought it was no 
big deal for LAVs to go against the much heavier enemy tanks. 
 Pollard was now caught in quandary of his life. Scared, tired, mad, confused, 
frustrated, and with a balefully incomplete understanding of the situation, he now had to 
decide whether to take his LAVs, which were never designed to get involved in such a 
tank attack, against the enemy tanks. Pollard had no idea of recon’s true disposition, did 
not know what had caused recon to open up fire, and did not know what else the enemy 
had in store for them. Earlier that afternoon, despite a meeting with Ross, Pollard did not 
find out if Ross had enough transportation for all his marines, and did not know if Ross 
had an entire platoon on the berm or just a single five-man team. Ross’s platoon was 
equipped with an older type of radio set meaning the only way that Pollard could talk to 
Ross was via a relay through Lt. Williams. This relay cost precious time and messages 
could get distorted as they passed from one end of the chain to the other. Pollard could 
not ignore recon’s pleas. He had planned to stay a safe distance away and use Vitale’s 
TOWs to destroy the enemy tanks. TOWs had the capability to destroy vehicles out to 
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3,750 meters. The longest range of the enemy’s tanks was 3,000 meters. He knew that the 
enemy could not cross the berm without an intense effort, and the only gap in the berm 
was the gap at OP 4. Controlling the berm gap became the decisive element to defending 
OP 4. Pollard figured that while he fought, Lieutenant William could work on obtaining 
further air support. 
 Pollard called over to Vitale and informed him that his platoon and Lieutenant 
Kendall’s Second platoon were to launch up to the border to go get recon and that he 
(Pollard) would need half of Vitale’s TOW vehicles to follow in trace to provide 
protective long range fire. As a final preparation, Pollard ordered his logistics train, the 
fuel truck, the recovery vehicle, the drinking water trailer, and the headquarters Humvees 
led by First Sergeant Alfonso Villa, to displace back away from the fight. 
 Pollard along with his second platoon, launched up the border. He left Lieutenant 
Sadowski’s platoon of six LAVs to hold down the position. Soon after they crossed the 
start line, things started disorganizing. Vehicle misalignment was not acceptable practice 
in such a nighttime situation. 
Nighttime, January 29, 1991, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 250 Miles South of OP 4 
 At the tactical air command center in Riyadh, the Coalition air headquarters for 
the war, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf and the commander of air forces, Lieutenant 
General Chuck Horner, had other concerns. They were working on degrading the 
enemy’s elite ground force, the Republican Guard, to fifty percent of their initial combat 
strength. 
 After midnight, one of Horner’s deputies, Brigadier General Buster Glosson was 
stunned to hear reports of enemy tanks columns attacking into Saudi Arabia. It looked to 
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be a major effort, encompassing most of the boarder region from OP 6, in the west, all the 
way to the town of Khafji on the Coast. Air strikes were being directed toward the border 
but only in piecemeal fashion. Horner’s air controllers were responding to Marine 
requests, but there was no real battle plan. No decisive action had been taken for over 
three hours. None of the air controllers on duty that night had warned Horner or Glosson 
that a major offensive was under way. 
 Over at the Light-Armored Infantry battalion command post, twenty miles south 
of OP 4, operations officer Major Jeff Powers heard from Delta team about the situation. 
After getting an update from Pollard, he ordered his staff to break down the command 
post tent and prepare for the fight. 
 Later, Powers received spot reports from his other company commanders. Bravo 
company to the south was reporting enemy movement to their front. Charlie company in 
transit from Khafji to OP 6 was reporting tanks on their horizon. Powers told the Bravo 
company commander to spread his vehicles out to prepare for saving Kibrit.
 Meanwhile, in the second Marine Division sector, 15 miles east of OP 4 at OP 2, 
the recon Marines at the police post watched the flashes from the fight at OP 4 on the 
horizon and decided to get out of the area while they could. 
 General Chuck Krulak, the head Marine logistics officer in the Gulf, had been 
worried for some time that the enemy would learn of Kibrit and attack the exposed 
supply base, demolishing the Marines offensive plans. When he heard of the enemy 
mechanized assault, he was convinced that Kibrit was the objective. He immediately 
ordered the base to hundred percent alert. 
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Approximately 9:15 P.M. January 29, 1991 
 Joshua Brierly the TOW gunner for Green 1 (in Delta group) saw an enemy tank 
at just 3,000 meters away from him. He reported to his vehicle commander that an enemy 
main battle tank was less than two miles away. This was just under the range of a soviet 
T-80 tank. The main plan of the group was to move up to the border and wait for the 
enemies to approach within the Marines TOW range. The enemies would be destroyed by 
missiles from vehicles they would never see. At that time, the situation was that the 
marines were exposed to the enemy fire. 
 Sergeant Michael Wissman, the commander of Green 1, called over to Vitale 
informing him that his gunner has a tank at three thousand meters, and was requesting 
permission to engage. 
 Vitale was a few hundred meters away, in Red 1. He knew Brierly as a good 
marine, one of the best in the group at armor identification. Vitale was also thinking how 
the enemies rolled up so close on them without them knowing, and wondering where the 
other enemy’s tanks were. 
 Vitale decided that he had to double check his information. He ordered Jason 
Brown from Red 1 and Scottie Pruett from Green 4 to conduct a search to confirm 
Brierly’s distance to target. After two minutes, both confirmed that Brierly’s target did 
not exist. Briely’s call from Green 1 did not seem right, it was way too close. Even 
Sergeant Wissman at the Green 1 has his doubts when Brierly first reported the tank. The 
enemies were at 6,000 meters at one minute and then somewhere under 3,000 the next 
minute.  
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 Wissman called again to Vitale asking permission to engage, Vitale switched over 
to Pollard in Delta 6 and cleared him to fire. Vitale switched back to the TOW net where 
he ordered Brown who was standing near him, Brierly from Green 1, and Pruett from 
Green 4 to fire. 
 At that time, Pollard saw the whole thing. Pollard and 2
nd
 platoon were heading to 
get recon when he saw Green 2 to his left rear getting ripped apart. Pollard reported back 
to Battalion that he lost a vehicle, but he did not know that his people had destroyed it. 
 After the missiles were launched, Vitale noticed that Brown’s missile hit the 
target at 23 seconds, Pruett’s missile impacted at 25 seconds, but Brierly’s missile hit 
after only 3 seconds. He knew that something was wrong. When he heard Pollard’s 
report, he knew that they had just killed Green 2 with Corporal Ismael Cotto, Lance 
Corporal Daniel Walker, Lance Corporal Dave Snyder, and Private Scott Schroeder in it. 
 At the berm, Roche and Pacheco noticed that the TOW vehicles suddenly stopped 
moving back. Lt. Ross was thus presented with a staggering dilemma. Should he and his 
platoon remain in the horseshoe and hope that LAVs would come to take the pressure, or 
did they “cut bait” and clear out of this bad scene. Clearing the area would be under the 
enemies’ fire, and staying there would be waiting for the enemy to attack them especially 
after their position was cleared to the enemy because of the infrared strobe fiasco. In 
combat, sometimes action, any action, seems preferable to doing nothing. 
 Ross told the men to load up. The Humvees started leaving the horseshoe within 
minutes. Roche was trying all Delta’s frequencies to try and obtain communication with 
them to let them know they were inbound. As they got closer, mistakenly, the LAVs 
began firing their 25-mm cannons at recon but recon was able to avoid it.  
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 After the death of Green 2, Pollard and Kendall’s group of LAV-25s pressed on 
with their attack, leaving the wounded TOW group behind. Pollard yelled over to 
Williams, “What does recon have for transportation? How many of them do we have to 
pick up? How close to the buildings do we have to go? Can’t they just meet us halfway?” 
Enemies’ Sagger missiles were flying up in the air. The Marines began putting a steady 
steam of 25-mm fire downrange. But firing at the enemy with 25-mm rounds was not 
solving anything. Pollard needed to resolve this recon question, pull back to the main 
body of the company, and wait for some serious air support to start leveling the 
battlefield. 
 After several minutes, Lt. Williams came back with the answer to Pollard’s 
question. Recon had five ton vehicle (the 5-ton, 6x6, vehicles are tactical vehicles 
designed for highway and cross-country terrain) and a few Humvees, and they were 
heading back for pickup. Soon Pollard started to see the recon vehicles so he called and 
informed Battalion that recon was out.  
 Pollard started the withdrawal back to Delta’s main line of resistance. At this 
time, Lt. Williams began shifting Sadowski’s Platoon south to a new position three 
thousand meters due west of OP 4. This superior locale allowed them to better suppress 
the enemy and provide cover for Pollard’s withdrawal back to Delta’s main line of 
resistance. 
 Allied aircraft were beginning to filter in. Lt. Williams along with the company’s 
air controller, Corporal Russell Zawalick, began to direct these planes onto OP 4. 
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Approximately 9:30 P.M. January 29, 1991 
 The first flight of aircraft to arrive at OP 4, after the lone A-6 jet, was a two-ship 
formation of Air Force A-10 Thunderbolts, responding to a request from the LAV 
battalion. The control of the A-10s was turned over to Zawalick, stationed two feet away 
from Lt. Williams inside Delta’s antenna-studded command-and-control LAV, a few 
hundred meters behind the main screen line. When Zawalick began to direct the A-10s 
onto the enemy columns of tanks, he discovered that A-10s lacked effective night vision 
equipment with which to acquire targets. 
 This unfortunate circumstance certainly was not making Zawalick’s life any 
easier. Actually, as the A-10s checked in, Zawalick attempted to orient them, asking if 
they could spot the police post buildings, the virtual center of the action. After several 
passes, the A-10 flight leader radioed back to Zawalick, informing him that they were 
unable to locate the landmark. 
 For Zawalick this was a tough decision. He could just point the pilots in the right 
direction, and hope for the best, knowing that they would blast some enemies, but he 
knew that if he did so, he ran a serious risk of the A-10s mistaking one of Delta’s LAV 
for an enemy tank. 
 Williams came up with the idea of trying to direct the A-10s using the flashes of 
the LAV’s 25-mm rounds as they ricocheted off the enemy tanks. One of the pilots had 
mentioned that he could see their rounds impacting. Williams thought that if they could 
coordinate their fire, then they could adjust the A-10 aircraft off the flashes and bring the 
aircraft to bear on the enemy in short order. He ordered the company to train their 
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weapons on the tanks nearest the breach. After a series of runs, the adapted targeting plan 
worked. 
 A second pair of A-10s checked aboard. Zawalick tried to bring the flight around 
for a Maverick missile run, but this night knew no master and was aggravated by the Iraqi 
jamming and the fact that Delta and its enemies were now only hundreds of yards apart. 
Earlier they had been able to guide the fliers to targets without difficulty, but now as 
forces converged, the pilots struggled to make sense of the swirling ground clutter of 
activity. The battle was entering a new phase, and Williams figured that it was time to fall 
back to somewhere safer. 
 An A-10 came around again and told Zawalick that he is going to drop a flare, 
hoping that Zawalick would be able to direct him based on the bright marker. The blazing 
cylinder was dropped from the sky, the only problem was that it was laying in the middle 
of Delta’s screen line, making their position clear for any enemy tank for miles around. 
The flare fell close to one of the LAVs, “Blaze of Glory”. Sergeant Mongerella was the 
vehicle commander, and Ron Tull was the vehicle driver. When they noticed the human 
sized flare, Mongrella ordered Tull to move the vehicle away. He had backed the vehicle 
up 50 or 60 yards when he saw one of his friends, out in the desert trying to extinguish 
the flare using a shovel. Thirty second later, the Blaze of Glory was consumed by fire. 
 Zawalick told the A-10s that he had just marked Delta’s position with his flare. 
Zawalick then radioed for the A-10s to engage targets 6,000 meters away at an azimuth 
of 126 degrees magnetic. At this point, Lt. William grabbed Zawalick and told him to 
shut the A-10s down because Blaze of Glory was hit. Zawalick replied that no one he was 
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controlling had fired yet. Williams told him to figure out who fired. Zawalick began 
spinning to all frequencies asking who had just shot, but no one answered. 
 When Pollard discovered what happened, he first thought that the enemy had hit 
them. He needed to figure things out. He thought that because of the flare, the enemy had 
zeroed in on Delta’s position, but seeing as how they were still outside of tank range, he 
had no idea what they could have hit them with. He asked Vitale to scan for any enemy in 
the region and the answer was that there were no tanks approaching. 
 First Sergeant Alfonso Villa, back with the logistics vehicles and Humvees, 
radioed Pollard asking if there were any survivors from Blaze of Glory. Villa has several 
corpsmen back with him, and if they were going to mount a recovery effort, they needed 
to get started immediately. Pollard told him no, that the explosion was too intense to 
allow any survivors. 
 Lt. Williams came up on the net and said that they now had aircraft stacked up 
from OP 4 to Riyadh and that they should evacuate the area and let the air wing handle 
the situation. At 11:30 PM, Pollard called over to Battalion, who quickly gave him 
permission to evacuate OP 4. 
12:45 A.M. January 30, 1991 
 Eventually the recon platoon made its way to a safe position well away from the 
dangers berm. Sergeant Vitale could not just leave without trying to check on Green 2. 
Delta had started withdraw, but as far as he was concerned, he still had a missing vehicle 
out there. He could not just walk away. He was hoping that somehow Cotto and his 
soldiers were still alive, that their radio was dead or that they had experienced a total 
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electrical meltdown and were just waiting for a pickup. He lit out from Delta lines to go 
get them. 
 Because he was trying to travel as much as possible in hunt for Green 2, when 
Vitale decided to head back to friendly lines, he discovered that he was disoriented. 
 After he gave up, he began swinging a blue-colored chem-light on a piece of cord 
to attract the company’s attention. He was found 20 minutes later. 
5.4 Scenario Features  
 The term scenario originated in the performing arts, it means an outline or 
synopsis of a film or play. In this research, the term scenario means an internally 
consistent story about how events develop over time (Kirkwood, 1997). The battle of 
Khafji scenario was chosen because of many reasons. The battle of Khafji scenario was 
detailed enough to gain a deep understanding of the decision makers values. The scenario 
covers the smallest thoughts and details about what they cared about. The derived value 
models and hierarchies captured the values of the decision makers accurately. 
 The battle of Khafji was also chosen because it included the worst incidents of 
friendly fire or fratricide between US forces since the Vietnam War (Hedges, 2003). A 
total of 11 US Marines were killed in two separate incidents on January 29, 1991 at 
Observation Post 4 (OP 4). The main cause of friendly fire incident can be seen as data 
flow misinterpretation. These incidents and other events where information was 
misinterpreted by decision makers in the scenario are modeled using the reliability 
distributions.   
 The scenario also includes examples of how the value of information degraded 
over time. This degradation is captured by an information reliability model which is used 
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to feed the decision model. In other words, the battle of Khafji scenario contains 
decisions that were made exploiting information available. This information varied over 
time due to the dynamic nature of the battle. This variation had a unique affect on the 
decision situations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
VALUE STRUCTURE AND VALUE-FOCUSED THINKING MODEL 
6.1 Introduction 
  A battlefield decision making scenario is easily classified as a dynamic multi-
objective decision making problem, mostly unstructured and highly uncertain. A decision 
maker in the battlefield decision space deals with dynamically changing information. A 
future decision may depend on what happened before even if what occurred before was 
unexpected. Typically, information used to make decisions flows from various sources. 
Whether this information is reliable or not, motivates the decision maker to use this 
information to plan, analyze, and decide on a best alternative to achieve the desired 
objective, such as defeating the enemy. In a battlefield there is really no single decision to 
make; several sequential decisions are made. Each period of time may receive new 
information making it sometimes necessary to make a new decision each time. In a 
battlefield, one decision and its impact, leads to another decision in a sequential fashion. 
 Multi-objective decision making models provide a means to examine how 
decision makers make choices among competing alternatives, available or generated 
alternatives, by weighting the importance of different objectives and then systematically 
evaluating how well alternative solutions achieve the desired objectives. This research 
explores such models applied to battlefield decision making. 
 Military decision making comprises both individual and group decisions. The 
members of a group may or may not be located at the same physical location through the 
scenario, but in an ideal case they are aware of one another. Military forces in combat are 
one of the common examples of decision making groups at different physical locations. 
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 Regardless of whether decisions are made individually or as a group, the 
decisions are made based on a systematic process. This research proposes the use of 
value focused thinking as a means of describing that systematic decision making process. 
What follows in this chapter is the value-focused thinking model of the research decision 
making scenario. The value-focused thinking decision model is composed of a decision 
model and a value model. A decision model is the combination of a fundamental 
objectives hierarchy, a means objectives network, and the attributes used to assess how 
well alternatives achieve objectives. A value model expands the decision model into a 
model that can be used quantitatively to evaluate alternatives in a decision situation using 
the value-focused thinking decision analysis techniques.  
 Figure 24 present a general form of the decision hierarchy for the military.  
 
Figure 24 General Decision Hierarchy for Military 
 The decision hierarchy in Figure 25 was derived as applicable to the battle of AL 
Khafji scenario. The hierarchy presents the decision makers modeled in this research. 
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Figure 25 Decision Hierarchy 
 Different members in the decision hierarchy may have different values, and thus a 
different VFT model (decision model and a value model) is constructed for most of the 
members in Figure 25 decision hierarchy.  
 In this chapter, the battle field collaborative multi-objective decision making is 
characterized using value focused thinking. Due to the doctrinal military decision making 
process, there are two different classes of collaborative multi-objective decision 
situations in the decision hierarchy in Figure 25. One class involves multiple decision 
makers that must collectively agree on a course of action (examined horizontally through 
the decision hierarchy). This class relation is embedded in the qualitative derivation of 
the objectives of the different members in the decision hierarchies. In the second class, 
one decision maker is the main decision maker, but he accounts for the values of other 
subordinate members in his decision. The values of each member may be treated equally, 
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or the main decision maker may assign less weight to the values of other members 
(examined vertically through the decision hierarchy). This class of relation is embedded 
in the qualitative derivation of the objectives of the different members in the decision 
hierarchies. This type of relation applies constraints and restrictions on the use of 
resources and alternatives by the subordinate members in the decision hierarchy.   
 Value focused thinking has been used before as a methodology in military 
application. However, it was never used in combat applications. Parnell, et al. (1998) 
developed a value-focused thinking model “Foundations 2025” to evaluate which system 
concepts and technologies for achieving air and space dominance in the year 2025 have 
the greatest potential to ensure that dominance. The model study was preceded by a 
similar study in 1993 “Spacecast 2020” reported by Burk and Parnell in 1997 to identify 
future space system concepts (as referred in Parnell, et al. 1998). 
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6.2 Decision Models 
 A decision model is the combination of a fundamental objectives hierarchy, a 
means objectives network, and the attributes used to assess how well alternatives achieve 
objectives. Objectives structuring is the main task in building a decision model. The 
framework for deriving objectives was personal military conceptual experience, and 
military training and doctrine documents. In the proceeding section, a specified decision 
model is constructed for each member of the decision hierarchy in Figure 25. 
6.2.1 Headquarters 
 The definition of military objectives according to the Department of Defense 
(DOD), as mentioned in (US Military Glossary, 2005), is: “the derived set of military 
actions to be taken to implement National Command Authorities guidance in support of 
national objectives. Defines the result to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to 
commanders”. 
 Working with this, defense planning begins with basic national level objectives. 
Examples of basic national level objectives are the political objectives in the documents 
of the U.S. Constitution. All of national power instruments (political, economic, and 
military) can be used in achieving political objectives. 
 Political objectives and military objectives are different in form and structure, but 
are strongly related. The political objectives describe the destination, while the military 
objectives describe how to reach the destination militarily. 
 Political objectives can be limited or unlimited. Unlimited political objectives are 
usually easily explained. Limited political objectives are usually complicated due to the 
combination of positive and negative goals. Limited political objectives are usually 
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supported by limited military objectives; the cost of the war based on unlimited military 
objectives might be more than the value of the objective (Essays on Air and Space Power, 
1997). 
 The Gulf War however, is an example of an unlimited military strategy applied 
successfully in pursuit of a limited political objective (Strategy, 2005). The limited 
political objective was to restore Kuwait’s independence. To achieve this objective it was 
deemed necessary to destroy all the capability of the enemy forces to resist and eject 
them from Kuwait by force, essentially an unlimited military objective. 
 The battle of Al Khafji scenario is a part of the larger Gulf War scenario. To 
develop the fundamental objectives hierarchies for the different members in the decision 
hierarchy, or at least for the top level, the general objectives of the Gulf war should be 
considered. 
 The strategic objective of the Gulf War scenario was “winning the war”. A 
strategic objective should provide common guidance to all the generated objectives and 
later to all the decision opportunities. The fundamental objectives that fall under this 
strategic objective are considered the Headquarters fundamental objectives for the Gulf 
War. These fundamental objectives are: 
• Deter the Iraqi aggression. 
• Restore lost territory (Kuwait). 
• Defend the homelands like: Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar (Basically the 
lands where the coalition forces exist). 
• Protect lines of communication. 
• Defeat an opponent. 
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• Win the media war. 
 The political objectives effects are clear in the list of the Headquarters 
fundamental objectives for the Gulf War like the political objective of “win the media 
war”. A media war is a political concern rather than a military concern. 
 The fundamental objective hierarchy of the general headquarters for the Gulf War 
is shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26 Headquarters Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy for the Gulf War 
 Using the strategic objectives and the fundamental objectives of the Gulf War, 
with an understanding of their deriving forces, the Headquarters’ strategic objective and 
fundamental objectives for the battle of Al Khafji are derived. The initial strategic 
objective for the battle of Al Khafji was to defeat the Iraqi aggression. This strategic 
objective changed over time to a more specific objective. As the Iraqi aggression resulted 
in occupying Al Khafji city, the strategic objective changed to restoring the freedom of 
the city of AL Khafji. Both strategic objectives were guided by the main strategic 
objective of winning the war; both can be combined into a single strategic objective as 
“Win the battle”. 
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 The fundamental objectives of the headquarters were derived and are: 
• Restore lost territory. 
• Deter Aggression. 
• Protect lines of Communication. 
• Protect Resources “Kibrit”. 
 The fundamental objective hierarchy of the headquarters for the battle of Al 
Khafji is shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27 Headquarters Fundamental Objective Hierarchy for the Battle of Al Khafji 
A complete decision model for the headquarters was not derived and constructed  
in this research due to scenario constraints. However, the Headquarters’ fundamental 
objectives serve as a guide in deriving the fundamental objectives of the lower levels in 
the decision hierarchy, and to help capturing a complete overview of the values in the 
decision hierarchy. 
 The second level in the decision hierarchy is the platoon and group commanders. 
In the scenario, there are two decision makers in this level:  
• 1st Lt. Stephen Ross, Commander of the recon platoon. 
• Captain Roger Pollard, Commander of Delta Company. 
  
 
 112 
 Separate sets of objectives were generated and organized into fundamental 
objectives hierarchies and means objectives networks. Attributes are used to measure the 
achievement of their objectives when examining alternatives. 
6.2.2 Lt. Stephen Ross 
 Lt. Ross is a commander of a recon platoon. The mission of a recon platoon in the 
military is to observe and report any enemy activity and if threatened by a large enough 
force, to evacuate with utmost haste.  
 In considering Lt. Ross’s values, one considers values significant enough to 
consider when evaluating decision alternatives. Using this approach a list of Ross’s 
objectives, consistent with the decision context (scenario), were derived and are: 
• Keep the troops alive. 
• Stay alive. 
• Achieve the main mission successfully. 
• Establish a good communication with the upper chain commanders. 
• Establish a good communication with lower officers and soldiers. 
• Maintain a high Situation awareness. 
• Minimize response time. 
This list of objectives includes both means objectives and fundamental objectives. 
Both kinds of objectives were separated by examining each objective on the list (using 
the WITI test). This was a critical step because the objectives which are important 
because they help achieve other objectives (means objectives) were separated from the 
objectives that are important because they reflect what Lt. Ross really wants to 
accomplish. The results of the effort are the following: 
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Fundamental objectives: 
• Stay alive 
• Keep the troops alive 
• Achieve the main mission successfully 
Means objectives: 
• Establish a good communication with the upper chain commanders. 
• Establish a good communication with lower officers and soldiers. 
• Maintain a high situation awareness. 
• Minimize response time. 
 The fundamental objectives are organized into a fundamental objectives 
hierarchy. The upper levels in the hierarchy represent more general objectives, and the 
lower-levels explain the important elements of the more general levels (Clemen and 
Reilly, 2001). 
For example, the higher level fundamental objective of “Keep the Troops Alive” 
has two lower-level fundamental objectives “Minimize Number of Injuries” and 
“Minimize Number of Casualties” that explain what is meant by the higher level 
objective. Each of the lower-level fundamental objectives describes an aspect of keeping 
the troops alive. Another lower-level was added as an aspect of those two lower-level 
objectives distinguishing between injuries to soldiers or team leaders, and similarly 
distinguishing between death of soldiers or team leaders. Figure 28 displays the 
fundamental objectives hierarchy for Lt. Stephen Ross. 
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Figure 28 Lt. Stephen Ross, Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
 The means objectives were organized into a network depicting how the means 
objectives are important to achieve specified fundamental objectives. The fundamental 
objectives hierarchy and the means objectives network combined together as shown in 
Figure 29. 
 
 
Figure 29 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy and Means Objectives Network for Lt. Ross 
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Figure 29 shows the relation between the means objectives and the fundamental 
objectives. The mean objective “Minimize Response Time” helps achieve the 
fundamental objectives “Stay Alive” and “Achieve the Main Mission Successfully”. If 
the commander response time to take the right decision is short, the odds to achieve the 
mission successfully can be higher. 
The next step was to derive attributes to measure the achievement of the 
fundamental objectives. The assignment of attributes to measure the objectives required 
value judgments. These value judgments, like all other value judgments, can lead to 
insights from value focused thinking (Keeney, 1994). 
There are six fundamental objectives in the lower level of the hierarchy that need 
attributes to measure the objectives’ achievements.  
For the fundamental objective “Stay Alive”, the outcome related to this objective 
is either staying alive or dead. Two additional levels are added between these two 
outcomes. The attribute “Life Status” definition includes a verbal description of the four 
levels of the objective achievement and a numerical indicator assigned to each level. The 
complete attribute scale is illustrated in Table 7. Level 0 is defined as the most favorable 
level and level 3 is defined as the most unfavorable level. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attributes Level        
0        
1 
2 
3 
Alive without Injuries 
Alive with Minor Injuries 
Alive with Major Injuries 
Dead 
 
Table 7 Attribute “Life Status” for Lt. Ross  
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The fundamental objective “Keep his Troops Alive” is specified by the lower 
level objectives: “Minimize Casualties in Soldiers”, “Minimize Casualties in Team 
Leaders”, “Minimize Injuries of Soldiers”, and “Minimize Injuries of Team Leaders”. A 
single natural attribute for each of these lower level objectives is available. These natural 
attributes imply that each death or injury is evaluated equally which is appropriate for the 
given scenario.  Collectively, these four attributes are used to measure the degree to 
which the higher level fundamental objective “Keep his Troops Alive” is achieved. These 
four attributes scales are illustrated from Table 8 to Table 11, respectively. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 % Dead 
1-25% Dead 
26-50% Dead 
51-75% Dead 
76-100% Dead 
 
Table 8 Attribute “Number of Casualties in Soldiers” 
 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 Dead 
1 Dead 
2 Dead 
3 Dead 
 
Table 9 Attribute “Number of Casualties in Team Leaders” 
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Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 % Injured 
1-25% Injured 
26-50% Injured 
51-75% Injured 
76-100% Injured 
 
Table 10 Attribute “Number of Injuries in Soldiers” 
 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 Injured 
1 Injured 
2 Injured 
3 Injured 
 
Table 11 Attribute “Number of Injuries in Team Leaders” 
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 For the objective “Achieve the Main Mission Successfully”, the complete 
attribute “Mission Achievement” scale is illustrated in Table 12. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
Mission was Perfectly Achieved 
(Information was sent) 
Mission was Partially Achieved 
(Information was partially sent) 
Mission Failed 
(Information was sent) 
 
Table 12 Attribute “Mission Achievement” 
 
This constructed attribute was developed specifically for the scenario decision 
context. The mission was to send information to the headquarters. Therefore, to avoid 
ambiguity and to meet the understandability requirement, the meaning of each level of 
the scale is described in Table 12. For example, the meaning of “Mission Failed” is 
explained as (information was not sent). It was necessary to construct this attribute 
because there is no natural attribute existed to measure the objective “Achieve the Main 
Mission successfully”. 
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6.2.3 Captain Roger “Rock” Pollard 
Captain Pollard is a commander of a fighting group. His mission includes 
visualizing the current state and future state, formulating concepts of operations to get 
from one state to another state, and doing so at least cost. His duties also include: 
assigning missions to his troops, assigning priorities, allocating resources, selecting the 
critical time and place to act, and knowing when and how to make adjustments. 
 In considering Captain Pollard values, one considers values significant enough to 
consider when evaluating decision alternatives. Using this approach a list of Pollard’s 
objectives, consistent with the decision context (scenario), were derived and are: 
• Stay alive. 
• Keep the troops alive. 
• Achieve the main mission successfully. 
• Re-supply friendly forces. 
• Protect Military assets. 
• Maintain a high situation awareness. 
• Locate and destroy enemy weapons. 
• Neutralize enemy radars. 
• Stop and prevent artillery attacks against forces.  
This list of objectives includes both means objectives and fundamental objectives. 
Both kinds of objectives were separated by examining each objective on the list (using 
the WITI test). This was a critical step because the objectives which are important 
because they help achieve other objectives (means objectives) were separated from the 
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objectives that are important because they reflect what Capt. Pollard really wants to 
accomplish. The results of the effort were the following: 
Fundamental objectives: 
• Stay alive 
• Keep the troops alive 
• Achieve the main mission successfully 
• Protect Military Assets 
Means objectives: 
• Maintain a high situation awareness. 
• Locate and destroy enemy weapons. 
• Neutralize enemy radars. 
• Stop and prevent artillery attacks against forces.  
• Re-supply friendly forces. 
 The fundamental objectives are organized into a fundamental objectives 
hierarchy. The upper levels in the hierarchy represent more general objectives, and the 
lower-levels explain the important elements of the more general levels (Clemen and 
Reilly, 2001). 
The higher level fundamental objective of “Keep the Troops Alive” has two 
lower-level fundamental objectives “Minimize Number of Injuries” and “Minimize 
Number of Casualties” that explain what is meant by the higher level objective. Each of 
the lower-level fundamental objectives describes an aspect of keeping the troops alive. 
Another lower-level was added as an aspect of those two lower-level objectives 
distinguishing between injuries to soldiers or officers and team leaders, and similarly 
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distinguishing between death of soldiers or officers and team leaders. Figure 30 displays 
the fundamental objectives hierarchy for Captain Pollard. 
 
Figure 30 Captain Pollard, Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
The means objectives were organized into a network that depicting how the 
means objectives are important to achieve specified fundamental objectives. The 
fundamental objectives hierarchy and the means objectives network were combined as 
shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy and Means Objectives Network  
for Capt. Pollard 
 
 Figure 31 shows the relation between the means objectives and the fundamental 
objectives for Pollard. The mean objective “Neutralize Enemy Radar” helps achieve the 
fundamental objectives “Keep his Troops Alive” and “Protect Military Assets”. 
 The next step was to derive attributes to measure the achievement of the 
fundamental objectives. There are ten fundamental objectives in the lower level of the 
hierarchy that need attributes to measure the objectives’ achievements.  
For the fundamental objective “Stay Alive”, the outcome related to this objective 
is either staying alive or dead. Two additional levels are added between these two 
outcomes. The attribute “Life Status” definition includes a verbal description of the four 
levels of the objective achievement and a numerical indicator assigned to each level. The 
complete attribute “Life Status” scale is illustrated in Table 13. Level 0 is defined as the 
most favorable level and level 3 is defined as the most unfavorable level. 
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Attribute Level      Description of Attributes Level        
0        
1 
2 
3 
Alive without Injuries 
Alive with Minor Injuries 
Alive with Major Injuries 
Dead 
 
Table 13 Attribute “Life Status” for Capt. Pollard 
 The fundamental objective “Keep his Troops Alive” is specified by the lower 
level objectives: “Minimize Casualties in Soldiers”, “Minimize Casualties in Officers and 
Team Leaders”, “Minimize Injuries of Soldiers”, and “Minimize Injuries of Officers and 
Team Leaders”. A single natural attribute for each of these lower level objectives is 
available. These natural attributes imply that each death or injury is evaluated equally 
which is appropriate for the given scenario.  Collectively, these four attributes are used to 
measure the degree to which the higher level fundamental objective “Keep his Troops 
Alive” is achieved. These four attributes are illustrated from Table 14 to Table 17, 
respectively. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 % Dead 
1-25% Dead 
26-50% Dead 
51-75% Dead 
76-100% Dead 
 
Table 14 Attribute “Number of Casualties in Soldiers” 
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Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 Dead 
1 Dead 
2 Dead 
3 Dead 
 
Table 15 Attribute “Number of Casualties in  
Officers and Team Leaders” 
 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 % Injured 
1-25% Injured 
26-50% Injured 
51-75% Injured 
76-100% Injured 
 
Table 16 Attribute “Number of Injuries of Soldiers” 
 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 Injured 
1 Injured 
2 Injured 
3 Injured 
 
Table 17 Attribute “Number of Injuries 
 of Officers and Team Leaders” 
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 The fundamental objective “Protect Military Assets” is specified by the lower 
level objectives: “Minimize Total Damages in Light vehicles”, “Minimize Total 
Damages in Heavy Vehicles”, “Minimize Minor Damages in Light Vehicles”, and 
“Minimize Minor Damages in Heavy Vehicles”. A single natural attribute for each of 
these lower level objectives is available. These natural attributes imply that each light 
vehicle is evaluated equally as each heavy vehicle. This value judgment is appropriate for 
the given scenario. In the scenario, the light vehicles are the LAVs and the heavy vehicles 
are the TOWs. Collectively, these four attributes are used to measure the degree to which 
the higher level fundamental objective “Protect Military Assets” is achieved. These four 
attributes are illustrated from Table 18 to Table 21, respectively. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 % Damaged 
1-25% Damaged 
26-50% Damaged 
51-75% Damaged 
76-100% Damaged 
 
Table 18 Attribute “Number of Total Damages in Light Vehicles” 
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Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 % Damaged 
1-25% Damaged 
26-50% Damaged 
51-75% Damaged 
76-100% Damaged 
 
Table 19 Attribute “Number of Total Damages in Heavy Vehicles” 
 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 % Damaged 
1-25% Damaged 
26-50% Damaged 
51-75% Damaged 
76-100% Damaged 
 
Table 20 Attribute “Number of Minor Damages in Light Vehicles” 
 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
0 % Damaged 
26-50% Damaged 
51-75% Damaged 
76-100% Damaged 
 
Table 21 Attribute “Number of Minor Damages in Heavy Vehicles” 
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 The complete attribute “Mission Achievement” scale for the objective “Achieve 
the Main Mission Successfully” is illustrated in Table 22. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
 
1 
 
2 
Mission was Perfectly Achieved 
(Recon is Helped) 
Mission was Partially Achieved 
(Recon is Partially Helped) 
Mission Failed 
(Failed to Help Recon) 
 
Table 22 Attribute “Mission Achievement” 
This constructed attribute was developed specifically for the research scenario 
decision context. Pollard’s mission was to help Lt. Ross’s recon platoon. To avoid 
ambiguity and to meet the understandability requirement, the meaning of each level of 
the scale is described as illustrated in Table 22. For example, the meaning of “Mission 
was Perfectly Achieved” was explained as (Recon was Helped). It was necessary to 
construct this attribute because there is no natural attribute existed to measure the 
objective “Achieve the Main Mission successfully”. 
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6.2.4 Second in Command Officers 
1
st 
Lt. Scott Williams is the second officer in command of Delta Company, and 
Sergeant Gillispie is second in command for the recon platoon. Due the doctrine nature of 
the military, their decision models (fundamental objectives hierarchy, mean objectives 
network, and attributes) are considered the same as the decision models of their 
commanders. The driving forces to assign weights to the attributes and to the objectives 
might be different.  
6.2.5 Teams Leaders 
 Sergeant Mike Davis is a team leader in the recon platoon and Sergeant Nick 
Vitale is a team leader in the Delta Company. Their missions include leading, and 
motivating soldiers into action to accomplish missions. They serve as the connection 
point between the commanders and the soldiers. 
 In considering the team leader (either Sgt. Nick Vitale or Sgt. Mike Davis) values, 
one considers values significant enough to consider when evaluating decision 
alternatives. Using this approach a list of a team leader’s objectives, consistent with the 
decision context (scenario), were derived and are: 
• Stay alive. 
• Keep the troops alive 
• Achieve the assigned mission 
• Help other groups 
• Achieve implied tasks 
• Follow engagement regulations 
• Maintain a high situation awareness 
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• Minimize response time 
 This list of objectives includes both means objectives and fundamental objectives. 
Both kinds of objectives were separated by examining each objective on the list (using 
the WITI test). This was a critical step because the objectives which are important 
because they help achieve other objectives (means objectives) were separated from the 
objectives that are important because they reflect what a team leader really wants to 
accomplish. The results of the effort were the following: 
Fundamental objectives: 
• Stay alive 
• Keep the troops alive 
• Achieve the assigned Mission  
Means objectives: 
• Help other groups 
• Achieve implied tasks 
• Follow engagement regulations 
• Maintain a high situation awareness 
• Minimize response time 
 The fundamental objectives are organized into fundamental objectives hierarchy. 
The upper levels in the hierarchy represent more general objectives, and the lower-levels 
explain the important elements of the more general levels (Clemen and Reilly, 2001). 
For example, the higher level fundamental objective of “Keep the Troops Alive” 
has two lower-level fundamental objectives “Minimize Number of Injuries” and 
“Minimize Number of Casualties” that explain what is meant by the higher level 
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objective. Each of the lower-level fundamental objectives describes an aspect of keeping 
the troops alive. Figure 32 displays the fundamental objectives hierarchy for each of the 
team leaders. 
 
Figure 32 Team Leaders, Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
The means objectives were organized into a network depicting how the means 
objectives are important to achieve specified fundamental objectives. The fundamental 
objectives hierarchy and the means objectives network were combined together as shown 
in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy and Means Objectives Network  
for a Team Leader 
 The next step was to derive attributes to measure the achievement of the 
fundamental objectives. There are four fundamental objectives in the lower level of the 
hierarchy that need attributes to measure the objectives’ achievements. 
For the fundamental objective “Stay Alive”, the outcome related to this objective 
is either staying alive or dead. Two additional levels are added between these two 
outcomes. The attribute “Life Status” definition includes a verbal description of the four 
levels of the objective achievement and a numerical indicator assigned to each level. The 
complete attribute scale is illustrated in Table 23. Level 0 is defined as the most favorable 
level and level 3 is defined as the most unfavorable level. 
 
 
 132 
Attribute Level      Description of Attributes Level        
0        
1 
2 
3 
Alive without Injuries 
Alive with Minor Injuries 
Alive with Major Injuries 
Dead 
 
Table 23 Attribute “Life Status” for Team Leaders 
The fundamental objective “Keep the Soldiers Alive” is specified by the lower 
level objectives: “Minimize Injuries of Soldiers” and “Minimize Casualties in Soldiers”. 
A single natural attribute for each of these lower level objectives is available. These 
natural attributes imply that each death or injury is evaluated equally which is appropriate 
for the given scenario.  Collectively, these two attributes are used to measure the degree 
to which the higher level fundamental objective “Keep the Soldiers Alive” is achieved. 
These two attribute scales are illustrated in Table 24 and Table 25, respectively. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 % Injured 
1-25% Injured 
26-50% Injured 
51-75% Injured 
76-100% Injured 
 
Table 24 Attribute “Number of Injuries in Soldiers” 
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Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
0 % Dead 
1-25% Dead 
26-50% Dead 
51-75% Dead 
76-100% Dead 
 
Table 25 Attribute “Number of Casualties in Soldiers” 
 The complete attribute “Mission Achievement” scale for the objective “Achieve 
the Assigned Mission” is illustrated in Table 26. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attribute Level 
0 
1 
2 
Mission was Perfectly Achieved 
Mission was Partially Achieved 
Mission Failed 
 
Table 26 Attribute “Assigned Mission Achievement” 
 
This constructed attribute was developed to accommodate the dynamic nature of 
the scenario decision context facing the team leaders. Their mission was changing along 
the time horizon of the scenario.  
 
 
 
 
 
 134 
6.2.6 Soldiers 
 On the battle field, soldiers make decisions depending on their sense of the state 
of the battlefield. In fact, most of what infantry soldiers do on the battlefield involve 
varying degrees of sensing. This includes the specific functions of searching, acquiring 
and tracking targets. Accordingly, the soldier’s sensed perception of the battlefield plays 
a critical role in his decision process and resulting actions (Tollefson, Kwin, Martin, 
Boylan, and Foote, 2004). On the other hand, sometimes constraints apply to the 
available or derived alternatives which affect the nature of the soldier’s list of objectives. 
For example, soldiers have constraints on the direction of their movement as decided by 
their commander. These constraints are often problem or scenario specific. 
 In considering a soldier’s values, one considers values significant enough to 
consider when evaluating decision alternatives. Using this approach a list of a soldier’s 
objectives, consistent with the research decision context (scenario), were derived and are: 
• Stay alive. 
• Complete assigned personal task. 
• Help other soldiers. 
• Protect personal weapons. 
• Minimize response time. 
• Achieve implied tasks. 
• Establish good relations with commanders. 
• Follow rules of engagement regulations. 
• Follow military regulations for safety. 
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 This list of objectives includes both means objectives and fundamental objectives. 
Both kinds of objectives were separated by examining each objective on the list (using 
the WITI test). This was a critical step because the objectives which are important 
because they help achieve other objectives (means objectives) were separated from the 
objectives that are important because they reflect what a soldier really wants to 
accomplish. The results of the effort were the following: 
Fundamental objectives: 
• Stay alive 
• Protect personal weapons 
• Establish good relations with commanders 
• Complete assigned personal task 
Means objectives: 
• Follow rules of engagement regulations 
• Follow military regulations for safety 
• Minimize response time 
• Help other soldiers 
• Achieve implied tasks 
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 The fundamental objectives are organized into a fundamental objectives hierarchy 
as shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34 A Soldier, Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy 
The means objectives were organized into a network that shows how the means 
objectives are important to achieve specified fundamental objectives. The fundamental 
objectives hierarchy and the means objectives network were combined together as shown 
in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35 Fundamental Objectives Hierarchy and Means Objectives Network 
for a Soldier 
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 The next step was to derive attributes to measure the achievement of the 
fundamental objectives. There are four fundamental objectives in the lower level of the 
hierarchy that need attributes to measure the objectives’ achievements. 
For the fundamental objective “Stay Alive”, the outcome related to this objective 
is either staying alive or dead. Two additional levels are added between these two 
outcomes. The attribute “Life Status” definition includes a verbal description of the four 
levels of the objective achievement and a numerical indicator assigned to each level. The 
complete attribute scale is illustrated in Table 27. Level 0 is defined as the most favorable 
level and level 3 is defined as the most unfavorable level. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attributes Level        
0        
1 
2 
3 
Alive without Injuries 
Alive with Minor Injuries 
Alive with Major Injuries 
Dead 
 
Table 27 Attribute “Life Status” for Soldiers 
For the fundamental objective “Protect Personal Weapons”, the outcome related 
to this objective is either the weapon is protected or the weapon is damaged or lost. The 
attribute “Weapon Status” is illustrated in Table 28.   
Attribute Level      Description of Attributes Level        
0        
1 
Protected 
Damaged or lost 
 
Table 28 Attribute “Weapon Status” 
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The complete attribute “Relation Status” scale for the objective “Establish Good 
Relations with Commanders” is shown in Table 29. 
Attribute Level      Description of Attributes Level        
0        
 
1 
 
2 
Excellent Relation 
(Compliments is Received) 
Neutral 
(Neither Compliments or Complaints is received) 
Poor Relation 
(Complaints is received) 
 
Table 29 Attribute “Relation Status” 
 
This constructed attribute was developed specifically for the scenario decision 
context. There is no natural attribute existed to measure the objective “Establish Good 
Relations with Commanders”. To avoid ambiguity and to meet the understandability 
requirement, the meaning of each level is described in Table 29. For example, the 
meaning of an “excellent” relation is measured as whether a compliment was received, a 
complaint was received, or neither was received. 
The complete attribute “Personal Task Completion” scale for the objective 
“Complete Assigned Personal Task” is illustrated in Table 30.     
Attribute Level      Description of Attributes Level        
0        
1 
2 
Achieved Perfectly 
Partially Achieved 
Failed 
 
Table 30 Attribute “Personal Task Completion” 
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This constructed attribute was developed to accommodate the dynamic nature of 
the scenario decision context that would face a soldier. The soldier’s personal task was 
changing along the time horizon of the scenario.  
6.3 Decision Context: Decision Situation Identification and Alternatives      
Development 
6.3.1 General Discussion 
 Keeney (1994) defined a decision context as “the set of alternatives appropriate to 
consider for a specific decision situation”. A decision context is composed of a decision 
situation and the alternatives appropriate for this situation. However, the decision 
situation is a description for a course of events with specific considerations. These 
considerations might be constraints or restrictions. Figure 36 highlights this matter. 
 
 
Figure 36 A Decision Context Components 
 A decision maker must choose a context that captures the decision situation. The 
considerations in the decision situation must give the decision maker the authority and 
the available resources to make the decision. If those criteria do not fit the decision 
situation is incorrectly identified. 
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 Decision situations are created in the normal course of events and by the actions 
of others (Keeney, 1994). However, not all decisions are created by outside forces. It is 
worthwhile to transfer a decision problem into a decision opportunity. Decision 
opportunities occur because of decision maker control over the situation. There are two 
ways to identify decision opportunities, by either transferring a decision problem into a 
decision opportunity or by creating a decision opportunity from scratch. 
 Identifying decision opportunities is applicable to combat. In combat, transferring 
problems into opportunities is applicable in a defensive act, while creating decision 
opportunities from scratch is applicable in an offensive act.  
 The decision maker can take advantage of a decision problem by transferring it 
into a decision opportunity. A decision opportunity may alleviate the decision problems 
or avoid future decision problems. Therefore, identifying a decision opportunity is 
analogous to prevention, while solving a decision problem is analogous to a cure 
(Kenney, 1994). 
 Creating a decision opportunity can be established by broadening the decision 
context. However, broadening the decision context is not always possible in battlefield 
situations because of the nature of military doctrine. Military doctrine applies constraints 
to the decision makers and these constraints often narrow the freedom of generating 
alternatives in order to broaden the decision context. 
 Identifying a decision context involves a systematic process of developing 
alternatives and arranging resources and limitations with respect to objectives 
accomplishment. Working with this, alternatives development is required for decision 
problems and decision opportunities.  
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 Alternatives in battlefields can usually be defined as action, or a course of actions 
as the result of estimating the strategic situation. Taking no action is also an action; 
sometimes taking no action and waiting for the situation to develop is the best action. 
 Military objectives, and consequently alternatives, require control over resources. 
Both are influenced by the availability of resources. If alternatives are not compatible 
with the available resources, then there is a higher risk of not achieving the specified 
objectives. 
 A decision maker must determine any limitations to their freedom of action 
(generating alternatives) which might influence task accomplishment (Achieving 
objectives). These limitations are constraints. There are two kinds of constraints, either 
restrictions on resources, or restrictions on the types of alternatives. In a battlefield, the 
restrictions on resources are barriers like lack of time, troops, weapons, or supplies. The 
restrictions on the type of alternatives include doctrinal considerations. An example is 
reconnaissance is not allowed beyond the forward line of troops before midnight. In 
battlefield, restrictions on resources limit what a decision maker can do, while restrictions 
on the types of alternatives are things the decision maker can not do. 
6.3.2 Scenario Decision Contexts 
 Four decision situations, and their related considerations, were generated based on 
the battle of Khafji scenario. The considerations were used to clarify the limitations and 
constraints of the scenario. A set of alternatives was then developed for each decision 
situation based on the values of the decision maker and the considerations of the decision 
situation. Keeney (1994) suggested guidelines to aid developing alternatives. The 
principle was to develop alternatives that best achieve the decision maker values 
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specified for the decision context. Each alternative was developed exhibiting the 
following characteristics: 
• Feasibility: each alternative must consider and comply with the constraints of the 
decision situation. 
• Usability: each alternative must (potentially) perform well with respect to the 
objectives in the decision model. 
 Each decision situation along with its alternatives shaped a decision context for 
each different decision problem. There are four decision contexts considered. 
Decision Context 1: 
Decision maker: Lt. Ross, commander of recon platoon. 
Location: The Berm (Recon platoon location). 
Time: 8:45 P.M.  
Decision situation: at 8:10 P.M. Ross saw enemy tanks heading toward the border. He 
tried to communicate with headquarters but failed. At 8:20 P.M. he found out that the 
enemy was jamming their communication capabilities. He tried to repair the radio but it 
didn’t work. 
Considerations:  
• The recon platoon consisted of four Humvees and a five-ton truck. 
• The recon platoon mission was to observe and report any enemy activity, and to 
evacuate the area with utmost haste if threatened by a large enough force, where it 
is Ross’s call to assess the threat level. 
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• The geography of the platoon location provides a distinct disadvantage; forces 
approaching the platoon have the benefit of being in a position to fire down upon 
them. 
Alternatives: 
• Escape and try to restore communication capability. 
• Wait and try to restore communication capability. 
• Pull back to horse-shoe berm and try to restore communication capability. 
• Pull back to horse-shoe berm and try to restore communication capability. If 
communication is not restored, send some soldiers back to Delta team. 
Decision Situation 2: 
Decision makers: Sergeant Mike Davis, Team Leader 
       L. Corporal Anderson, Soldier 
       Sergeant Luis Bench, Soldier.                  
Location: The Berm (Recon platoon location). 
Time: 9:00 P.M. 
Decision situation: Sergeant Davis received a signal to engage (Wrong interpretation). L. 
Corporal Anderson and Sergeant Luis Bench are in his team. 
Considerations:  
• The signal was to pull back to the horse-shoe berm, but Sergeant Davis 
misinterpreted the signal.  
Alternatives for Sergeant Mike Davis:  
• Engage the enemy. 
• Do not engage the enemy. 
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Alternatives for L. Corporal Anderson and Sergeant Luis Bench considering that 
Sergeant Mike Davis the team Leader gave the signal to engage: 
• Engage the enemy 
• Do not engage the enemy. 
Decision Situation 3: 
Decision maker: Captain Roger “Rock” Pollard, Commander of Delta Company. 
Location: 3.7 miles away from recon platoon. 
Time: 9:07 P.M. 
Situation: Lt. William reported to Capt. Pollard that recon platoon was under fire and had 
requested Delta’s assistance. 
Considerations: 
• The Company consists of 19 LAVs and 10 TOWs. 
• TOWs had the capability to destroy vehicles out to 3,750 meters. The longest 
range for enemy tanks was 3,000 meters. 
• Pollard had no idea of recon’s deposition (number of soldiers and vehicles). 
• Pollard had no idea that recon managed to get air support. 
Alternatives: 
• Call and wait for air support then move to help recon. 
• Move up the company and help recon with the uncertainty of recon disposition. 
• Figure out recon’s disposition, and then move up the required soldiers and 
vehicles to help them. 
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Decision Situation 4: 
Decision maker: Sergeant Nick Vitale, TOWs team leader. 
Location: 3.5 miles away from recon platoon. 
Time: 9:15 P.M. 
Situation: Joshua Brierly, the TOW gunner for Green 1 reported an enemy tank 1.8 miles 
(2900 meters) away from him. Joshua’s vehicle commander reported to Vitale and 
requested permission to engage. At 9:18 P.M. Joshua’s vehicle commander requested 
permission to engage again. 
Considerations: 
• The plan was to stay on safe distance and use Vitale’s TOWs to destroy the 
enemy tanks. 
• Vitale considered how the enemies were 6,000 meters away at one minute and 
then somewhere less than 3,000 meters the next minute. 
• Vitale considered that if the target is an object in the desert rather than an enemy 
vehicle, firing at it might lead the enemy to observe their movement to the berm. 
• Vitale knew Brierly as a good soldier and one of the best in the group at armor 
identification. 
Alternatives: 
• Ignore Joshua and wait for further situation development. 
• Double check Joshua’s information and act accordingly. 
• Clear Firing Order. 
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6.4 Value Models 
6.4.1 General Discussion 
 Usually, a value model is developed via direct discussion between a decision 
analyst and the individual whose values are being quantified. The analyst focuses the 
discussion to elicit information about the value judgments needed for quantifying a 
decision model (Keeney, 1994). In this research, I will play the role of both, the analyst 
and the individual. Throughout the research, the entire individual’s (decision maker’s) 
attitudes toward risk were considered neutral.   
 After the decision models (fundamental objectives hierarchies, means objectives 
networks, and attributes) were defined and the alternatives were developed, there was a 
need to expand the decision models into value models to quantitatively evaluate the 
competing alternatives. 
 In all the decision contexts, there is no alternative that yields a best outcome with 
respect to all the possible outcomes related to all objectives. One alternative may be 
better achieving an objective while another alternative is better achieving a different 
objective. A systematic analysis may produce preference for one alternative over its 
competitors. Thus, tradeoffs among the attributes must be considered to determine the 
best alternative. The alternatives are ranked only if the attributes are combined into a 
single index of the overall desirability of an alternative. In other words, there needs to be 
a general structure to combine the various attributes in some proper manner. Therefore, a 
single dimensional value functions and weights were determined. 
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 After determining the single dimensional value functions and the weights, the 
form of the final value function is: 
 )(...)()(),...,( nnnbbbaaana XvwXvwXvwXXv +++=  
where aX , …, nX  are different attributes, aw , …, nw  are the weights on the attributes, 
and )( aa Xv , …, )( nn Xv  are the single dimensional value functions over each of the 
attributes. The value function scales to accommodate any number of attributes, n. 
 Using the value model (value function), the alternatives were examined to decide 
on the alternative to best accomplish the objectives. If none of the alternatives are good, 
then the best alternative is the best of a poor lot (Kirkwood, 1997). 
6.4.2 Determining Single Dimensional Value Functions 
 Piecewise linear single dimensional value functions were determined for the 
attributes of each decision maker’s fundamental objectives. Each single dimensional 
value function varies between 0 and 1 over the range of scores of an attribute. Table 31 
through Table 34 shows the single dimensional values for the attribute score levels of the 
decision makers. 
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Attribute Score Value 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.572 
Life Status 
3 0 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.572 
3 0.143 
Number of Casualties in Soldiers 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.75 
2 0.5 
Number of Casualties in Team Leaders 
3 0 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.572 
3 0.143 
Number of Injuries in Soldiers 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.75 
2 0.5 
Number of Injuries in Team Leaders 
3 0 
0 1 
1 0.66 Mission Achievement 
2 0 
 
Table 31 Single Dimensional Values for Lt. Ross  
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Attribute Score Value 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.572 
Life Status 
3 0 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.572 
3 0.143 
Number of Casualties in Soldiers 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.75 
2 0.5 
Number of Casualties in Team Leaders 
 & Officers 
3 0 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.572 
3 0.143 
Number of Injuries in Soldiers 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.75 
2 0.5 
Number of Injuries in Team Leaders 
3 0 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.572 
3 0.143 
Number of Total Damages in Light Vehicles 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.875 
2 0.625 
3 0.125 
Number of Total Damages in Heavy Vehicles 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.715 
3 0.286 
Number of Minor Damages in Light Vehicles 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.834 
2 0.667 
3 0.334 
Number of Minor Damages in Heavy Vehicles 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.75 Mission Achievement 
2 0 
 
Table 32 Single Dimensional Values for Captain Pollard  
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Attribute Score Value 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.429 
Life Status 
3 0 
0 1 
1 0.875 
2 0.625 
3 0.25 
Number of  Injuries in Soldiers 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.9 
2 0.7 
3 0.4 
Number of Casualties in Soldiers 
4 0 
0 1 
1 0.6 Assigned Mission Achievement  
2 0 
 
Table 33 Single Dimensional Values for a Team Leader  
 
Attribute Score Value 
0 1 
1 0.858 
2 0.43 
Life Status 
3 0 
0 1 
Personal Weapon Status 
1 0 
0 1 
1 0.66 Relation status 
2 0 
0 1 
1 0.5 Personal Task Completion  
2 0 
 
Table 34 Single Dimensional Values for a Soldier  
 
6.4.3 Assigning Weights 
 There are always some attributes that are more important than others. Thus, 
weights on different attributes for each decision maker were assigned as illustrated from 
Table 35 to Table 38. 
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 The weight of an attribute is equal to the increment in value received when 
moving the score on that attribute from the least preferred level to the most preferred 
level. 
Attributes Weight 
Life Status 
Number of Casualties in Soldiers 
Number of Casualties in Team Leaders 
Number of Injuries in Soldiers 
Number of Injuries in Team Leaders 
Mission Achievement 
0.15 
0.20 
0.20 
0.15 
0.15 
0.15 
 
Table 35 Weights for Lt. Ross Objectives’ Attributes 
 
Attributes Weight 
Life Status 
Number of Casualties in Soldiers 
Number of Casualties in Officers and Team Leaders 
Number of Injuries in Soldiers 
Number of Injuries in Officers and Team Leaders 
Number of Total Damages in Light Vehicles 
Number of Total Damages in Heavy Vehicles 
Number of Minor Damages in Light Vehicles 
Number of Minor Damages in Heavy Vehicles 
Mission Achievement 
0.10 
0.10 
0.15 
0.05 
0.10 
0.10 
0.10 
0.05 
0.05 
0.20 
 
Table 36 Weights for Captain Pollard Objectives’ Attributes  
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Attributes Weight 
Life Status 
Number of Injuries in Soldiers 
Number of Casualties in Soldiers 
Assigned Mission Achievement 
0.3 
0.2 
0.3 
0.2 
 
Table 37 Weights for the Team Leaders Objectives’ Attributes 
 
Attributes Weight 
Life Status 
Personal Weapon Status 
Relation Status 
Personal Task Completion 
0.4 
0.2 
0.1 
0.3 
 
Table 38 Weights for a Soldier Objectives’ Attributes 
 
6.4.4 Assigning Probabilities 
 Decision makers assign probabilities to the outcome of an alternative related to 
each attribute. Kirkwood (1997) reported general procedures and considerations in 
electing probabilities. Table 39 to Table 42 shows the probability of yielding a certain 
score on the attribute scale when a certain alternative is chosen, and the single 
dimensional value of that score. Table 39 to Table 42 corresponds to decision context 1 
through decision context 4, respectively. 
Decision Context 1:  
 Table 39 shows the probability of yielding a certain score on the attribute scale 
when a certain alternative is chosen, and the single dimensional value of that score. For 
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example, Alternative 1 has a 0.90 probability of having a score of 0 and a 0.10 
probability of having a score of 1 for the life status attribute. A score of 0 has a single 
dimensional value of 1 and a score of 1 has a single dimensional value of 0.858. 
Alternatives: 
• Alternative 1: Escape and try to restore communication capability. 
• Alternative 2: Wait and try to restore communication capability. 
• Alternative 3: Pull back to horse-shoe berm and try to restore communication 
capability. 
• Alternative 4: Pull back to horse-shoe berm and try to restore communication 
capability. If communication is not restored, send few soldiers back to Delta team. 
Alternatives 
 
Alternative 
1 
Alternative 
2 
Alternative 
3 
Alternative 
4 
Prop. 0.90    0.10 .25  .25   .5      0.95    0.05 0.95    0.05 
Score 0              1 0      1      3   0              1 0              1 Life Status 
Value 1       0.858 1    .858   0 1       0.858 1       0.858 
Prop. 0.5        0.5 0.5        0.5 0.8        0.2 0.8        0.2 
Score 1              2 2              3 0              1 0              1 
Number of  
Casualties in 
Soldiers Value .858    .572 .572    .143 1       0.858 1       0.858 
Prop. 0.5        0.5 0.5        0.5 0.8          .2 0.8          .2 
Score 1              2 2              3 0              1   0              1   
Number of 
Casualties in Team 
Leaders Value 0.75      0.5 0.5           0 1         0.75 1         0.75 
Prop. 0.5        0.5 0.5        0.5 0.8        0.2 0.8        0.2 
Score 1              0 1              2 0              1 0              1 
Number of Injuries 
in Soldiers 
Value 0.858       1 .858    .572 1       0.858 1         .858 
Prop. 0.5        0.5 0.5        0.5 0.8        0.2 0.8        0.2 
Score 1              0 1              2 0              1 0              1 
Number of Injuries 
in Team Leaders 
Value 0.75         1 0.75      0.5 1         0.75 1         0.75 
Prop. 0.75    0.25 .4    .3     .3 .4    .3     .3 .7            .3 
Score 0              2 2      1      0 2      1      0  0              1  
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Mission 
Achievement 
Value 1              0 0     .66    1 0     .66    1 1         0.66 
 
Table 39 Probabilities and Single Dimensional Values for Decision Context 1 
Alternatives 
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Decision Context 2: 
 
 Table 40 shows the probability of yielding a certain score on the attribute scale 
when a certain alternative is chosen, and the single dimensional value of that score. For 
example, Alternative 2 has a 0.7 probability of having a score of 3 and a 0.3 probability 
of having a score of 1 for the life status attribute of Sergeant Mike Davis. A score of 3 
has a single dimensional value of 0 and a score of 1 has a single dimensional value of 
.858 on that attribute. The same table interpretation is applied for the soldier portion of 
the table. 
Alternatives: 
Alternatives for Sergeant Mike Davis:  
• Alternative 1: Engage the enemy. 
• Alternative 2: Do not engage the enemy. 
Alternatives for L. Corporal Anderson and Sergeant Luis Bench considering that 
Sergeant Mike Davis, the team Leader, gave the signal to engage: 
• Alternative 1: Engage the enemy 
• Alternative 2: Do not engage the enemy. 
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Alternatives  
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 
Prop 0.8           0.2 0.7           0.3 
Score 3                1 3                1 Life Status 
Value 0         0.858 0         0.858 
Prop .5    .25    .25 0.5           0.5 
Score 4       3        2 3                 2 
Number of  Injuries  
in Soldiers 
Value 0    .25   .625 .25         .625 
Prop .4     .3       .3 0.4           0.6 
Score 4       3        2 3                 2 
Number of Casualties 
 in Soldiers 
Value 0      .4      .7 .4               .7 
Prop 0.5           0.5  1 
Score 1                 2 2 
S
er
g
ea
n
t 
M
ik
e 
D
av
is
 
 
Assigned Mission  
Achievement  Value 0.6             0 0 
Prop 0.8           0.2 0.5           0.5 
Score 3                1 3                 1 Life Status 
Value 0            .858 0            .858 
Prop 0.8           0.2 0.7           0.3 
Score 0                1 0                1 Personal Weapon Status 
Value 1                0 1                0 
Prop 1 1 
Score 0 2 
Relation status 
 
Value 1 0 
Prop 0.5           0.5  1 
Score 1                 2 2 
D
ec
is
io
n
 M
ak
er
 
A
 S
o
ld
ie
r 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Personal Task  
Completion 
Value 0.5              0 0 
 
Table 40 Probabilities and Single Dimensional Values for Decision Context 4 
Alternatives 
 
Decision Context 3: 
 
 Table 41 shows the probability of yielding a certain score on the attribute scale 
when a certain alternative is chosen, and the single dimensional value of that score. For 
example, Alternative 1 has a 1.00 probability of having a score of 0. A score of 0 has a 
single dimensional value of 1 on that attribute. 
Alternatives: 
• Alternative 1: Call and wait for air support then move to help recon. 
 156 
• Alternative 2: Move up the company and help recon with the uncertainty of recon 
deposition. 
• Alternative 3: Figure out recon’s deposition, and then move up the required 
soldiers and vehicles to help them. 
Alternatives 
 
Alternative 
1 
Alternative 
2 
Alternative 
3 
Prop. 1 1 1 
Score 0 0 0 Life Status 
Value 1 1 1 
Prop. 0.8         0.2 0.7         0.3 0.8         0.2 
Score 0               1 0               1 0               1 
Number of  Casualties in 
Soldiers 
Value 1        0.858 1        0.858 1        0.858 
Prop. 0.8         0.2 0.7         0.3 0.8         0.2 
Score 0               1 0               1 0               1 
Number of Casualties in Team 
Leaders & Officers 
Value 1          0.75  1          0.75 1          0.75 
Prop. 0.5         0.5 1 0.4         0.6 
Score 0               1 1 0               1 Number of Injuries in Soldiers 
Value 1        0.858     0.858 1        0.858  
Prop. 0.5         0.5 1 0.4         0.6 
Score 0               1 1 0               1 
Number of Injuries in Team 
Leaders & Officers 
Value 1          0.75  0.75 1          0.75 
Prop. 0.9         0.1 0.7         0.3 0.8         0.2 
Score 0               1 0               1 0               1 
Number of Total Damages in 
Light Vehicles 
Value 1        0.858 1        0.858 1        0.858 
Prop. 0.8         0.2 0.7         0.3 0.8         0.2 
Score 0               1 0               1 0               1 
Number of Total Damages in 
Heavy Vehicles 
Value 1        0.875 1        0.875 1        0.875 
Prop. 0.8         0.2 0.7         0.3 0.8         0.2 
Score 0               1 0               1 0               1 
Number of Minor Damages in 
Light Vehicles 
Value 1        0.858 1        0.858 1        0.858 
Prop. 0.8         0.2 0.7         0.3 0.8         0.2 
Score 0               1 0               1 0               1   
Number of Minor Damages in 
Heavy Vehicles 
Value 1        0.834 1        0.834 1        0.834 
Prop. 0.8  0.1  0.1 .7   .15   .15 0.8  0.1  0.1 
Score 0      1       2 0      1       2  0      1       2 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Mission Achievement 
Value 1   0.75     0 1   0.75     0 1     0.75   0 
 
Table 41 Probabilities and Single Dimensional Values for Decision Context 3 
Alternatives 
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Decision Context 4: 
 
 Table 42 shows the probability of yielding a certain score on the attribute scale 
when a certain alternative is chosen, and the single dimensional value of that score. For 
example, Alternative 1 has a 0.3 probability of having a score of 0, a 0.35 probability of 
having a score of 2, and a 0.35 probability of having a score of 3 for the life status 
attribute. A score of 0 has a single dimensional value of 1, a score of 2 has a single 
dimensional value of 0.429 and a score of 3 has a single dimensional value of 0 on that 
attribute. 
Alternatives: 
• Ignore Joshua and wait for further situation development. 
• Double check Joshua’s information and act accordingly. 
• Clear Firing Order. 
Alternatives 
 
Alternative 
1 
Alternative 
2 
Alternative 
3 
Prop. .3    .35   .35 .4     .3      .3  0.5          0.5 
Score 0       2       3 0       2       3 0                3 Life Status 
Value 1    .429     0 1    .429     0 1                0 
Prop. .3      .6     .1 .8              .2 0.8          0.2 
Score 0       1       2 1                2 1                2 
Number of  Injuries in 
Soldiers 
Value 1   .875 .572 1           .572 1           .572 
Prop. .2      .6     .2 .7              .3 .1     .7      .2 
Score 0       1       2 1                2 0       1       2 
Number of Casualties in 
Soldiers 
Value 1      .9      .7 .9              .7 1      .9      .7 
Prop. .25   .25    .5    .8              .2 0.5          0.5 
Score 0        1      2 0                1 0                2 
A
tt
ri
b
u
te
s 
Assigned Mission 
Achievement 
Value 1     0.6      0 1             0.6 1               0 
 
Table 42 Probabilities and Single Dimensional Values for Decision Context 4 
Alternatives 
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6.4.5 Evaluating Alternatives 
 Usually, military leaders intuitively assign advantages and disadvantages for each 
course of action (Alternative) to objectively and logically analyze the advantages and the 
disadvantages of each alternative against the advantages and disadvantages of the others 
(Leading Situations, 2006). This procedure does not yield the best alternative always. 
Sometimes, the alternative with the most advantages or the fewest disadvantages is not 
the best alternative to achieve the objectives.  
 Using the value model (value function) the alternatives were evaluated to suggest 
the alternative that best accomplish the objectives. The expected value was calculated for 
each alternative in each decision context using the following function: 
[ ] )(...)()(),...,( nnnnbbbbaaaaca XvwPXvwPXvwPXXvEValueExpected +++==  
where aP , …, cP  are the probabilities of the attribute level (certain outcome) occurrence 
when a certain alternative is selected. 
6.4.6 Results 
 Using the expected value analysis, the value number of each alternative is shown 
in Table 43.  
 The procedure is specified so that an alternative that has the least preferred level 
on all of the attributes will have a value of zero. Similarly, an alternative that has the 
most preferred level on all of the attributes will have a value of one. The value number 
for a certain alternative gives the proportion of distance, in a value sense, that the 
alternative is from the alternative with a value of zero to the alternative with a value of 
one. 
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 Alternatives 
Decision 
Context 
Decision Maker Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 Alternative 4 
1 Lt. Ross 0.79897 0.466875 0.896195 0.956195 
2 
Sgt. Mike Davis 
A Soldier 
0.25423 
0.38648 
0.33872 
0.2687 
  
3 Capt. Pollard 0.94161 0.90226 0.93698  
4 Sgt. Nick Vitale 0.655485 0.77749 0.69388  
 
Table 43 Decision Context Solutions (Evaluating Alternatives) 
 
Decision context 1: 
 The analysis shows that for decision context 1 alternative 4 was the best available 
alternative among the others. Alternative 4 was to pull back to the horse-shoe berm and to 
try to restore the communication capability and then send a few soldiers back to Delta 
team if communication was not restored. This alternative was compatible with the 
scenario decision; Lt. Ross ordered Gillispie to signal the platoon to move back to the 
horseshoe. 
Decision context 2: 
 The analysis shows that for decision context 2 alternative 2 was the best available 
alternative among the others for the decision context of Sgt. Mike Davis. Alternative 2 
was not to engage the enemy. In the scenario, Sgt. Davis engaged the enemy with his 
platoon.  
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 For a soldier, the analysis shows that alternative 1 was the best available 
alternative among the others. Alternative 1 was to engage the enemy. In the scenario, the 
soldiers engaged the enemy. 
Decision context 3: 
 The analysis shows that for decision context 3 alternative 1 was the best available 
alternative among the other alternatives. Alternative 1 was to call and wait for air support 
before going to help recon. If the decision maker (Captain Pollard) was aware of the 
incoming air support, so this alternative would not been considered nether evaluated. The 
best alternative in this case is alternative 3, figure out recon’s deposition and then move 
up the required soldiers and vehicles to help them, which is rated the second preferred 
after alternative 1. 
 The decision maker (Captain Pollard), in the scenario, took 12 LAVs and 5 TOWs 
and planned to stay on a safe distance to use Vitale’s TOWs to destroy the enemy tanks. 
His decision was compatible with alternative 3. 
Decision context 4: 
 The analysis showed that for decision context 4 alternative 2 was the best 
available alternative among the other alternatives. Alternative 2 was to double check 
Joshua’s information and act accordingly. The decision maker in the scenario cleared an 
order to fire even though his double check turned out to contradict Joshua’s information. 
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6.5 Summary 
 Decision analysis provides a practical approach to a quantitative analysis of 
decisions under uncertainty (Kirkwood, 1992). Value focused-thinking decision analysis 
focuses on how to study decision making on the basis of the decision maker’s values. The 
flow chart in Figure 37 presents a decision analysis process for modeling combat 
situations. 
 
Figure 37 Decision Analysis Process for Combat situations 
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 The process in Figure 37 is compatible with the five activities of value-focused 
thinking decision analysis presented in Table 2. 
 First, a generic decision model (fundamental objectives hierarchy, means 
objectives network, and attributes) is developed for a decision maker in a combat 
scenario. Then, the scenario is divided into decision situations. The decision model 
(fundamental objectives hierarchy, means objectives network, and attributes) should be 
compatible with each decision situation, or the decision model would be edited to 
accommodate the decision situation requirements. 
 A battlefield decision making is a dynamic multi-objective decision making 
problem. A future decision may depend on what happened before even if what happened 
before was unexpected. This dynamic nature is transferred to a set of static decision 
situations. Each decision situation is composed of course of events and considerations. 
The considerations might contain and capture the previous decision outcome making 
each decision situation a single decision problem on its own. 
 A set of alternatives is developed after identifying the decision situation that is 
compatible with the decision model. Finally, a value model is developed for each 
decision context to evaluate alternatives. 
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CHAPTER 7 
INFORMATION AND RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION MODEL 
7.1 General Discussion  
 Obtaining and controlling information has been, and will continue to be, critical in 
the conduct of warfare (Deckro, 2001). Information is a critical part of military 
operations, has been since the earliest days of organized combat and has continued in 
criticality through the current days of modern army. It is critically important to include 
models of combat information in designing and evaluating any combat decision making 
process and devising tactics for employment. Little has been done to establish a clear 
relationship between information and the outcome of military operations or combat 
(Perry, 2000). 
 In a battlefield, a commander’s courses of actions (alternatives) are derived after 
identifying the problem and gathering information. A decision maker in a battlefield 
encounters a dynamic information environment. During combat, individuals gather 
information from a variety of sources, other individuals or the environment, and then 
determine what information is reliable and useful, and what information is not. This 
information is an input to their internal decision model. Actually, this information 
introduces the decision situation to the decision maker. The information may be 
incomplete, excessive, and subjective. If decision makers are given false information, it 
may lead them to incorrect problem identification and therefore to inadequate or 
inappropriate decisions. Similarly, if the decision maker misinterprets the information, 
they may identify the wrong decision situation and therefore develop inadequate or 
inappropriate decisions. 
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 The value of information in the battlefield degrades temporally. An example is the 
information sent to aircraft to attack a certain mobile target. By the time the aircraft are in 
a position to act on that information, the information may no longer be as precise or as 
valuable. The information was not wrong, but temporally it was no longer precise or 
useful enough, since the target might be on a significant distance from its original 
location. This degradation process forces decision makers to make and execute decisions 
within the constraints of a fixed time frame window. The probability of information 
usefulness degradation along time can be modeled using reliability concepts, but has yet 
to be so modeled. Delaying the information can also be costly. On October 22
nd
 2000, ten 
days after the explosion aboard the USS Cole in Yemen, General Tommy Franks briefed 
the Senate Armed Services Committee. He was explaining why the Cole had been in 
Yemen even though there was intelligence that the risk was high that day. He described 
the decision making process and noted that the information was not received aboard the 
Cole until after the ship had been attacked (Franks, 2004). 
 Reliability studies are of interest to the military. The technological advances in 
equipment create integration issues as well as special maintenance and repair issues. 
Therefore, it is essential to model equipment reliability. For example, Thomas (2004) 
presented a method for determining the reliability of a logistics network for supporting 
contingency operations. The method was based on the interference of random load and 
capacity of the distribution links of a supply chain. Conditions of risk are considered 
using various assumed distributions, and uncertainty based on maximum entropy 
distributions. 
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 Although there are a good deal of research and models in the reliability area, 
current studies and models do not model the reliability of information and fail to 
explicitly link decision making and information models. This is a concern given there is a 
clear correlation between the decision making process and the information feeding that 
process. In this chapter, battlefield information is defined, a new reliability of information 
concept is defined and developed, and then the concept is applied to the battle of Khafji 
decision situation scenario to develop information models that capture the decision 
makers’ information. 
7.2 Battlefield information 
 Information in the battlefield can be defined as what is transmitted from an event 
to a decision maker. The transmitted information is what subsequently shapes the 
decision process. Since the definition specifies an event as the source of information, an 
event might be sensed directly by the decision maker whose decision problem is being 
addressed or might be sensed by another individual who then transmits the information to 
the decision maker whose decision problem is being addressed. In other words, the 
information can be transmitted indirectly or directly from the event to the decision maker.  
 Battlefield information possesses several attributes: accuracy, completeness, 
precision, and relevancy. Following are some definitions of these information attributes 
(adapted from Hamill, et al., 2002). 
• Accuracy: information that conveys the true situation. 
• Completeness: all necessary information required to cover the situation. 
• Precision: information that has the required level of details.  
• Relevancy: information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand. 
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The accuracy, completeness, and precision attributes are considered a subset of quality 
information, while the relevancy attribute is considered a subset of valuable information. 
Figure 38 highlights this matter. 
 
Figure 38 Information Attributes 
7.3 Reliability of Information   
 There are two meanings for the word “Reliability”. The first meaning is a 
common language scene of “reliable” as something that can be counted on. The second 
meaning is the technical version found in the mathematical theory of reliability and 
reliability engineering: the probability that an item continues to function as is intended as 
time passes (Tortorella and Driscoll, 2005). Reliability engineering is a relatively new 
discipline. The increased degree of complexity in technology is a key factor in the growth 
of the reliability engineering field.  
 The reliability concept assumes that failures will occur randomly over time. This 
random process can be modeled using probability distributions, where the failure events 
or the non-failure events can be predicted statistically. Probabilistic models are used to 
model many military systems. For example, Aviv and Kress (1997) presented the use of 
probabilistic models to represent Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) tactics for a single shooter. 
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Shoot-Look-Shoot (SLS) is a firing tactic which includes firing, damage assessing and 
subsequent firing. For a single shooter, the tactic represents sequential engagements 
where the shooter may occasionally assess the damage inflicted on a certain target before 
acquiring and shooting again at previous or alternative targets. Aviv and Kress defined 
effectiveness criteria for the SLS tactics and constructed representative probabilistic 
models. The efficiency of the SLS tactic was evaluated in situations where the 
availability of damage information is not certain. The evaluations were performed with 
respect to the expected number of kills criterion. 
 This section reviews literature and approaches used to model the reliability of 
information based on the available literature of modeling the reliability of physical 
components and systems. 
7.3.1 Reliability of Information Definition  
 Reliability as defined in Ebeling (1997) is “The probability that a component or 
system will perform a required function for a given period of time when used under 
stated operating conditions”. This definition is applied to physical components or 
systems. 
 Working with Ebeling’s (1997) definition, the reliability of information can be 
defined as “the probability that the data/information sensed by the decision maker will 
keep a value (the value that makes it useful) for a given period of time before it loses its 
usefulness, under stated conditions”. Information reliability is the probability of non-
failure of the information value over time. 
 The cognition of information conveyed depends upon the abilities of the receiving 
decision maker. This human process further depends on the circumstances of the 
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situation, as well as the personality, training, and experience of the decision maker 
(Shupenus and Barr, 1999). Working with the reliability of information definition 
definition, we find, it is applicable to situations where the information is correctly 
interpreted when sensed by the decision maker, while it is not applicable to the situations 
where the information is misinterpreted by the decision maker. In other words, the correct 
interpretation of information by the decision maker is a stated condition to make the 
definition of the concept applicable. Also, it is assumed that there is no deterioration or 
distortion as the information passes through from its origin to the decision maker. 
 Information in the battlefield possesses two main attributes: value and quality. 
Information has value if it adds new significant information to the decision maker to 
enhance his knowledge of the combat situation. On the other hand, information quality 
depends on the accuracy, precision, and the completeness of that information. The quality 
of information is related to the quality of the source of this information. A source of high 
quality will likely deliver high quality information while a source of low quality will 
likely deliver low quality information. 
 Valuable information is not always of high quality. For example, a commander 
might receive information (valuable information) about the location of an enemy unit. 
This information is valuable, but might be inaccurate (low quality). Conversely, high 
quality information might have no value. For example, a commander might receive 
information about the result of another battle that took place out of his unit control radius; 
in this case, the information is of high quality but has no value for the decision maker. 
 The definition of reliability of information is applicable whether the information 
is of a high quality or low quality as long as the information has value. The valuable 
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information is information that can withstand a large amount of error and can positively 
contribute to the decision maker knowledge. On the other hand, the concept is not 
applicable to information that is not valuable regardless whether this is due to irrelevancy 
or misinterpretation of the information. 
 Table 44 highlights the situations where the reliability of information concept is 
applicable or not applicable. 
Reliability of Information 
Applicable to Not Applicable to 
-High quality valuable information 
-Low quality valuable information 
-Not valuable (irrelevant or misinterpreted)  
information whether its of a high  
quality or low quality 
 
Table 44 Reliability of Information Applicability 
7.3.2 Reliability of Information Concept  
 The reliability of information addresses the probability of information usefulness 
over time. The value of the information degrades along time as does the probability of 
usefulness degrades along time. The reliability concept does not really model the 
degradation of the information value along time; it really models the probability of the 
usefulness of information along time. In other words, the reliability of information 
concept looks at the value of information as either valuable or not valuable at a certain 
point in time without capturing the value of the information itself. This value is neither 
modeled nor recorded. For example, the value of information might be (x) at time 1t , and 
then its value might be 





2
x
 at time 2t . The reliability of information examines the 
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probability of the usefulness (valuable to the decision maker) of that information at time 
1t  or at time 2t  whether the value of information was (x) or 





2
x
. 
 In this research, at any time the decision maker receives a single piece of 
information that shapes his decision situation, they are not required to rank or prioritize 
the information. 
 Ebeling (1997) discussed three requirements to determine reliability in an 
operational sense: 
• First, the definition of failure must be made specific by establishing an 
unambiguous description of the failures; the failure must be defined relative to the 
system performed function.  
• Second, the unit of time must be specified.  
• Third, the system should be observed under normal performance. 
 Applying these requirements to the reliability of information concept, failure is 
described as the case where the information is not useful or has no value to the decision 
situation. The unit of time along the degradation process is specified according to each 
decision situation. Finally, the normal performance condition is illustrated by the 
condition of the right interpretation of the relevant information. 
 As mentioned earlier, the reliability of information is defined as “the probability 
that the data/information sensed by the decision maker will keep a value (the value that 
makes it useful) for a given period of time before it loses its usefulness, under stated 
conditions”, or the probability of non-failure of the information value over time. 
Mathematically, 
 R (t) = P (T ≥ t)                                                                                                     (1) 
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where T ≥ 0 is a continuous random variable representing the time to information failure. 
For a given value of time (t), the reliability is the probability that the time to failure (T) is 
greater than or equal to that given value of time (t). R (t) is a probability and hence the 
usual axioms of probability hold, 
 R (t) ≥ 0, R (0) = 1, and 0)(lim =∞→ tRt . 
The reliability of information is a positive number between 0 and 1. The reliability of 
information at t = 0 ( ot , time when the information was sensed by the decision maker) is 
always 1, so the probability of valuable or useful information is always 1 when the 
information is first received by the decision maker given that it is relevant and correctly 
interpreted when received. Finally, the reliability of information approaches zero as the 
time approaches ∞ . 
 Define )(tF  to be the probability that a failure occurs before time t,  
              ][)(1)( tTPtRtF <=−=                                                                             (2) 
 and       
 dttdFtf /)()( =   or dttdRtf /)()( −= .                                                                (3) 
F (t) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the failure distribution, and f (t) is 
the probability density function (PDF) of the failure distribution. 
 The failure rate, or hazard rate function, provides an instantaneous (at time t) rate 
of failure (Ebeling, 1997). 
 )(tλ =
dt
tdR )(−
 .
)(
)(
)(
1
tR
tf
tR
= .                                                                                (4) 
 Since the reliability of information degrades over time, the Weibull distribution is 
the selected as the mathematical distribution to initially model the reliability of 
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information. The Weibull distribution is one of the most powerful probability 
distributions in reliability. It is used to model both increasing and decreasing failure rates. 
Other distributions are useful too such as the normal distribution which used to model the 
fatigue and wear out phenomena, or the right triangular distributions. The weibull is 
chosen because of its flexibility and the ease of controlling its parameters. The four 
reliability functions in equations (1) to (4) are expressed, respectively, as the following: 
 
βθ )/()( tetR −=  ,                                                                                                      (5) 
 
βθ )/(1)( tetF −−= ,                                                                                                  (6) 
 
βθ
β
θθ
β )/(
1
)( te
t
tf −
−





−= ,                                                                                    (7) 
and      
1
)(
−





=
β
θθ
β
λ
t
t  , where 0,0,0 ≥>> tβθ .                                                          (8) 
 Beta ( β ) is called the shape parameter as it determines the shape of the failure 
distribution. Theta (θ ) is called the scale parameter or the characteristic life and effects 
the mean and the spread of the distribution. 
 The mean time to failure (MTTF) and the variance for a Weibull distribution is 
given as follows: 
 MTTF = 





+Γ
β
θ
1
1                                                                                            (9) 
 




















+Γ−





+Γ=
2
22 11
2
1
ββ
θσ                                                                    (10) 
where Γ (x) is defined to be an extension of the factorial to complex and real number 
arguments. The median time to failure is given using the following formula: 
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 βθ /1)5.0ln(−=medt                                                                                             (11) 
7.3.3 Reliability of Information Application  
 The reliability of information concept can be used to model the information used 
by decision makers in a battlefield decision making situation.  
 A reliability function is fit to each decision situation scenario considering that the 
distribution starts at ot  (when the information was sensed by the decision maker) and 
ends at ∞t  (when the information fails or has no value). The procedure is the following: 
• Consider a Weibull distribution as a mathematical form for the hazard rate 
function and the other reliability functions. 
• Assign ot  where the information was sensed by the decision maker. 
• Assume a value for β in a logical manner. A convex hazard rate function 
distribution as in Figure 39 fits a decision situation with fast dynamic events. The 
hazard rate function of a fast dynamic decision situation increases in an increasing 
rate. The value of β that satisfies this is 2 ≤β ≤ 3. 
 
Figure 39 Convex Hazard Rate Function 
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 A convex hazard rate function distribution as in Figure 40 fits a decision situation 
with slower, more stable events. The hazard rate function of a slower decision situation 
increases in a decreasing rate. The value of β that satisfies this is 1< β <2. 
 
Figure 40 Concave Hazard Rate Function 
 Table 45 adapted from (Ebeling, 1997) summarizes the effect of varied values of 
β on the failure rate distribution. 
Event Property 
0< β <1 Decreasing failure rate 
β =1 
Exponential distribution 
Constant Failure Rate 
1< β <2 
Increasing failure rate 
(Concave) 
β =2 Rayleigh distribution 
β >2 
Increasing failure rate 
(Convex) 
3≤ β ≤4 
Increasing failure rate, Approaches 
normal distribution 
 
Table 45 Weibull Shape Parameter effects 
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• Assume a ∞t , where the reliability of information is almost zero, as the time when 
the information have no value, and then find the corresponding value of theta (θ) 
using the following equation: 
  
{ } β
θ
1
))(( ∞
∞
−
=
tRLn
t
                                                                               (12) 
 Equation (12) is derived from equation (5). 
• Using the values of β and θ, fit the reliability distributions.   
7.4 Reliability of Information Modeling 
 Decision makers can assign values for beta (β) and theta (θ). The parameters 
values should be assigned via a direct discussion between the analyst and the decision 
maker. The analyst should focus the discussion to elicit information about the values of 
the parameters; β and θ. The decision maker might not be aware of the nature or the 
meaning of θ and β as distribution parameters. The following are questions that might be 
asked by the analyst to aid in eliciting the parameters values from the decision maker. 
 To find the value of β, the analyst can ask the direct question “Do you expect the 
events to be of a fast dynamic nature or of a slow stable nature?”. The answer to this 
question assigns the value range of β. The answer to this question is subjective, so a 
constructed attribute of the nature of events might be helpful. 
 To find the value of θ, the decision maker has to estimate the time when the 
information fails; the information no longer has value. Using this time in equation (12) 
yields θ. The information failure should occur when the decision maker believes the 
information in no longer helpful as a means to achieve his objectives. The question for 
the decision maker might be “After how many units of time, you expect that the 
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information will have no value with respect to your objectives?” In order to assign the 
value of θ, first assign the failure time according to a base line case. A base line case is 
the case where no action is taken in response to the information sensed or received. 
Practically, the decision maker should assign the failure time considering that no action 
or course of actions was taken after the information was sensed. 
7.5 Reliability of Information Models 
 The reliability of information concept can be applied to model the information for 
the decision makers in the battle of Khafji scenario. Usually the reliability of information 
model is developed via direct discussion between the decision maker and a decision 
analyst. In this research, I will play the role of both, the analyst and the decision maker. 
The framework of assigning the parameters to develop the reliability of information 
models was personal military conceptual experience.  
 While developing the reliability of information model for each decision maker in 
each decision situation, the information is illustrated, the time unit is specified, and the 
reliability of information conceptual conditions are considered. 
Decision Situation 1: 
Decision maker: Lt. Ross, commander of recon platoon. 
Location: The Berm (Recon platoon location). 
Decision situation: At 8:10 P.M. Ross saw enemy tanks heading toward the border. He 
tried to communicate with headquarters but failed. At 8:20 P.M. he found out that the 
enemy was jamming their communication capabilities. He tried to repair the radio but it 
still did not work. 
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Considerations:  
• The recon platoon consisted of four Humvees and a five-ton truck. 
• The recon platoon mission was to observe and report any enemy activity, and to 
evacuate the area with utmost haste if threatened by a large enough force. It was 
Ross’s call to assess the threat level. 
• The geography of the platoon location provided a distinct disadvantage; forces 
approaching the platoon will have the benefit of being in a position to fire down 
upon them. 
Information: Enemy tanks were heading toward the border while the communication 
capabilities were not available (Valuable information / High quality). 
Time Unit: minutes. 
ot  = 0 minutes (8:20 P.M.) 
∞t  = 80 minutes (9:40 P.M.) 
β = 1.5 
Assume R (80) = 0.009. Since the Weibull distribution reaches zero at infinite, 0.9% is 
considered significantly close to 0% in terms of reliability, but is by no means a unique 
choice. 
Solving for θ: 
 
{ } β
θ
1
))(( tRLn
t
−
=  = 
( ){ } 5.11009.0
80
Ln−
= 28.5 minutes. 
The mathematical form of the reliability of information is: 
 
5.1)5.28/()( tetR −= . 
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Figure 41 displays the reliability of information function R (t) for decision situation 1. 
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Figure 41 R (t) for Decision Situation 1 
 The mathematical form of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the 
failure distribution, F (t), is: 
 
5.1)5.28/(1)( tetF −−= . 
Figure 42 displays the cumulative distribution function F (t) for decision situation 1. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 20 40 60 80
Time 
F
(t
)
 
 
Figure 42 F (t) for decision situation 1 
 The mathematical form of the probability density function (PDF) of the failure 
distribution, f (t), is: 
 
5.1)5.28/(
5.0
5.285.1
5.28
)( te
t
tf −
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

−= . 
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Figure 43 displays the probability density function f (t) for decision situation 1. 
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Figure 43 f (t) for decision situation 1 
 The mathematical form of the hazard rate function λ (t) is: 
 
5.0
5.285.28
5.1
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t
tλ . 
Figure 44 displays the hazard rate function λ (t) for decision situation 1. 
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Figure 44 λ (t) for decision situation 1 
 The mean time to failure is: 
 MTTF= 





+Γ
β
θ
1
1 = 25.7445 minutes. 
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 The failure distribution variance is: 
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 Another measure of central tendency of the failure distribution is the median time 
to failure: 
 βθ /1)5.0ln(−=medt = 22.295 minutes 
Decision Situation 2: 
Decision makers: Sergeant Mike Davis, Team Leader 
Location: The Berm (Recon platoon location). 
Decision situation: Sergeant Davis received a signal to engage (Wrong interpretation).  
L. Corporal Anderson and Sergeant Bench were in his team. 
Considerations:  
• The signal was to pull back to the horse-shoe berm, but Sergeant Davis 
misinterpreted the signal. 
Information: The information was in the form of a signal to pull back to the berm.  
 The decision maker (Sergeant Mike Davis) misinterpreted the information so the 
reliability of information concept is not applicable to model this information. 
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Decision Situation 3: 
Decision maker: Captain Roger “Rock” Pollard, Commander of Delta Company. 
Location: 3.7 miles away from recon platoon. 
Situation: At 9:07 P.M. Lt. William reported to Capt. Pollard that recon platoon was 
under fire and requested Delta’s assistance. 
Considerations: 
• The Company consisted of 19 LAVs and 10 TOWs. 
• TOWs had the capability to destroy vehicles out to 3,750 meters. The longest 
range for enemy tanks was 3,000 meters. 
• Pollard had no idea of recon’s deposition (number of soldiers and vehicles). 
• Pollard had no idea that recon managed to get air support. 
Information: Recon platoon is under fire, and had requested Delta’s assistance (Valuable 
information / less quality). 
Time Unit: minutes. 
ot  = 0 minutes (9:07 P.M.) 
∞t  = 30 minutes (9:37 P.M.) 
β = 2.5 
Assume R (30) = 0.009 
Solving for θ: 
 
{ } β
θ
1
))(( tRLn
t
−
=  = 
( ){ } 5.21009.0
30
Ln−
= 16.14 minutes. 
The mathematical form of the reliability of information is: 
 
5.2)14.16/()( tetR −= . 
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Figure 45 displays the reliability of information function R (t) for decision situation 3. 
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Figure 45 R (t) for decision situation 3 
 The mathematical form of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the 
failure distribution, F (t), is: 
 
5.2)14.16/(1)( tetF −−= . 
Figure 46 displays the cumulative distribution function F (t) for decision situation 3. 
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Figure 46 F (t) for decision situation 3 
 The mathematical form of the probability density function (PDF) of the failure 
distribution, f (t), is: 
 
5.2)14.16/(
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14.16
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t
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


−= . 
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Figure 47 displays the probability density function f (t) for decision situation 3. 
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Figure 47 f (t) for decision situation 3 
 The mathematical form of the hazard rate function λ (t) is: 
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Figure 48 displays the hazard rate function λ (t) for decision situation 3. 
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Figure 48 λ (t) for decision situation 3 
The mean time to failure is: 
 MTTF= 





+Γ
β
θ
1
1 = 14.32 minutes. 
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 The failure distribution variance is: 
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 Another measure of central tendency of the failure distribution is the median time 
to failure: 
 βθ /1)5.0ln(−=medt = 13.9391 minutes. 
Decision Situation 4: 
Decision maker: Sergeant Vitale, TOWs team leader. 
Location: 3.5 miles away from recon platoon. 
Situation: at 9:15 P.M. Corporal Brierly, the TOW gunner for Green 1 reported an enemy 
tank 1.8 miles (2900 meters) away. Brierly’s vehicle commander reported to Vitale and 
requested permission to engage. At 9:18 P.M. Brierly’s vehicle commander requested 
permission to again engage. 
Considerations: 
• The plan was to stay a safe distance and use Vitale’s TOWs to destroy the enemy 
tanks. 
• Vitale considered how the enemies were 6,000 meters away at one minute and 
then somewhere less than 3,000 meters the next minute. 
• Vitale considered that if the target is an object in the desert rather than an enemy 
vehicle, firing at it might lead the enemy to observe their movement to the berm. 
• Vitale knew Brierly as a good soldier and one of the best in the group at armor 
identification. 
Information: enemy tank in range (Valuable information / Low quality). 
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Time Unit: seconds. 
ot  = 0 seconds (9:15 P.M.) 
∞t  = 300 seconds (9:20 P.M.) 
β = 2.5 
Assume R (300) = 0.009 
Solving for θ: 
 
{ } β
θ
1
))(( tRLn
t
−
=  = 
( ){ } 5.21009.0
300
Ln−
= 161.4 seconds. 
 The mathematical form of the reliability of information is: 
 
5.2)4.161/()( tetR −= . 
Figure 49 displays the reliability of information function R (t) for decision situation 4. 
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Figure 49 R (t) for decision situation 4 
 The mathematical form of the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the 
failure distribution, F (t), is: 
 
5.2)4.161/(1)( tetF −−= . 
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Figure 50 displays the cumulative distribution function F (t) for decision situation 4. 
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Figure 50 F (t) for decision situation 4 
 The mathematical form of the probability density function (PDF) of the failure 
distribution, f (t), is: 
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Figure 51 displays the probability density function f (t) for decision situation 4. 
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Figure 51 f (t) for decision situation 4 
 The mathematical form of the hazard rate function λ (t) is: 
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Figure 52 displays the hazard rate function λ (t) for decision situation 4. 
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Figure 52 λ (t) for decision situation 4 
The mean time to failure is: 
 MTTF= 





+Γ
β
θ
1
1 = 143 seconds. 
 The failure distribution variance is: 
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 Another measure of central tendency of the failure distribution is the median time 
to failure: 
 βθ /1)5.0ln(−=medt = 139.39 seconds. 
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CHAPTER 8 
AN INTEGRATED INFORMATION-BASED, VALUE-FOCUSED 
THINKING MODEL 
8.1 General Discussion 
 Military decisions are always made based on models. These models might be as 
simple as a conceptual model in the mind of the decision maker. These conceptual mental 
models are based on experience and self-confidence. However, as the use of modeling 
and computer tools have grown, so has the need to employ quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to build better computational models of the decision making process (Hughes, 
1994). The value-focused thinking (VFT) mode is an example of these models. However, 
the VFT model falls short in capturing some important characteristic of the decision 
making process in reality, the use of information. 
 Col. Boyd in 1978 (as referred in Beene, 1998) described the decision cycle in a 
battlefield context, particularly the decision process of a fighter aircraft pilot. His concept 
of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (O-O-D-A) cycle of decision making has become a 
standard tool for enunciating the phases on which each decision depends. He models 
decision makers in a battlefield operating according to the decision structure illustrated in 
Figure 53. 
 
Figure 53 Boyd’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (O-O-D-A) Loop 
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 The Observe phase involves taking in information, such as sensor or intelligence 
information. The Orient phase involves updating of an internal model of the situation 
including noting any changes. The Decide phase involves considering each known course 
of action available to the decision maker in light of the information (or situational 
assessment) within the decision maker mental model. The Act phase involves putting into 
action the decided course of action. 
 Combat can be viewed as a sequence of different events, as was presented in 
chapter 6. To better model these events there is need to incorporate improved information 
about men, materials, and engagement processes (Hughes, 1994). A lack of knowledge 
regarding present states of a situation might have a severe cost in terms of future 
outcomes. 
 In reality, the decision maker tries to take the proper action during an event, or 
after an event has occurred. The VFT modeling captures this picture, but it does not 
capture other decision making process characteristics such as the decision maker 
assessing the quality of the information source and the reliability of the information, 
which in turn shapes his decision problem, before generating and considering alternatives 
and taking any actions. 
 In this chapter, an integrated model for capturing the battlefield decision making 
process is derived. The model is based on value-focused thinking decision making 
analysis, while assessing the quality of the information source, and incorporating 
information reliability modeling. This chapter refers to this model as the Integrated 
Model. The Integrated Model is defined, and then applied to model the battle of Khafji 
decision situation scenarios. 
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8.2 Introduction  
 To make use of the decision modeling techniques for battlefield modeling, 
information that creates a complete or almost a complete picture of the present situation 
is needed. The picture requires data regarding the weapons, modes of movement, existing 
terrain and weather, and location and motion of all physical elements on the battlefield. 
Even assuming perfect data, there remain uncertainties about the future. What is needed 
is a modeling process that considers the decision maker’s evaluation of the received 
information, and produces a methodology for evaluating alternatives based on the 
decision maker’s objectives (values) and his evaluation of the information. 
 The Integrated Model presented here was derived based on, and capturing, an 
aggregate view of the following scenario. The information is sent to the decision maker 
from variety of sources. This information introduces the decision maker to the decision 
problem. The decision maker assesses the quality of that information source. A source of 
high quality will likely deliver high quality information while a source of low quality will 
likely deliver low quality information. After assessing the quality of the information’s 
source, the decision maker assesses the reliability of that information. Finally, after 
assessing the information’s source quality and the information reliability, the decision 
maker derives alternatives (courses of action) and makes decisions based on his 
objectives and his assessment of the information’s source quality and information 
reliability.  
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8.3 Source Quality sQ  
 The battlefield is a dynamic environment where events constantly change. 
Information must not only be provided to the decision maker, but also must be rich 
enough to overcome the uncertainties and be useful enough to support decision making. 
The United States Army Field Manual (USA FM, 1996), entitled “Information 
Operations”, directs commanders and planners to carefully assess the quality of the 
information sources before its use because the sources of information are imperfect and 
susceptible to distortion and deception. The source of information in a battlefield might 
be an individual or an environment source. In some cases, as here, the assessment of 
quality is subjective. The quality assessment is not an easy process, and is not well 
defined, especially when assessing the quality of human intelligence sources (HUMINT). 
The probability distribution provides a good way of modeling the behavior of information 
along time, but it does not capture the quality of that information source. Current methods 
of evaluating information sources are subjective and require considerable user expertise 
(Noble, 2004). The assessment process depends on the skill of the individual, meaning 
the resulting assessment is proportional to the individual knowledge. 
 Assessing quality of the information source raises several issues with respect to 
the decisions the commander might take. If he suspects deception, intentional or 
unintentional, he may assign less quality to the source of information. If he trusts the 
source of information, he may assign a higher quality to that source. 
 A good deal of research to assess the quality of information sources or open 
information sources (internet) in particular is available. For example, Bovens and 
Hartmann (2001) developed a probabilistic criterion to assess the reliability (quality) of 
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information sources. In their research, they stipulate that all information sources are 
unreliable: more reliable than randomization, but short of being fully reliable. Another 
stipulation was the independence of the source. Independent sources gather information 
by observing the facts that they report on, but they are not influenced by other reports 
from other sources. Other research on this area include Pon and Cardenas (2005), 
Parssian, Sumit, and Jacob (2004), and Noble (2004). 
 The research to date, in general, considers the following three considerations 
(Noble, 2004): 
• The actual historical quality of the information source on similar events. 
• The reports consistency with confirmed facts. 
• The source consistency with the information available from other sources. 
 The above three considerations might not be applicable to the battlefield 
environment in this research; historical data about the sources quality are not available 
and are hard to develop. The research considers one piece of information at a time, so it is 
not applicable to compare a source consistency with other different sources.  
 In this research, the quality of the information source ( sQ ) is a number between 0 
and 1 representing the probability that the source delivers a sufficient level of quality 
information. The level of quality is defined as information that is complete, accurate, and 
precise enough to support the decision maker action on that information, if the 
information is relevant (value attribute) to his decision problem. The source of 
information quality is defined as the probability that the source can provide information 
that meets the required information quality attributes: completeness, precision, and 
accuracy.  Mathematically, 
 193 
 A: event, source can provide information of sufficient level of quality. 
 sQ = P (A) 
 It is critical to distinguish between information reliability and an information’s 
source quality. The information reliability is a dynamic value that captures the changes 
which might take place concerning the value of information along time, while the source 
of information quality is a static value that captures the attainment probability, the ability 
of attaining the information attributes: completeness, precision, accuracy. 
8.4 Information Joint Probability  
 Let R (t) be the reliability of information, defined as the probability that the 
data/information sensed by the decision maker retains value (the value that makes it 
useful) for a given period of time, after which it loses its usefulness, under stated 
conditions. The reliability R at a time t is the probability that the information has a value 
at time t. 
 sQ  is the quality of the information source and defined as the probability that the 
source can provide information that meets the required information quality attributes: 
completeness, precision, and accuracy. 
 Both measures are independent events. The information joint probability concept 
defines the probability that the information has value at a certain time and the source of 
this information delivers a sufficient level of quality information.  Mathematically, by 
defining the events A and B as the following: 
 A = event, source can provide information of sufficient level of quality. 
 B = event, the information is useful (has a value) at a certain time t. 
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then the quality of the information source and the reliability of information can be 
defined as the following, respectively: 
 P (A) = sQ  
 P (B) = R (t) 
with the joint probability as: 
 J (t) = sQ  * R (t) = P (A) * P (B) = P (A ∩ B) 
 This point probability sQ  serves as a scaling factor for the reliability of 
information distribution resulting in a new (non reliability) distribution J (t). The 
mathematical form of this joint probability distribution is as follow: 
 
βθ )/()( tseQtJ
−=  
8.5 Desired Joint Probability Level and Alternatives Development 
 When considering the decision making process, it is important that the model of 
that process includes the required tasks (evaluate alternatives) consistently with respect to 
the information available (fed to the process). The decision analysis model should aid the 
decision maker in taking the appropriate action at the appropriate time. 
 An event must be detected and the information must be received before any action 
is taken. In order for a decision maker to gain value from a detection and information 
received, the decision must be made and executed quickly, accurately, and at sufficient 
level. Time is a crucial factor in battlefields and must be considered in the analysis tools. 
 Decision makers differ in their attitudes toward risk. Decision makers prefer to 
make a decision and execute it before a certain point in time. This point of time varies 
among decision makers and represents the decision maker’s accepted level of risk 
associated with the level of the joint probability at that time. In other words again, a 
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decision maker would prefer to act upon the information available within a certain 
probability level of information’s usefulness considering the source quality. For example, 
a decision maker may prefer to execute a decision, acting upon information, before the 
joint probability of information decreases below 70%. The Required Information Life 
(RIL) is used to model this temporal aspect of information. The RIL is defined to be the 
time to failure Rt  that corresponds to a specified joint probability J.  
Given a desired Joint probability J, 
 JeQtJ ts ==
− βθ )/()(  
the RIL is found from 
 βθ /1)ln(
s
R
Q
J
t −=  
where J is the desired joint probability, sQ  is the source quality, θ and β are the 
distribution parameters, and Rt  is the time when there is (1-R)% probability that the 
information failed. 
 The speed of performing the mission, evaluating alternatives and making a 
decision, is critical to success. With the RIL assessed, the decision maker should derive 
and develop alternatives that consider Rt .  For example, a commander is considering a 
retreat from a certain location if no backup forces arrived to the location. In this case, the 
alternative “withdraw the troops in 20 minutes if backup forces did not show up” is more 
detailed and specified than the alternative “wait for the backup, and then withdraw forces 
if the backup did not show up”. The 20 minutes time is the RIL in this case. 
 The detailed alternatives also allow for an initial screening of proposed 
alternatives. For example, sometimes executing the decision embedded in a certain 
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alternative is impossible within the time window frame contained in that certain 
alternative. 
 In the VFT model, the set of alternatives is usually developed for each decision 
situation based on the values of the decision maker and the considerations of the decision 
situation. A principle in the VFT model was to develop alternatives that best achieve the 
decision maker values specified for the particular decision context. Each alternative was 
developed exhibiting the following characteristics: 
• Feasibility: each alternative must consider and comply with the constraints of the 
decision situation. 
• Usability: each alternative must (potentially) perform well with respect to the 
objectives in the decision model. 
 In the Integrated Model, the set of alternatives is developed for each decision 
situation based on the values of the decision maker, the considerations of the decision 
situation, and the reliability of information. Each alternative must be developed 
exhibiting the two typical characteristics, feasibility and usability, to which we now add 
another characteristic: time. 
• Time: each alternative must consider the time factor with respect to the reliability 
of the information shaping that decision situation. 
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8.6 Integrated Model 
 Research in the decision making field has shown that individuals tend to make 
common decision making mistakes. A goal of the Integrated Model is to capture and 
shape the battlefield decision making process and improve the possibility of making a 
good battlefield decision. Guaranteeing a good decision making process is the closest we 
can get to assuring good decision outcomes (Russo and Schoemaker, 1990). The 
Integrated Model is based on VFT decision making analysis, source quality assessment, 
and information reliability modeling. The model examines the process of decision 
making systematically based on how each part of the process contributes to make better 
decisions. In this section, the integrated model is defined and developed, and its 
advantages compared to the strict VFT model are discussed. 
8.6.1 Integrated Model Process 
 The integrated model provides a practical approach to quantitatively analyze 
battlefield decisions. The model focuses on how to study decision making on the basis of 
the decision maker’s values and his evaluation of the information (source quality and 
information reliability) driving the decision. The flow chart in Figure 54 presents the 
integrated model process for modeling combat decision situations. The three main 
activities in the integrated model process are:  
• Developing a Generic Decision Model 
• Identifying the Decision Context 
• Developing the Value Model 
 Each activity with its subordinate steps is presented in the following sections. 
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Figure 54 Integrated Model Process for Combat Situations 
• Developing a Generic Decision Model 
 A decision model is a combination of a fundamental objectives hierarchy, a 
means objectives network, and attributes to measure the achievement of the objectives. 
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Specify Values 
 Values are what a decision maker cares about; it is the area of concern. Values are 
specified via a direct discussion between the decision maker and an analyst. 
Derive Objectives 
 Objectives are the specific statements of something that the decision maker 
desires to achieve. Objectives are derived via a direct discussion between the decision 
maker and an analyst.  
Derive Attributes 
 Attributes are used to measure the achievement of the objectives. 
• Identifying the Decision Context 
 A decision context is composed of a decision situation and the alternatives 
appropriate for the situation. A decision situation is a description of a course of events 
with specific considerations. These considerations might be constraints or restrictions. 
Figure 55 highlights this matter. 
 
 
Figure 55 A Decision Context Components 
 A decision maker must identify the decision situation correctly and derive 
alternatives that capture and consider that decision situation to avoid type III error, 
correctly solving the wrong problem.  
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Identify Decision Situation 
 Decision situations are created through the normal course of events and the 
actions of others (Keeney, 1994). The integrated model assumes that the decision 
situation is shaped by the battlefield information received by the decision maker. The 
battlefield information is defined as what is transmitted from an event to a decision 
maker. This transmitted information shapes the decision process. The decision model 
(fundamental objectives hierarchy, means objectives network, and attributes) should be 
applicable to the decision situation or it must be changed to consider the values of the 
decision maker for this specific situation. 
Assign Source Quality 
 When a decision maker receives the information that shapes his decision problem, 
his mind processes that information automatically and without awareness of details of the 
process (Russo and Schoemaker, 1990). Assigning a quality value for the source of that 
information is one of the unconscious details that should be explicitly addressed in a 
model to avoid relying inappropriately on trusting the information or anchoring on 
convenient facts. 
 Recall the basic assumption, a source with a high quality will likely deliver high 
quality information while a source with low quality will likely deliver low quality 
information. This sQ  measure is a number between 0 and 1 and is defined as the 
probability that the source can provide information that meets the required information 
quality attributes: completeness, precision, and accuracy. The sQ  value can be derived 
via a direct discussion between the decision maker and the analyst. The decision maker 
will assign the value based on his awareness of the source situation. The assessment 
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process of the sQ should be defined at the time this information was created. In other 
words, the quality of the source of information is assessed at the time of the information 
creation to avoid complications. The complications might arise from a misunderstanding 
of assessing the quality of information instead, or by mistakenly assessing the quality of 
the source considering the distortion on the way. This number sQ  will serve as a scaling 
factor for the reliability of information distribution as shown later. 
Assign Information Reliability 
 Decision makers assign values for beta (β) and theta (θ); the parameters of the 
Weibull failure distribution. The parameters values should be assigned via a direct 
discussion between the analyst and the decision maker. 
 To find the value of β, the analyst can ask the direct question “Do you expect the 
events to be of a fast dynamic nature or of a slow stable nature?” 
 To find the value of θ, the decision maker estimates the time when the 
information fails; the information no longer has value. Substitute this time value in 
following equation to find the value of θ: 
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 In order to assign the value of θ, first assign the failure time according to a base 
line case. A base line case is the case where no action is taken in response to the 
information sensed or received. Practically, the decision maker should assign the failure 
time considering that no action or course of actions were taken after the information was 
sensed. 
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Assign Desired Level of Joint Probability 
 After assigning the source quality and the information reliability, the decision 
maker assigns the desired level of joint probability based on the risk he is willing to 
assume. The desired level of joint probability is derived via a direct discussion between 
an analyst and the decision maker. The question to decision maker could be “What the 
lowest joint probability of valuable information and the source ability to deliver quality 
information, you are welling to act upon?” 
 With the desired level assigned, RIL is used to calculate the time to failure Rt  that 
corresponds to the desired joint probability J.  
Given a desired joint probability J, 
 JeQtJ ts ==
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the RIL is found from 
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Generate Alternatives 
 Identifying a decision context involves a systematic process of developing 
alternatives and arranging resources and limitations with respect to objective 
accomplishment. Keeney (1994) suggested guidelines to help in developing alternatives. 
The principle underlying the guidelines is to develop alternatives that best achieve the 
decision maker values specified for the decision context. These alternatives should now 
also account for the time values associated with the required level of information joint 
probability specified by the decision maker. The result is a set of alternatives that best 
achieve the decision maker values, and detailed enough to include the time factor. 
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Initial Evaluation 
 The set of generated alternatives allow for an initial evaluation of alternatives 
based on the applicability of the time window frame for the action proposed by the 
alternative. 
• Developing the Value Model 
 Capturing the essence of the decision situation, assessing the source quality, and 
assigning a reliability measure for the information shaping the decision situation is not 
enough to make the best decision. There is a need for a systematic approach to choose 
among competing alternatives. A value model helps clarify any complex matter related to 
values. A value model v assigns a number v(x) to each consequence x = (x1,…, xN), where 
xi  is a level of attribute Xi measuring objective Oi . This number, v(x), measures the 
desirability of the consequences of an alternative and can be used to evaluate and choose 
among the alternatives. The next three steps are essential in building a value model. 
Determine Single Dimensional Value Functions 
 Specify the value increments between the attribute levels. The value increment 
refers to the degree to which the decision maker prefers high levels on an attribute scale 
to the lower levels on that attribute scale. 
Assign Weights 
 In reality, not all attributes are of equal importance. Weights are used to highlight 
this difference. The weight of an attribute is equal to the increment in value of moving 
the level on that attribute between its least preferred level to its most preferred level. 
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Assign Probabilities 
 Before eliciting probability values to each possible level (outcome) in all the 
different attributes in the decision problem, it is helpful to organize the different 
attributes’ levels into an event space. Kirkwood (1997) presents procedures for 
determining and eliciting probabilities from decision makers. 
Evaluate Alternatives 
 The decision model defines what is important to the decision maker. The value 
model (value function) measures, and ranks, each alternative with respect to the decision 
model. After determining the single dimensional value functions and the weights, the 
form of the final value function becomes: 
 v (Xa, Xb, Xc) = wa va(Xa) + wb vb(Xb) + wc vc(Xc) 
where Xa, Xb, and Xc are different attributes, wa, wb, and wb are the weights on the three 
attributes, and va(Xa), vb(Xb), and vc(Xc) are the single dimensional value functions over 
each of the three attributes. The value function scales to accommodate any number of 
attributes beyond the three shown in the example. 
 To determine the expected value for each alternative in a decision problem, the 
value function is calculated as: 
 Expected value for an alternative = E [wa va(Xa) + wb vb(Xb) + wc vc(Xc)] 
8.6.2 Integrated Model Advantages 
 There is a clear correlation between the decision making process and the value of 
information feeding that process. In the battlefield, the decision maker decides to take an 
action once the information is received. The period after an event is detected, information 
is received, and before making a decision is critical to the decision making process 
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because this is the point at which any potential compromise can be minimized and 
contained. The compromise may take the form of assessing the source quality or the 
information reliability. Current models like the VFT model fail to capture this aspect of 
the process.  
 In a battlefield decision making model, before making decisions, the process of 
evaluating the source quality and mapping the information value must be considered. The 
Integrated Model addresses these critical processes. In other words, the Integrated Model 
shifts the decision making process from a value-based process to a value-and-
information-based process. The model incorporates both information reliability and the 
source quality in the decision making process. The reliability model and the source 
quality are directly involved in generating and evaluating alternatives. The model 
generates more detailed alternatives, and allows for initial screening of these alternatives. 
 Usually, decision makers begin to gather information and reach conclusions based 
on a mental model decision framework (Russo and Schoemaker, 1990). Sometimes, 
decision makers fail to consciously define the problem. For the most part analytical 
models of decision makers have ignored most of this decision making process. The 
Integrated Model overcomes this lack of problem definition by addressing each phase in 
the decision problem in a systematic way. 
 The integrated model is one step towards solving the decision making modeling 
dilemma. Decision makers will continue to struggle with how to make the best decisions. 
This integrated model captures the real life situations in combat and provides a 
quantitative tool to help generate detailed alternatives and evaluate them. The Integrated 
Model is next applied to the battle of Khafji scenario. 
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8.7 Battle of Khafji Integrated Models  
 The integrated model approach was used to model the four decision problems 
derived from the battle of Khafji scenario. The same decision models (fundamental 
objectives hierarchy, means objectives network, and attributes), for each decision maker, 
developed for the VFT model in chapter 6 are used in the Integrated Model. The 
framework of deriving objectives was based on in depth scenario knowledge, personal 
military experience, military training, and doctrine documents.  
 Modeling the source quality and the reliability of information is usually 
developed via direct discussion between a decision analyst and the individual decision 
maker whose values are being quantified. In this research, the values for source quality 
assessment and the reliability modeling were derived from engineering principles, 
military doctrine, and personal experience based on an in-depth understanding of the 
modeled scenario. The individuals in the scenario are considered risk neutral. 
 A set of alternatives was developed for each decision situation based on the 
values of the decision maker, the considerations of the decision situation, the source 
quality assessment, and the reliability of information. Keeney (1994) suggests guidelines 
for developing alternatives. The principle is to develop alternatives that best achieve the 
decision maker values specified for the decision context. Each alternative was developed 
exhibiting the following characteristics: 
• Feasibility: each alternative must consider and comply with the constraints of the 
decision situation. 
• Usability: each alternative must perform well with respect to some of the 
objectives in the decision model. 
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• Time: each alternative must consider the time factor with respect to the reliability 
of the information shaping that decision situation. 
Decision Problem 1 
Decision maker: Lt. Ross, commander of recon platoon. 
Location: The Berm (Recon platoon location). 
Decision situation: At 8:10 P.M. Ross saw enemy tanks heading toward the border. He 
tried to communicate with headquarters but failed. At 8:20 P.M. he found out that the 
enemy was jamming their communication capabilities. He tried to repair the radio but it 
still did not work. 
Considerations:  
• The recon platoon consisted of four Humvees and a five-ton truck. 
• The recon platoon mission was to observe and report any enemy activity, and to 
evacuate the area with utmost haste if threatened by a large enough force. It was 
Ross’s call to assess the threat level. 
• The geography of the platoon location provided a distinct disadvantage; forces 
approaching the platoon had the benefit of being in a position to fire down upon 
them. 
Source quality: 1 
Information: Enemy tanks were heading toward the border while the communication 
capabilities were not available (Valuable information / High quality). 
Time Unit: Minutes. 
ot  = 0 minutes (8:20 P.M.) 
∞t  = 80 minutes (9:40 P.M.) 
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β = 1.5 
Assume R (80) = 0.009 
Solving for θ: 
 
{ } β
θ
1
))(( tRLn
t
−
=  = 
( ){ } 5.11009.0
80
Ln−
= 28.5 minutes 
The mathematical form of the reliability of information is: 
 
5.1)5.28/()( tetR −=  
Figure 56 displays the reliability of information function R (t) for decision situation 1. 
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Figure 56 R (t) for Decision Situation 1 
The mathematical form of the joint probability distribution is: 
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 209 
Figure 57 displays the information joint probability J (t) for decision situation 1. 
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Figure 57 J (t) for Decision Situation 1 
Desired joint probability level: 0.7 
Required life time: βθ /1)ln(
s
R
Q
J
t −=  = 5.1/1)
1
7.0
ln(*5.28 −  = 14 minutes 
 A set of alternatives was then developed for this decision situation based on the 
values of the decision maker, the considerations of the decision situation, the source 
quality, and the reliability of information.  
Alternatives: 
• Escape from the area in less than 14 minutes and try to restore communication 
capability. 
• Wait and try to restore communication capability. 
• Pull back to horse-shoe berm within 14 minutes and try to restore communication 
capability. 
• Pull back immediately to horse-shoe berm and try to restore communication 
capability. If communication is not restored in 10 minutes, send some soldiers 
back to Delta team. 
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Initial evaluation: Alternative 2 “wait and try to restore communication capability” 
should be dropped from the set of alternatives. The decision should be executed before 14 
minutes to avoid undesired consequences, which alternative 2 does not satisfy. 
Value Model: The value model is the same as developed in chapter 6, except that 
alternative 2 is not evaluated. 
 Appendix A examines the Weibull distribution parameters sensitivity, more 
specifically the effect of varied parameters values on the RIL calculations in this decision 
problem. Appendix B includes a discussion on the effects of using the right triangular 
distribution for modeling the reliability of information in this decision problem. 
Decision Problem 2 
Decision makers: Sergeant Mike Davis, Team Leader 
Location: The Berm (Recon platoon location). 
Decision situation: Sergeant Davis received a signal to engage (Wrong interpretation).  
L. Corporal Anderson and Sergeant Bench were in his team. 
Considerations:  
• The signal was to pull back to the horse-shoe berm, but Sergeant Davis 
misinterpreted the signal. 
Information: The information was in the form of a signal to pull back to the berm.  
 The decision maker (Sergeant Mike Davis) misinterpreted the information so the 
reliability of information concept is not applicable to model this information. 
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Decision problem 3 
Decision maker: Captain Roger “Rock” Pollard, Commander of Delta Company. 
Location: 3.7 miles away from recon platoon. 
Situation: At 9:07 P.M. Lt. William reported to Capt. Pollard that recon platoon was 
under fire and requested Delta’s assistance. 
Considerations: 
• The Company consisted of 19 LAVs and 10 TOWs. 
• TOWs had the capability to destroy vehicles out to 3,750 meters. The longest 
range for enemy tanks was 3,000 meters. 
• Pollard had no idea of recon’s deposition (number of soldiers and vehicles). 
• Pollard had no idea that recon managed to get air support. 
Source Quality: 0.8 
Information: Recon platoon is under fire, and had requested Delta’s assistance (Valuable 
information / less quality). 
Time Unit: Minutes. 
ot  = 0 minutes (9:07 P.M.) 
∞t  = 30 minutes (9:37 P.M.) 
β = 2.5 
Assume R (30) = 0.009 
Solving for θ: 
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The mathematical form of the reliability of information is: 
 
5.2)14.16/()( tetR −=  
Figure 58 displays the reliability of information function R (t) for decision situation 3. 
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Figure 58 R (t) for decision situation 3 
The mathematical form of the joint probability distribution is: 
 
5.2
)14.16/(*8.0)( tetJ −=  
Figure 59 displays the information joint probability J (t) for decision situation 3. 
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Figure 59 J (t) for Decision Situation 3 
Desired joint probability level: 0.75 
Required life time: βθ /1)ln(
s
R
Q
J
t −=  = 5.2/1)
8.0
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ln(*14.16 −  = 6 minutes 
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 A set of alternatives was then developed for this decision situation based on the 
values of the decision maker, the considerations of the decision situation, the source 
quality, and the reliability of information.  
Alternatives:  
• Call and wait for air support then move to help recon. 
• Move up the company immediately and go to help recon with the uncertainty of 
recon disposition. 
• Determine recon’s disposition in less than 6 minutes, and then move up the 
required soldiers and vehicles to help them. 
Initial evaluation: Alternative 1 “Call and wait for air support then move to help recon” 
should be dropped from the set of alternatives. The decision should be executed in less 
than 6 minutes to avoid undesired consequences which alternative 1 does not satisfy. 
Value Model: The value model is the same as developed in chapter 6, except that 
alternative 1 is not evaluated. 
Decision Problem 4 
 This decision problem highlights the situation where the decision maker might 
suspect that he is being deceived, so he may choose to wait until more reliable (quality) 
information is available. If he does not suspect deception, then he may act as before, 
producing different, and perhaps less desirable, outcomes. 
Decision maker: Sergeant Vitale, TOWs team leader. 
Location: 3.5 miles away from recon platoon. 
Situation: at 9:15 P.M. Corporal Brierly, the TOW gunner for Green 1 reported an enemy 
tank 1.8 miles (2900 meters) away. Brierly’s vehicle commander reported to Vitale and 
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requested permission to engage. At 9:18 P.M. Brierly’s vehicle commander requested 
permission to again engage. 
Considerations: 
• The plan was to stay a safe distance and use Vitale’s TOWs to destroy the enemy 
tanks. 
• Vitale considered how the enemies were 6,000 meters away at one minute and 
then somewhere less than 3,000 meters the next minute. 
• Vitale considered that if the target is an object in the desert rather than an enemy 
vehicle, firing at it might lead the enemy to observe their movement to the berm. 
• Vitale knew Brierly as a good soldier and one of the best in the group at armor 
identification. 
Source quality: 0.8 
Information: Enemy tank in range (Valuable information / Low quality). 
Time Unit: Seconds. 
ot  = 0 seconds (9:15 P.M.) 
∞t  = 300 seconds (9:20 P.M.) 
β = 2.5 
Assume R (300) = 0.009 
Solving for θ: 
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t
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The mathematical form of the reliability of information is: 
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Figure 60 displays the reliability of information function R (t) for decision situation 4. 
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Figure 60 R (t) for decision situation 4 
The mathematical form of the joint probability distribution is: 
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Figure 61 displays the information joint probability J (t) for decision situation 4. 
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Figure 61 J (t) for Decision Situation 4 
Desired joint probability level: 0.75 
Required life time: βθ /1)ln(
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8.0
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ln(*4.161 −  = 54 seconds  
= 0.9 minutes 
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 A set of alternatives was then developed for this decision situation based on the 
values of the decision maker, the considerations of the decision situation, the source 
quality, and the reliability of information.  
Alternatives: 
• Ignore Brierly and wait for situation development. 
• Double check Brierly’s information and act accordingly in less than 54 seconds. 
• Clear Firing Order in less than 54 seconds. 
Initial evaluation: Alternative 1 “Ignore Joshua and wait for situation development” 
should be dropped from the set of alternatives. The decision should be executed in less 
than 54 seconds to avoid undesired consequences, and alternative 1 does not satisfy that. 
Alternative 2 “Double check Brierly’s information and act accordingly in less than 54 
seconds” and alternative 3 “Clear firing order in less than 54 seconds” are the effectively 
same, except that alternative 2 gives a chance to double check the information, which is 
more desirable, so alternative 3 could be dropped from the set of alternatives. 
Value Model: If alternative 3 is dropped, then there is no need to build a value model; 
alternative 2 is the best decision. If alternative 3 is not dropped, then the value model is 
the same as in chapter 6 except that alternative 1 will not be evaluated. 
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8.8 Summary 
 The Integrated Model incorporates the newly developed concept of information 
reliability with VFT and the concept of source quality assessment in modeling 
techniques. 
The three major activities in the employing Integrated Model process are: 
• Developing a Generic Decision Model 
• Identifying the Decision Context 
• Developing the Value Model 
 A decision model is a combination of a fundamental objectives hierarchy, a 
means objectives network, and attributes to measure the achievement of the objectives. 
 A decision context is composed of a decision situation and the alternatives 
appropriate for the situation. The Integrated Model helps in generating a set of 
alternatives that account for the time values in its details. The assigned source quality and 
the assigned information reliability contribute to the estimate of these time values.  
 A source quality is defined as the probability that the information source can 
provide information that meets the required information quality attributes: completeness, 
precision, and accuracy. The reliability of information is defined as the probability that 
the data/information sensed by the decision maker retains value (the value that makes it 
useful) for a given period of time, after which it loses its usefulness, under stated 
conditions. The reliability R at a time t is the probability that the information has a value 
at time t. 
 These two concepts, independent probabilities, are combined together in a new 
concept called the joint probability. The joint probability is defined as the probability that 
 218 
the information has value at a certain time and the source of this information delivers a 
sufficient level of quality information. The decision maker’s required level of joint 
probability is used to back calculate the required information life RIL, or in other words, 
the time values that should be included in the alternatives details. 
 The set of generated alternatives in the Integrated Model allow for an initial 
evaluation of alternatives based on the applicability of the time frame for the action 
proposed by the alternative. A value model help clarify any complex matter related to 
values. It is a systematic approach to choose among competing alternatives. 
 The Integrated Model addresses the critical processes of assigning the information 
source quality and the reliability of information. It shifts the decision making process 
from a value-based process to a value-and-information-based process. In the Integrated 
Model, the reliability model and the source quality are directly involved in generating and 
evaluating alternatives. The model generates more detailed alternatives, and allows for 
initial screening of these alternatives. 
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CHAPTER 9 
EXTENSIONS TO INTEGRATED MODEL 
9.1 Introduction 
 The tremendous advance in information technologies (IT) afford decision makers 
the capability to quickly fuse data from multiple sources, make informed decisions, and 
convey those decisions to necessary units and soldiers at the highest speed possible 
(Hamill, et al., 2002). 
 More information helps only to the extent that it is used intelligently (Russo and 
Schoemaker, 1990); vast amounts of data may only confuse matters. The Integrated 
Model techniques can be extended and employed to systematically address this aspect. 
9.2 Extended Cases 
 The Integrated Model assumes that each piece of information shapes the decision 
situation of a decision maker. In other words, the Integrated Model examines a snapshot 
picture of the situation. The decision situations in the battle of Khafji scenario were 
compatible with that assumption. In this chapter, the Integrated Model techniques are 
briefly discussed while relaxing that assumption. Figure 62 presents different cases 
beyond the single piece of information case. Each case is discussed with respect to the 
employment of the Integrated Model techniques. These discussions set the direction for 
further research in this area.   
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Figure 62 Extended Cases 
 The different cases in Figure 62 assume receipt of valuable information by the 
decision maker. Figure 62 distinguishes between two main cases: two pieces of 
information received at different times, and two pieces of information received at the 
same time. In Figure 62, the relevancy attribute, when two pieces of information are 
received at different times, refers to the relevancy of the new information to the decision 
situation as shaped by the past information. When two pieces of information are received 
at the same time, the relevancy attribute refers to the relevancy between the two pieces of 
information.  
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9.2.1 New Information / Same Source / Related to Old Information / Agreement 
 If new information agrees with old information and is received from the same 
source and the same source quality 
sQ , then the Integrated Model remains the same.  
 If the assessed source quality 
sQ  of the new information is better than the 
assessed source quality 
sQ  for the old information, then the RIL is longer. Similarly, if 
the assessed source quality 
sQ  of the new information is less than the assessed source 
quality 
sQ  for the old information, then the RIL is shorter. This aspect might have a 
critical effect over the alternative details whether this primary alternative, derived for the 
old decision situation, was executed or not. If the primary alternative was not executed, 
the alternative is edited to adopt the new RIL. Similarly if the primary alternative was 
executed, any second phase of the alternative is updated with the new RIL. 
9.2.2 New Information / Same Source / Related to Old Information / Contradiction 
 When new information, from the same source as the old information, is received 
contradicting the old information, the Integrated Model techniques are employed based 
on the execution situation of the primary alternative which was derived for the decision 
situation shaped by the old information. 
 If the primary alternative was executed, then the new information will shape a 
new decision problem. On the other hand, if the primary alternative was not executed, the 
information source quality 
sQ  value will decide between the two contradictory decision 
problems. This situation, contradictory information, is the most complicated and 
unfortunate situation because the decision maker has to make a choice between two 
decision situations. The 
sQ  value decides what situation is framed and analyzed. If the 
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sQ  value for both of the information pieces is equal, then the decision maker’s attitude 
toward risk impacts the decision rule. 
 An example of contradicting information is “The approaching enemy vehicles are 
tanks” while the old information was “The approaching enemy vehicles are LAVs”. 
9.2.3 New Information / Same Source / Related to Old Information / Completion 
 When new information from the same source of the old information is received in 
a form of update information completing the old information, the Integrated Model 
techniques are employed based on the execution situation of the primary alternative 
which was derived for the decision situation shaped by the old information. 
 If the primary alternative was executed, then the new information will shape a 
new decision problem. On the other hand, if the primary alternative was not executed, 
both pieces of the information should be combined to shape one decision problem. 
 An example of completion information is “There are two more enemy tanks at 
area X”. It is critical to distinguish between the contradictory information and the 
completion information. For example, if the old information states that there are 3 enemy 
tanks approaching the friendly troops’ location, and the new information states that there 
are 5 enemy tanks approaching the location, then the new information is in a form of 
update information, completing the old information, not contradicting it. The new 
information does not contradict the approaching of the 3 enemy tanks, but it updates the 
number of the enemy tanks. 
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9.2.4 New Information / Same Source / Unrelated to Old Information 
 If the new information is unrelated to the old information received from the same 
source, then this information will shape a new decision situation. The Integrated Model 
techniques are employed to shape and analyze a new different decision situation. 
9.2.5 New Information / Different Source / Related to Old Information / Agreement 
 If new information agrees with old information but is received from different 
source and the source quality 
sQ  is the same, the Integrated Model remains the same 
without any additions.  
 If the new information source quality 
sQ  is better than the old information source 
quality 
sQ , then the RIL is longer. Similarly, if the new information source quality sQ  is 
less than the old information source quality 
sQ , then the RIL is shorter. This aspect 
might have a critical effect over the alternative details whether this primary alternative, 
derived for the old decision situation, was executed or not. If the primary alternative was 
not executed, the alternative is edited to adopt the new RIL, and similarly if the primary 
alternative was executed, any second phase of the alternative is updated with the new 
RIL. 
9.2.6 New Information / Different Source / Related to Old Information / 
Contradiction 
 When new information from a different source is received and contradicting the 
old information, the Integrated Model techniques are employed based on the execution 
situation of the primary alternative which was derived for the decision situation shaped 
by the old information. 
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 If the primary alternative was executed, then the new information will shape a 
new decision problem. On the other hand, if the primary alternative was not executed, the 
information source quality 
sQ  will decide between the two decision problems. The sQ  
value decides what situation is framed and analyzed. If the 
sQ  value for both information 
pieces is equal, then the decision maker’s attitude toward risk influences the decision 
rule. 
9.2.7 New Information / Different Source / Related to Old Information / Completion 
 When new information from a different source is received in a form of update 
information completing the old information, the Integrated Model techniques are 
employed based on the execution situation of the primary alternative which was derived 
for the decision situation shaped by the old information. 
 If the primary alternative was executed, then the new information will shape a 
new decision problem. On the other hand, if the primary alternative was not executed, 
both pieces of the information should be combined to shape one decision problem. 
9.2.8 New Information / Different Source / Unrelated to Old Information 
 If the new information is unrelated to the old information received from a 
different source, then this information will shape a new decision situation. The Integrated 
Model techniques are employed to shape and analyze a new different decision 
9.2.9 New Information / Different Two Sources / Related to Old Information 
 If two pieces of new information, related to the old information, are received from 
different two sources, these two pieces of information might be of any combination of the 
possible relations: agreement, contradiction, and completion. The Integrated model 
techniques in these cases are employed as a combination of different cases. 
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9.2.10 New Information / Different Two Sources / Unrelated to Old Information 
 If two pieces of new information, unrelated to the old information, are received 
from different two sources, these two pieces of information will shape a new decision 
situation if they are related to each other, or will shape two new different decision 
situations if they are unrelated to each other. In the case of two different decision 
situations, it is important to prioritize the pieces of information. 
9.2.11 Two Pieces of Information at the Same Time / Related / Agreement 
 When two pieces of information are received at the same time and there is 
agreement between them, then these two pieces are combined to shape one decision 
situation. 
9.2.12 Two Pieces of Information at the Same Time / Related / Contradiction 
 When two pieces of contradictory information are received at the same time, the 
information source quality 
sQ  will decide between the two decision problems. If the sQ  
value for both information pieces is equal, then the decision maker’s attitude toward risk 
influences the decision rule. 
9.2.13 Two Pieces of Information at the Same Time / Related / Completion 
 When two pieces of information are received at the same time and they 
complement each other, then these two pieces of information are combined to shape one 
decision situation. 
9.2.14 Two Pieces of Information at the Same Time / Unrelated  
 When two pieces of unrelated information are received at the same time, then 
each piece of information shapes a different decision situation. The Integrated Model 
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techniques will be employed to shape and analyze two different decision problems. In 
such a situation, it is important to prioritize the pieces of information. 
9.3 Ranking Information 
 Information ranking or decision problems’ prioritization is required whenever 
there are two unrelated pieces of information that shapes two different decision situations 
at the same time. Different pieces of information are ranked by considering the time 
dynamics of the information and how quickly the information becomes outdated and of 
limited use. The rate of change in value over time is information dependent. In other 
words, the value of information can be ranked or prioritized according to the value of 
theta (θ) or according to the possible outcomes associated with the VFT model being fed 
with this information.  
 Ranking the information according to the value of theta (θ) is justified since theta 
(θ) affects the mean and the spread of the failure distribution. Therefore, some value of 
information degrades faster than the value of other information. Ranking the information 
according to the related possible outcomes associated with the VFT model being fed with 
this information is justified by the fact that different information has different effect on 
the outcome of a certain decision situation. If this difference between the outcome 
without considering the information and the outcome considering the information is 
recorded, then the information can be ranked according to the value of this difference. 
 Doyle (1998) remarked “the age of information is best related to the potential 
cycles of change for a given piece of information and its use”. If information changes 
frequently, then it is implied to have more impact than information that changes less 
frequently. By using this concept, information can be prioritized.  
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9.4 Summary 
 Decision makers in battlefields receive different pieces of information that shape 
their decision situations. These pieces of information can be received at the same time or 
at different times. Any two pieces of information can be either related or unrelated. If two 
pieces of information are related, then there relation might be agreement, contradiction, 
or completion of old information. The Integrated Model techniques can be used to model 
these different situations. This chapter organized and discussed different scenarios of 
receiving information in battlefields and the employment of the Integrated Model 
techniques. Further research is required in the areas of information ranking when two 
valuable but unrelated pieces of information are available at the same time, shared 
awareness between different sources of information, and combining different pieces of 
information from the same or different sources to shape one decision problem.  
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE AVENUES 
10.1 Conclusion 
 The process of decision making in battlefields takes place under unpredictable 
and rapidly changing conditions. Battlefield decisions may involve risks especially when 
there is uncertainty about the consequences of the decision. Any decision made may 
result in consequences that may affect a large number of people and a vast array of 
resources. 
 Leaders throughout the military hierarchy are concerned with ways to employ 
means to achieve their objectives. Due to the criticality of the decisions and the 
importance of deploying good strategies, a systematic structured approach to problem 
solving and decision making is needed. A good deal of research in the area of multi-
objective decision making modeling provide a means to examine how decision makers 
make choices among competing alternatives by weighting the importance of different 
objectives and then systematically evaluating how well alternative solutions achieve the 
desired objectives. This research explored applying the value-focused thinking model to 
battlefield decision making using the battle of Khafji scenario. The research developed a 
general VFT model to apply to different battlefield situations. In developing the VFT 
model, the research views the combat as a sequence of different events and therefore 
presented a methodology for dividing the dynamic decision situations of a battlefield 
scenario into a group of static decision situations. While developing decision models for 
the VFT model, the research generated value hierarchies that represent the basic 
objectives of different individuals in the military chain of command. This value hierarchy 
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might be used as a generic hierarchy for similar cases or scenarios with few editions if 
required. 
 The VFT model coupled with modern technology, particularly computer 
simulations, can provide improved training experiences. However, the VFT model alone 
still falls short in capturing all the details in the battlefield decision making process. 
 The decision maker in a battlefield also encounters a dynamic information 
environment. During combat, individuals gather and consider information from a variety 
of sources to determine what information is or is not reliable and useful. This research 
defined the battlefield information as “what is transmitted from an event to a decision 
maker”. The battlefield information is particularly uncertain. The uncertainty of the 
battlefield information depends on many factors, including the source quality, reliability, 
and age of information. This research examined how each piece of information shapes the 
decision situation of the decision maker. 
 The temporal value of each piece of information can and should be modeled when 
modeling decisions. In battlefields, the value of information degrades over time. The 
probability of degradation over time can be modeled using a probability distribution. This 
research modeled the probability of information usefulness over time using reliability 
concepts. As such, this research defined a new reliability of information concept and 
defined it as “the probability that the data/information sensed by the decision maker 
retains value (the value that makes it useful) for a given period of time, after which it 
loses its usefulness, under stated conditions”. The concept was applied to the battle of 
Khafji decision situation scenario to develop information models that capture the decision 
makers’ information. Reliability studies are of interest to the military. Although there is a 
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good deal of research and models in the reliability area, current studies and models do not 
model the reliability of information. The new reliability of information concept was a 
unique contribution of this research effort. 
 There is a clear correlation between the decision making process and the value of 
information feeding that process. Current decision making models, including the VFT 
model, do not consider information degradation in this manner and in fact fail to 
explicitly link decision making and the information models developed in the research. 
This research initiated the means to overcome this deficiency. 
 In creating models, the commander’s approach must be understood and specified. 
This model approach is needed to not only understand the actual decision making process 
but also to create better models of the process. As mentioned earlier, the VFT model falls 
short in capturing some important characteristic of the decision making process in reality, 
the use of information. In a battlefield, a commander’s courses of actions (alternatives) 
are derived after identifying the problem and gathering information. In reality, the 
decision maker tries to take the proper action during an event, or after an event has 
occurred. The VFT modeling captures this aspect, but it does not capture other decision 
making process characteristics such as the decision maker assessing the quality of the 
information source and the reliability of the information, both of which shape his decision 
problem, before generating and considering alternatives or taking any actions. 
 This research developed an integrated model for capturing the battlefield decision 
making process based on value-focused thinking decision making analysis, while 
assessing the quality of the information source, and incorporating information reliability 
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modeling. The research defined the Integrated Model in general, and then applied it to 
model the battle of Khafji decision situation scenario. 
 The Integrated Model was based on VFT decision making analysis, source quality 
assessment, and information reliability modeling. The research defined the source quality 
as “the probability that the source can provide information that meets the required 
information quality attributes: completeness, precision, and accuracy” and proposed a 
methodology for assessing it. Based on the source quality and the reliability of 
information a new concept called the joint probability was developed. The joint 
probability is defined as “the probability that the information has value at a certain time 
and the source of this information delivers a sufficient level of quality information”. The 
decision maker’s required level of joint probability is used to back calculate the required 
information life RIL, or in other words, the time values that should be included in the 
alternatives details. 
 An advantage of the Integrated Model is that the set of generated alternatives in 
the Integrated Model allow for an initial evaluation of alternatives based on the 
applicability of the time window frame for the action proposed by the alternative. 
 In general, the Integrated Model shifts the decision making process from a value-
based process to a value-and-information-based process. In other words, the Integrated 
Model is a modeling process that considers the decision maker’s evaluation of the 
received information, and produces methodology for evaluating alternatives based on the 
decision maker’s objectives (values) and his evaluation of the information. The model 
was theoretical, but detailed enough to generate a computational model presenting its 
process. 
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 Finally, in summarizing the research, this research examined a decision making 
model applicable to the battlefield space, a reliability of information model, and then a 
combined model to capture both of the individual models. The decision making model 
exploited the value-focused thinking paradigm. The reliability model captured the 
probability of information usefulness degradation considerations. The combined model, 
Integrated Model, provided a means to capture and examine the dynamics of battlefield 
decision making. Each effort represents a novel approach and a unique contribution of 
this research.   
 Time pressure and stress are key characteristics in the battlefield decision making 
process. These characteristics affect the decision makers’ performance (Maule and 
Hockey, 1993). A deep understanding of the Integrated Model can be used to enhance 
decision making and improve the ability of the decision maker to learn from an event and 
adapt to the new situation resulting from the event. It can also be incorporated as an aid to 
decision makers to help them learn from any mistakes made in the decision making 
process to better control future decisions. 
 The techniques within the Integrated Model highlight the importance of 
consistently updating the information. The lack of recent reports might reverse the effect 
of previous reports, for instance, the enemy location. 
 The Integrated Model is one step towards solving the decision making modeling 
dilemma. Decision makers will continue to struggle with how to make the best decisions. 
This Integrated Model captures the real life situations in combat and provides a 
quantitative tool to help generate detailed alternatives and evaluate them. 
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10.2 Future Avenues 
 The decision makers modeled in this research were assumed risk neutral when the 
value function calculations were incorporated. In a future research, the decision makers’ 
attitudes toward risk could be recorded where the utility theory should be incorporated. 
The affect of using the expected utility theory on the models outcome could be examined 
and investigated. 
 A computational model could be derived based on the theoretical integrated 
model developed in this research. The SIMULINK package in MATLAB could be used 
or graphical-based simulation software as ARENA. The simulations can also be used to 
generate data to validate and verify the theoretical model. Validation refers to testing the 
agreement of a model with reality while verification refers to testing the model for 
internal consistency (Clayton, 1997). 
 The Integrated Model shifts the decision making from a value-based process to a 
value-and-information-based process, by linking the value-focused thinking procedure 
with the reliability modeling techniques. Game theory studies strategic situations where 
players (Decision Makers) choose from different actions in an attempt to maximize their 
returns. Rasmussen (1989) defined game theory as “the study of the ways in which 
strategic interactions among rational players produce outcomes with respect to the 
preferences (or utilities) of those players, none of which might have been intended by any 
of them”. The correlation between the game theory and the reliability modeling can be 
investigated and recorded. 
 In battlefields, an event must be detected before any action can be taken. An event 
that is detected and classified incorrectly, or not at all, could impede the ability of the 
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organization to properly respond. A remark pertinent to the Integrated Model is that it is 
important to detect events as soon as possible since earlier detection will allow earlier 
reaction, and potentially minimize any negative impact of the event or maximize any 
beneficial impact. Detection is defined as “the ability of an individual or a system to 
detect an event” (Beauregard, Deckro, and Chambal, 2002). The relation of this aspect 
with the decision making process can be investigated. A further level of this aspect, could 
investigated and its relation with the decision making process, is the accountability 
defined as the ability to correctly classify detected events. 
 There are two versions of probability: the classical probability and the fuzzy 
probability. This research interprets the probability in the classical way; random variables 
are distinct. Thus, it is a relative frequency interpretation of probability given repeated 
trails of a battle or a situation. Fuzzy probability is based on the notion that many events 
can not be stated in a mutual exclusive fashion (Hughes, 1994). An example of a fuzzy 
probability is the probability related to the event “I won the Battle but lost more soldiers 
than the enemy did”. Fuzzy probability provides for results which are characterized by 
related functions, so a fraction of the result belongs to one event and a fraction to others. 
The use of the fuzzy probability in the decision making models and its affects on the 
techniques could be investigated. 
 In battlefields, we can not predict that the orders will be acted as intended even 
when the troops execute with the best motives what they believe are their orders (Hughes, 
1994). This aspect can be modeled and linked to the decision making process by further 
considering the probability of information misinterpretation. 
 
 235 
APPENDIX A 
PARAMETER SENSITIVTY ANALYSIS FOR MODELING THE RELIABILITY 
OF INFORMATION IN DECISION PROBLEM 1 
 
 The information reliability models developed in this research make various 
distributional and parameterization assumptions. The work in this appendix examines the 
sensitivity of the Weibull distribution parameterizations. Table 46 summarizes the effect 
of changing the value of ∞t , to change the value of θ, on the RIL calculations for decision 
problem 1. The analysis is performed while keeping the value of β constant at 1.5. 
Analyses for the other decision problems are similar and not presented. 
∞t (minutes) θ  (minutes) RIL (minutes) 
70 24.9 12.5 
71 25.26 12.7 
72 25.62 12.9 
73 25.97 13 
74 26.33 13.2 
75 26.68 13.4 
76 27.04 13.6 
77 27.4 13.8 
78 27.75 13.9 
79 28.11 14.1 
80 28.5 14.3 
81 28.8 14.5 
82 29.2 14.7 
83 29.5 14.8 
84 29.89 15 
85 30.2 15.2 
86 30.6 15.4 
87 30.96 15.6 
88 31.31 15.7 
89 31.67 15.9 
90 32.03 16.1 
 
Table 46 Varied Values of θ effects on Decision Problem 1 
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 The effect of varied values of θ on the RIL calculations in decision problem 1 is 
negligible, Each 10 minutes of change on the assumed ∞t  value, changes the resulting 
RIL by only 2 minutes. In the scenario modeled, this RIL change is likely insignificant. 
 Table 47 summarizes the effect of varied values of β  on the RIL calculations in 
decision problem 1. The analysis is performed with θ value held constant at 28.5 minutes. 
The current model uses two parameter values for β , β =1.5 for slow paced events and 
β =2.5 for fast paced events. 
β  RIL (minutes) 
1 10.15429 
1.1 11.15198 
1.2 12.05787 
1.3 12.88164 
1.4 13.63237 
1.5 14.31831 
1.6 14.94676 
1.7 15.52415 
1.8 16.05607 
1.9 16.54744 
2.1 17.42502 
2.2 17.81822 
2.3 18.18497 
2.4 18.52779 
2.5 18.84889 
2.6 19.15023 
2.7 19.43353 
2.8 19.70036 
2.9 19.95207 
 
Table 47 Different values of β  effects on Decision Problem 1 
 
 The RIL calculation is very sensitive to the assigned value of β  over the full 
range of β  values. However, given the proposed approach of using either β =1.5 or 
β =2.5, the impact on RIL is not as significant. 
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 Table 48 simultaneously examines the ∞t  and the R ( ∞t ) assumptions. For R ( ∞t ), 
the values include the modeled value of 0.009 and orders of magnitude multiples of 0.01.  
∞t  RIL 
 )( ∞tR =0.009 )( ∞tR =0.01 )( ∞tR =0.001 )( ∞tR =0.0001 )( ∞tR =0.00001 
70 24.91 25.29 19.30 15.93 13.73 
71 25.27 25.65 19.57 16.16 13.93 
72 25.62 26.01 19.85 16.39 14.12 
73 25.98 26.37 20.13 16.61 14.32 
74 26.33 26.73 20.40 16.84 14.51 
75 26.69 27.10 20.68 17.07 14.71 
76 27.05 27.46 20.95 17.30 14.91 
77 27.40 27.82 21.23 17.52 15.10 
78 27.76 28.18 21.50 17.75 15.30 
79 28.11 28.54 21.78 17.98 15.49 
80 28.47 28.90 22.06 18.21 15.69 
81 28.83 29.26 22.33 18.43 15.89 
82 29.18 29.62 22.61 18.66 16.08 
83 29.54 29.99 22.88 18.89 16.28 
84 29.89 30.35 23.16 19.12 16.47 
85 30.25 30.71 23.43 19.34 16.67 
86 30.60 31.07 23.71 19.57 16.87 
87 30.96 31.43 23.99 19.80 17.06 
88 31.32 31.79 24.26 20.03 17.26 
89 31.67 32.15 24.54 20.26 17.46 
90 32.03 32.51 24.81 20.48 17.65 
 
Table 48 Different values of ∞t  and R ( ∞t ) effects on the RIL for Decision Problem 1 
 Table 48 data indicate decreasing RIL as R ( ∞t ) decreases. R ( ∞t ) is as the 
assumed reliability of information at ∞t , which is close to zero. The more precise the 
assumption of R ( ∞t ), the shorten the resulting RIL. The value employed in the research, 
R ( ∞t )=0.009, provides a reasonably conservative approach. Future computational 
research should empirically examine the impact of more precise values of R ( ∞t ). 
 
 
 238 
APPENDIX B 
MODELING THE RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION IN DECISION 
PROBLEM 1 USING THR RIGHT TRINGULAR DISTRIBUTION 
 
 The information reliability model developed in this research uses a Weibull 
distribution. Other distributions are possible. The work in this appendix examines the 
information reliability model sensitivities to the Weibull assumption specifically 
examining a right triangular distribution alternative. The right triangular distribution is 
useful in modeling increasing failure rates in reliability studies. The four reliability 
functions in terms of the triangular distribution are expressed as the following: 
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Decision Problem 1 
 The information in decision problem 1 can be modeled using the right triangular 
distribution. The decision maker must assign the value of ∞t  indicating when the 
information has no value. Using the ∞t  value, the right triangular distribution parameter 
(a) is then calculated using the following formula: 
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 For the research scenario, decision problem 1, the ∞t  value was set equal to 80 
minutes, and hence: 
 
280
2
=a =0.000313 
 The mathematical form of the reliability of information is: 
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Figure 63 displays the reliability of information function R (t) for decision situation 1. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 20 40 60 80
Time
R
e
li
a
b
il
it
y
 
 
Figure 63 R (t) for Decision Situation 1 (Right Triangular Distribution) 
 The mathematical form of cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the failure 
distribution, F (t), is: 
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Figure 64 displays the cumulative distribution function F (t) for decision situation 1. 
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Figure 64 F (t) for Decision Situation 1 (Right Triangular Distribution) 
 The mathematical form of the probability density function (PDF) of the failure 
distribution, f (t), is: 
 ttf 000313.0)( =  
Figure 65 displays the probability density function f (t) for decision situation 1. 
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Figure 65 f (t) for Decision Situation 1 (Right Triangular Distribution) 
 The mathematical form of the hazard rate function )(tλ  of the failure distribution 
is: 
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Figure 66 displays the hazard rate function λ (t) for decision situation 1 
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Figure 66 λ (t) for Decision Situation 1 (Right Triangular Distribution) 
RIL Calculations 
 If the desired level of joint probability is 0.7, the RIL is: 
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r  minutes. 
Recall that the Weibull distribution yielded an RIL of 14 minutes. The mathematical 
distribution used to model the reliability of information can have a significant effect on 
the required information life calculations. Not only is the RIL difference likely to have 
statistically significance, the 29 minutes difference is a practical difference. The weibull 
assumption used in this research provides a reasonable first model. However, the 
sensitivity regarding this distribution assumptions means further research is required 
addressing the choice of distribution and modeling implications of the distribution choice. 
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